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ABSTRACT
Corporate Taxation and Investment
by
Eric Ohrn
Chair: James R. Hines Jr.
The three essays contained in this dissertation consider the effect of U.S. federal tax
policy on the investment behaviors of large, publicly traded firms. Chapter 1 considers
the effect bonus depreciation on physical capital investment. Chapter 2 tests whether
dividend and capital gains taxation impact mergers and acquisitions, a special form of
corporation investment. Chapter 3 documents and analyzes the business investment
response to the Domestic Production Activities Deduction. In sum, the essays find
that, over the last decade, corporate taxation and changes in corporate tax policies
have had large impacts on the investment decisions of US corporations.
Chapter I: Does Corporate Governance Induce Earnings Management?
Evidence from Bonus Depreciation and the Fiscal Cliff
Commonly-used corporate governance mechanisms can improve some aspects of man-
agerial performance, but also encourage managers to focus on current financial state-
ment earnings at the possible expense of long-run profits. This unintended effect
is revealed by reactions to “bonus depreciation,” a U.S. tax policy that encourages
xi
investment by reducing the present value of tax liabilities without directly improv-
ing reported financial statement earnings. During the period 2000–2010, investment
by better-governed firms responded less to bonus depreciation than did firms with
less effective governance; for example, one percent greater managerial share owner-
ship was associated with 22 percent less investment response to bonus depreciation.
Similarly, share prices of poorly governed firms reacted most strongly to the surprise
2013 extension of bonus depreciation. Taken together, this evidence suggests that
high-powered managerial incentives encourage earnings management behavior that is
value-reducing in the context of bonus depreciation.
Chapter II: Dividend Taxation and Merger Behavior: A New View Expla-
nation For The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle (with Nathan Seegert)
Mergers, on average, fail. A large literature in finance has documented this Post-
Merger Performance Puzzle. The most regularly cited explanations for this empirical
observation rely on managers making merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions based
on personal hubris or empire building objectives. This paper proposes an alternative
profit-maximizing explanation for merger “failures” in which dividend and capital
gains taxation increases the cost of substitute investment opportunities. In this set-
ting, “failed” mergers may be the result of profit-maximizing decisions. This theory
is tested empirically using tax rate variation created by the 2003 Bush Tax Cuts. As
the tax explanation would predict, long-run returns are 8 to 10 percent higher for
dividend paying firms following the dividend tax rate drop. This theoretical explana-
tion and empirical finding are especially significant given the enormous dollar value of
M&A activity, which in the US between 2000 and 2012 amounted to over $12 trillion.
xii
Chapter III: The Business Investment Response to the Domestic Produc-
tion Activities Deduction
The Domestic Production Activities Deduction is a U.S. federal tax regulation that
effectively lowers the corporate income tax rate on domestic manufacturing activities
by 3.15%. By exploiting industry level variation in manufacturing activity, this paper
analyzes the investment impact of the policy. Results indicate investment responds
strongly to the policy – the average publicly traded firm increases investment as
a percentage of installed capital by approximately 12% once the deduction is fully
implemented. This large response suggests that the Domestic Production Activities
Deduction, and more generally a drop in corporate income tax rates, is an investment
stimulus policy far superior to other recent corporate tax incentives such as the Bush
Tax Cuts and Bonus Depreciation.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Does Corporate Governance Induce Earnings
Management? Evidence from Bonus Depreciation
and the Fiscal Cliff
1.1 Introduction
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), economists have understood that the actions of
publicly traded corporations are greatly influenced by a separation of firm ownership
and control. Shareholders, the owners of the firm, hire professional managers to
control firm operations and make decisions on their behalf. This separation can give
rise to a principal–agent problem if the objectives of the professional managers differ
from those of the shareholders. These problems can be difficult to solve because
shareholders cannot perfectly observe and evaluate the managers’ decisions.
However, firm ownership can look towards corporate governance mechanisms, such
as threat of takeover, discretionary payments, or equity packages, to align the objec-
tives of the managers with their own. While strong corporate governance has the
ability to align objectives and move the firm towards actions that are optimal for
the shareholders, it may also generate an unintended and counterproductive side ef-
fect; strong corporate governance places pressure on managers to signal their value
to shareholders by manipulating performance metrics that are easily observable to
1
shareholders.
Evidence indicates that in the corporate context there is a single most salient
performance metric: “accounting earnings” or the bottom line number on a firm’s
income statement.1 Because investors fixate on accounting earnings, managers facing
strong corporate governance pressure are incentivized to manipulate accounting earn-
ings possibly at the cost of long-term real economic benefits to the firm, a behavior
known as “earnings management.”2
The canonical example of earnings management behavior is the delay or cancel-
lation of positive net present value investments because the project may adversely
affect accounting earnings. In addition to investment, earnings management may
distort firm financing and payout decisions, thereby depressing firm values and signif-
icantly impacting welfare for the economy as a whole.3 Thus, while strong corporate
governance may move the firm towards optimal behavior, it does so at the cost of
increasing earnings management.
Despite the strong intuition, theoretical underpinnings, and anecdotal evidence
that corporate governance induces earnings management, empirical analyses have
not been able to confirm the hypothesis for two reasons. First, identifying instances
in which managers choose to increase current accounting earnings by altering firm
behavior is difficult. Second, levels of corporate governance and earnings management
behavior are potentially simultaneously determined.
I rely on a corporate tax policy, “bonus depreciation,” to address these issues and
formally test whether corporate governance induces earnings management behavior.
1Publicly traded firms in the United States are required to prepare income statements under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Audited income statements appear on firms’
annual 10K financial reports.
2The accounting literature distinguishes two types of earnings management. Managers that
manipulate discretionary information on financial statements, such as loan loss provisions, engage
in “accruals management.” Managers that alter firm behaviors to manipulate financial reporting
engage in “real earnings management.” In this research, I focus on the relationship between corporate
governance and real earnings management.
3Stein (1989) shows that earnings management behavior can exist even in the context of efficient
capital markets.
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Bonus depreciation is a largely counter-cyclical corporate tax incentive that has been
the primary investment stimulus tool in use in the US over the last decade. Bonus de-
preciation decreases the net present value cost of investment projects by accelerating
the deduction for the costs of newly installed capital from taxable income.
While bonus depreciation effectively increases the economic value of investment
projects, it leaves the accounting earnings associated with any potential project un-
changed. Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the cost of new
investments appears on the earnings statement only as the new capital investment is
used up or economically depreciates over the life of the investment. Because the rate
at which new capital economically depreciates is unaffected by tax depreciation rules,
bonus depreciation does not affect the cost of investment on the earnings statement
and therefore leaves accounting earnings unchanged.4 This accounting treatment of
bonus depreciation provides exogenous variation that can be used to identify earnings
management behavior and test the governance hypothesis.
If managers seek to maximize only accounting earnings, then bonus depreciation
has no effect on their objective function and does not alter their behavior. Alter-
natively, for managers that seek to maximize the economic value of the firm, bonus
depreciation provides strong incentives for increased investment. The absence of re-
sponse (or under-response)to the policy is evidence of earnings management. If the
investment behavior of strongly governed firms is less responsive to bonus deprecia-
tion, then it can be interpreted as evidence that earnings management is a side effect
of corporate governance practices. This research design avoids the simultaneity com-
plications under the plausible assumption that corporate governance decisions are not
made based on investment response to the tax policy.
Exploring heterogeneity of response among firms with varying levels of governance
is exciting not only in that it may confirm earnings management as an unintended
4The discrepancy between the timing of expenses for tax and financial reporting purposes is
recorded as the “temporary book-tax difference” on financial statements.
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consequence of strong corporate governance but also from a tax policy perspective.
Use of bonus depreciation and the design of the policy itself may have to be re-
considered in light of heterogeneous response especially considering the staggering
magnitude of the policy: estimates suggest that in 2011 alone bonus depreciation
stimulated approximately $50 billion in new investment.
1.1.1 Summary of the Paper
This paper makes contributions to the corporate finance literature on governance
and the accounting literature on earnings management by extending models and em-
pirical methods developed in the public finance literature to identify the effects of
investment tax incentives. Section 1.2 reviews these literatures and several papers
that have taken the first steps in addressing the corporate governance–earnings man-
agement connection. Additionally, in this section, I discuss the bonus depreciation
tax policy as well as several papers that have addressed the impacts of the policy and
the interaction of bonus depreciation with accounting rules.
Section 3.3 presents a formal model of investment response to tax policy when ac-
counting earnings enter into the objective function. To test the connection between
governance and earnings management, I embed governance into the model as a de-
terminant of the extent to which the manager focuses on accounting earnings. The
qualitative predictions of the model are (1) investment response to bonus depreciation
is weaker when the manager is more focused on accounting earnings and (2) if gover-
nance increases accounting earnings focus, then the the most strongly governed firms
will be the least responsive to the policy. To formally test the relationship between
governance and earnings management, I impose functional form assumptions on the
model and derive a linear equation, the parameters of which can be estimated by
OLS regression. The linear estimating equation describes investment as a function of
firm governance, a tax term describing bonus depreciation incentives, and the inter-
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action of the two along with marginal Q to control for the value of investment. From
the model’s estimates, the parameter describing the relationship between corporate
governance and earnings management can be recovered.
In Section 3.4, I detail the data sources and construction of key variables used in
the analysis. I focus on two governance measures. The first follows Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003) in summarizing the corporate provisions that insulate managers
from shareholder discipline contained in the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC) database. The second is the percentage of equity held by the top executive
as originally examined by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and more recently utilized in
Chetty and Saez (2005). I construct a variable which captures bonus depreciation
incentives based on the types and proportions of capital that different industries
purchase following Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1994). Bonus depreciation most
impacts industries that invest in long-lived assets. The dependent variable, new
investment as a percentage of installed capital is easily observed in the Standard and
Poor’s COMPUSTAT database.
Section 1.5 discusses the identification of the model. With industry and year fixed
effects, the effect of the tax policy is identified from variation in how strongly bonus
depreciation affects different industries. Because there is not a significant amount
of within-firm variation in the governance term, the interaction term is identified
from how changes in the tax policy differentially affect firms across mean levels of
governance.
Section 1.6 estimates the parameters of the formal model. Results indicate that,
consistent with the corporate governance–earnings management hypothesis, invest-
ment response to bonus depreciation is concentrated among firms with weaker gov-
ernance structures. Estimated parameters show a one standard deviation increase in
governance increases accounting earnings focus by 26% relative to the least earnings-
focused firms. When equity incentives are considered, a 1% increase in managerial
5
equity holdings increases earnings focus by 22%.
The estimated results of the formal model are reinforced and expanded in Section
1.7, which examines stock market returns following the extension of the bonus depre-
ciation in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, the legislation which partially
resolved the “fiscal cliff.” Stock returns immediately following the surprise extension
of the tax policy are higher for firms which stood to gain more from bonus depreci-
ation and still higher for firms with low governance levels. I argue that in light of
the investment response results, strong corporate governance structures, which in-
crease earnings focus and therefore limit investment response to the tax policy, are
value-decreasing in the context of bonus depreciation.
Section 1.8 concludes and discusses the implications of the empirical results for
corporate governance and tax policy design. If shareholders have understood that
strong corporate governance causes earnings management behavior then this concern
could be driving the trend toward managerial entrenchment observed in the gover-
nance data. If, on the other hand, shareholders have not taken into account the
unintended earnings management side effects of strong governance, then governance
levels may be higher than optimal. That the firms with the lowest levels of gover-
nance and therefore most likely to suffer from principal–agent problems are the most
responsive is concerning. Firms with severe principal–agent problems are most likely
to make inefficient investment, finance, and payout decisions. The policy is partic-
ularly inefficient if it is only driving investment response among the least efficient
firms. However, the heterogeneous response also suggests that private firms which do
not have earnings management concerns will be even more responsive to the policy
than the publicly traded firms examined here. This implication suggests the policy




Since the 1970’s, an active literature has developed that addresses the role of
corporate governance in solving principal–agent problems of the firm. The first papers
in the literature detailed how the separation of ownership and control within the firm
affects firm behavior. Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined the impact of the agency
problem on the method of finance. Grossman and Hart (1980) described its effects
on takeover bids. Easterbrook (1984) formalized how dividend policy was altered
in an agency setting. Later research examined possible solutions to these agency
problems. Jensen (1986) suggested that the use of debt financing may discipline
suboptimal investment behavior arising from abuse of free cash flows by self-interested
managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that large minority shareholder can
overcome freeriding problems in effective monitoring of management and thereby
mitigate agency problems. Jensen and Murphy (1990) empirically explored pay-
for-performance incentives and their ability to align the incentives of top executives
with those of the owners. The general conclusions of these studies were that agency
costs were high and various governance mechanisms such as debt financing, strong
monitoring, and incentive pay can and should be increased.
More recent empirical evidence has reinforced these conclusions. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) used exogenous decreases in corporate takeover probability to
show that when managers are less subject to the threat of takeover, they prefer
to “live the quiet life” and decrease effort-intensive investment behavior. Gompers
et al. (2003) combined 24 governance provisions into an index that proxies for the
strength of shareholder rights and found that equity returns for firms in the top
decile of the index are larger than for firms in the bottom decile, suggesting that,
over time, firms with better corporate governance perform better. Bebchuk, Cohen
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and Ferrell (2009) reduced the Gompers et al. (2003) index to the six provisions
that truly matter from a legal perspective and found that Tobin’s Q, a measure of
firm performance, monotonically decreases when managers are subject to less strict
shareholder governance. 5
While the majority of empirical results have highlighted the benefits of stronger
governance, Jensen (2004) suggested that equity incentives may lead to unintended,
counterproductive consequences. Jensen (2004) considered the effect of high man-
agerial equity incentives when analysts project high earnings and stock prices are
overvalued. Overvaluation places pressure on managers to increase accounting earn-
ings often at the cost of real economic value. Jensen pointed out that the pressure to
engage in earnings management behaviors to artificially inflate earnings to hit targets
increases as management owns a larger portion of outstanding equity.
1.2.2 Earnings Management
Healy and Wahlen (1999) defined earnings management as “when managers use
judgment in financial reporting to alter financial reports to either mislead stake-
holders about the underlying economics performance of the company, or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported numbers.” In their review they con-
clude that empirical evidence is consistent with firms altering financial statements via
discretionary accountings of loan loss provisions and abnormal accruals prior to pub-
lic securities offerings, to avoid violating contracts and increase corporate managers’
compensation and job security (For an additional review of the earnings management
literature, see Dechow and Skinner (2000)). In short, managers alter earnings by the
use of discretionary accounting exactly when earnings mean the most to the firm.
While discretionary accounting may mislead investors, a more concerning type of
earnings management is detailed in survey evidence by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal
5I will make use of both the Gompers et al. (2003) “G Index” and the Bebchuk et al. (2009)
“Entrenchment Index” in the empirical analysis presented in Section 1.6 and Section 1.7.
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(2005). The authors survey more than 400 corporate financial executives on the rela-
tionship between equity performance and real business decisions. The responses show
that the majority of financial managers believe the key metric in evaluating firms’
performance is earnings (especially earnings per share), not cash flows. Additionally,
they find the majority of respondents would not initiate a positive net present value
project if it meant falling short of the current quarters’ earnings projection and would
give up economic value in exchange for smooth earnings performance. The respon-
dents described a general trade-off between the need to “deliver earnings” and the
making of long-run value-maximizing decisions. This survey evidence suggests not
only that managers might use discretionary accounting practices to mislead share-
holders, but also that they are pressured to distort real firm behaviors in order to
manipulate short term accounting earnings. If the need to deliver accounting earnings
affects real business decisions, then earnings management behaviors may have signif-
icant consequences for the long-run firm values and by extension for the economy as
a whole.
Empirical evidence from the stock market supports the beliefs and actions of the
corporate managers included in the survey. Sloan (1996) investigated the relation-
ship between stock prices and movement in different financial indicators. He found
that stock prices move in patterns that suggest that investors “fixate” on account-
ing earnings; stock prices do not reflect information contained in accruals or cash
flows that impact only future earnings. Given this fixation on accounting earnings
relative to other measures of future profitability, it is not surprising that corporate
managers manipulate earnings via changes in discretionary accruals and long-run
profit-maximizing behavior.
Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2004) provided an example of firms sacrificing
real economic value to increase accounting earnings. They examined a sample of 27
firms that paid a total of $320 million dollars of real cash taxes on earnings that were
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later alleged to be fraudulent. Shackleford, Slemrod and Sallee (2011) noted several
other empirical explorations of real earnings management behavior and have taken
the first steps towards modeling a firm that alters real economic activity to maximize
a function of accounting earnings.
1.2.3 Governance and Earnings Management
Stein (1989) suggested that earnings management can exist in an efficient capital
market and may be a function of governance. Stein suggests that short-run earnings
manipulation at the cost of long-run real economic benefits can be viewed as the Nash
Equilibrium outcome of a game between managers and the stock market. To induce
the market to predict higher future earnings, managers engage in costly behaviors to
improve short-term accounting earnings. In equilibrium, the market is not fooled by
the enhanced short-run earnings, but the behavior persists because deviating from the
equilibrium is strictly dominated from the perspective of the manager. Furthermore,
the weight the manager places on short-term accounting earnings increases in the
threat of takeover and the proportion of managerial compensation that is derived from
equity incentives: two governance mechanisms. Crucially, as corporate governance
measures are increased, the incentives for unintended counter-productive earnings
management behavior are stronger.
A limited empirical literature has tested theories related to the Stein (1989) hy-
pothesis that corporate governance increases focus on short-run accounting earnings.
Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Netter and Poulsen (1990) tested this hypothesis by
examining research and development activity, a behavior which reduces short-term
earnings but may lead to increased future profits. They found that anti-takeover
measures reduce R & D spending, an empirical result that contradicts Stein’s model
but may be driven by the “quiet life” theory of governance addressed in Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003). More recent evidence also contradicts Stein’s hypothesis.
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Klein (2002) found that when audit committees or boards are independent of exec-
utive management, abnormal accruals are smaller. Xie, Davidson III and DaDalt
(2003) and Zhao and Chen (2008) find that audit committee expertise in accounting,
the frequency at which the board and audit committees meet, and staggered boards,
another takeover defense, all decrease use of discretionary accruals.
1.2.4 Investment and Taxation
To test for earnings management behavior, I will rely on the theoretical and em-
pirical tools developed to explore the impact of tax policy on investment behavior.
Summers (1981), Poterba and Summers (1985), and Desai and Goolsbee (2004) built
on the seminal Hall and Jorgenson (1967) paper and estimate models which measure
investment as a function of marginal Q and a term that combines corporate income
taxation, investment tax credits, the rate of tax depreciation, interest rates, and real
rates of economic depreciation into a single “user cost of capital” measure. I utilize a
modified user cost model to test the relationship between corporate governance and
earnings management behavior.
1.2.5 Accelerated and Bonus Depreciation
When a firm invests in new capital, it can deduct the purchase price of the in-
vestment from its taxable income, thereby reducing its tax bill. In most cases, the
firm cannot deduct the entire amount immediately. Under US law, the schedule of
depreciation deductions is specified by the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery Sys-
tem (MACRS). For each type of property, MACRS specifies a recovery period and
a depreciation method that specifies how quickly and over what time frame the pur-
chase price is to be deducted. When the rate of depreciation for tax purposes is faster
than the true rate of economic depreciation on capital investments, depreciation is
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said to be “accelerated.”6 Accelerated depreciation decreases the user cost of cap-
ital and effectively creates a tax subsidy on new equipment purchases.7 While the
US Government has used accelerated depreciation to encourage investment for more
than 50 years, it has only recently employed the policy in a counter-cyclical manner
(Gravelle (2013)).8 “Bonus depreciation,” the counter-cyclical manifestation of ac-
celerated depreciation, is unique in its magnitude and its temporary nature. Under
bonus depreciation, businesses can write off a specified percentage of new purchases
immediately, thereby further accelerating depreciation and increasing the investment
tax subsidy. Bonus depreciation was used to combat both the 2001 and the 2008 re-
cessions and has been the primary tool used to stimulate business investment during
the last decade. The White House estimates that bonus depreciation saved businesses
approximately 55 billion present value dollars in corporate income taxes in each of
the years 2010 and 2011.9
Much evidence suggests that business investment does respond to bonus deprecia-
tion, although as noted by House and Shapiro (2008), investment elasticity estimates
are surprisingly small, given the temporary nature of the policy. The authors note
that with price elasticity of supply and adjustment costs equal to zero, the elasticity
of investment with respect to the changes in investment cost via temporary bonus de-
preciation should be infinite. Finding limited investment and supply price response,
House and Shapiro conclude that convex adjustment costs within the firm must mute
the investment response.
6The “true” rate of economic depreciation is how quickly the new capital actually deteriorates
or is “used up.”
7In order for bonus depreciation to decrease NPV costs of investment, the firm must have positive
taxable income. Heterogeneous response by firms with different tax statuses is examined in Appendix
1.9.10. Results continue to exhibit strong heterogeneous investment response across governance
levels.
8In 1954, depreciation rules were liberalized explicitly“to maintain the present high level of in-
vestment in plant and equipment” (Senate Finance Committee, quoted in Brazell, Dworin and Walsh
(1989)). Legislation has changed the depreciation rules several times since then, but the intention
to encourage investment through accelerated depreciation has persisted.
9In 2010, businesses could immediately deduct 50% of the cost of new investments; in 2011, 100%.
When all equipment is immediately fully deductible, it is known as “expensing.”
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The notion that bonus depreciation can identify earnings management behavior
and can used to test for the relationship between corporate governance and earnings
management began with Neubig (2006), which suggested an alternative explanation
for the tempered investment response to the policy. Neubig pointed out that, due
to GAAP, bonus depreciation does not affect accounting earnings. If firms, as the
earnings literature suggests, seek to maximize accounting earnings as opposed to net
present value of cash flows (real economic value), their investment behavior will be
unresponsive to bonus depreciation. Therefore, unresponsiveness in the face of the
policy is evidence of earnings management behavior; firms focusing on accounting
earnings do not increase investment despite a substantial subsidy.
Edgerton (2012) formalized Neubig’s intuitive and elegant explanation for the rela-
tively small elasticity and constructed a model of a firm that focuses attention on both
true economic value and accounting earnings. By observing investment responses to
different types of investment tax incentives that both do and do not affect accounting
earnings, Edgerton estimateed that the average firm focuses 45% of their attention on
accounting earnings and 55% of their attention on cash flows when making investment
decisions.10
1.3 Modeling Governance and Investment Response to Bonus
Depreciation
In this section, I build governance into the formal model of investment behavior
presented in Edgerton (2012), in which managers make investment decisions to maxi-
mize a weighted sum of cash flows and accounting earnings. The key innovation of the
model is that the weight placed on accounting earnings is a function of the strength
of governance faced by management. The formal model generates a linear estimating
10Also see Edgerton (2012) for a comprehensive explanation and examples of how and why bonus
depreciation effectively decreases net present value but leaves the accounting earnings associated
with any given investment project unchanged.
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equation that embodies the intuitive prediction that managers under strong corporate
governance face high pressure to maximize accounting earnings and are therefore less
responsive to bonus depreciation.
1.3.1 Model Preliminaries
Firms maximize a weighted average of their current and future present value net-
of-tax cash flows (CFt) and their accounting earnings (AEt). Investment is financed
using retained earnings.11 The definition of cash flows is
CFt = (1− τ)[F (Kt)− pψ(It, Kt)] + τδTKTt − pIt,
where τ is the corporate tax rate and p is the unit price of capital. F (·) is the net
operating income function and is a function of Kt, the firm’s capital stock. ψ(·) is
the adjustment cost of investment, which is a function of It, investment, and capital
stock. The firm’s capital stock evolves according to the law of motion,
K˙t = It − δKt (1.1)
where δ is the real depreciation rate of the capital stock.12 The cost of new investment,
It, is pIt.
13,14
11The model can be extended to include debt finance with relative ease. Investment policy is
identical when the firm invests with retained earnings or a combination of retained earnings and
debt.
12This law of motion formulation assumes geometric capital stock depreciation. In reality, capital
stock may depreciate at non-geometric patterns. This assumption is made for mathematic simplicity
and does substantively influence the predictions of the model.
13If investment tax credits were offered, the investment would generate investment tax credits of
pItITC. These credits would enter into accounting earnings identically and, therefore, investment
response to ITCs will not be a function of α.
14The model abstracts from investment tax credits (ITCs) because they are not available to
businesses during the estimation period. However, ITCs can be easily incorporated into the model.
ITCs affect both cash flows and accounting earnings identically and therefore investment response
to investment tax credits does not depend on α or determinants of α. This observation provides
another test that the observed empirical findings are generated by the accounting treatment of bonus
depreciation and is evidence of earnings management behavior. If investment response to ITCs
14
In addition to investment tax credits, the depreciation deductions permitted for
tax purposes enter into the cash flow definition and may encourage investment behav-
ior. These deductions are a function of the stock of the firm’s past capital expenditures
that have not been depreciated for tax purposes, KTt , and the statutory tax rate of
depreciation, δT . I will refer to KTt as the “tax capital” of the firm. Tax capital
evolves according to the law of motion,
K˙Tt = pIt − δTKTt . (1.2)
The tax savings afforded by these deductions appears in the cash flows equation as
τδTKTt . The policy parameter δ
T determines the extent to which depreciation is
accelerated for tax purposes and embodies the bonus depreciation policy.15
The firm’s accounting earnings are defined as
AEt = (1− τ)[F (Kt)− pψ(It, Kt)− δBKBt ].
Revenues F (Kt) and adjustment costs pψ(It, Kt) enter into both after-tax cash flows
and accounting earnings identically. However, the cost of investment, pIt, and cash
tax savings, τδTKTt , do not appear in the accounting earnings equation at all. Instead,
is not heterogeneous across governance levels then evidence of the corporate governance–earnings
management is reinforced.
Unfortunately, ITCs were last used in 1985 and corporate governance data is not available prior to
1991, so tests of this secondary hypothesis are challenging. However, in Appendix 1.9.12, I use 1991
governance data in an attempt to measure the degree of heterogeneous investment response to both
ITCs and depreciation tax allowances in years surrounding the ITC repeal. The analysis finds no
heterogeneity of response across governance levels to the ITC repeal. The absence of heterogeneity
could be the result of either changes in within-firm governance between years 1985 and 1991 or
support of the ITC hypothesis. The analysis presented in Robustenss Check 1.9.12 also finds no
differences in investment response to changes in tax depreciation allowances. Again, this could be
due to the poor measurement of mid 1980s governance using 1991 data. Alternatively, this result
could be due to the fact that changes in depreciation were not nearly as salient as changes in bonus
depreciation and were not the preeminent investment tax stimulus used during the 1980s, which
were investment tax credits.
15This parameter is also assumed to be constant, and thus tax depreciation allowances are assumed
to decline at a geometric rate. In reality, this is not the case. However, this abstraction does not
substantively alter the predictions of the theory.
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there appears a book measure of depreciation deductions, δBKBt , and their associated
tax savings, τδBKBt . The cost of new investment only depresses accounting earnings
as the capital depreciates for book purposes. Book capital evolves according to its
own law of motion,
K˙Bt = pIt − δBKBt . (1.3)
Thus, bonus depreciation, which increases δT and decreases the cash flow cost of
investment, does not alter accounting earnings.
I assume the firm places a weight α on book earnings (BE) and a weight (1− α)





e−rt[αAEt + (1− α)CFt]
subject to constraints (1), (2), (3), and (4).16
1.3.2 Corporate Governance and Book Earnings
To introduce the role of governance in earnings management behavior, I model
the weight placed on accounting earnings, α, as a function of the governance in the
16The model and by extension the following empirical analysis does not consider the possible an-
ticipatory effects of the policy; managers make investment decisions in response to contemporaneous
depreciation tax policies. Of course, managers who place a positive weight on cash flows and antic-
ipate the introduction of, or increase in, bonus depreciation would decrease current investment at
low bonus levels and increase future investment at high bonus levels. If managers anticipate future
decreases in bonus depreciation, they would act in reverse.
Anticipatory effects may impact estimates of the over-all effect of the policy on investment. The
policy may look more effective than it if changes in the policy were impossible to predict and lasted
indefinitely. However, anticipation should not affect the empirical test of the corporate governance–
earnings management hypothesis. If information about the policy is uniform across different levels
of governance, as is most plausible, then both low governance and high governance firms will change
investment behavior in anticipation of policy changes in the same way and the anticipatory effects




By taking the firm’s first order condition with respect to investment and totally differ-








where zT , a transformation of δT , is the present value of future depreciation allowances
for tax purposes.19 When bonus depreciation is introduced or increased and tax
depreciation allowances are accelerated, zT increases. ψII is the second derivative of
the adjustment cost function with respect to investment. The investment response to
the bonus depreciation decreases as more weight is placed on accounting earnings. If
f(G) is an increasing function of G, then investment response to bonus depreciation
decreases as the firm is more heavily governed.
1.3.3 Estimation
I approximate f(·) as a linear function,
α = γGG, (1.4)
17In Stein (1989), the manager makes a slightly different trade-off: short-run accounting earnings
at the expense of long-run accounting earnings. This model is reconciled with Stein’s trade-off by
recognizing that investment increases long-run cash flows at the expense of long-run cash flows.
When managers are more accounting earnings focused, they are less willing to make this trade-off
and long-run firm value suffers as a consequence.
18The derivation of this condition is contained in Appendix 1.9.1.
19See Robustenss Check 1.9.1 for more details.
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where γG defines how governance affects the accounting focus parameter α. Under the
assumption of quadratic adjustment costs,20 the investment ratio may be expressed
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which can be estimated using ordinary least squares regression of the form
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During the sample period that I examine, the corporate income tax rate τ does
not change. Under these conditions, I can drop the corporate tax rates from the
estimating equation and estimate
Iit
Ki,t−1








The regression equation contains a tax term that describes the impact of the bonus
depreciation zT , a governance term, G, and their interaction as well as marginal Q
(λit/pit). In order to account for firm-level unobserved determinants of investment
behavior and the endogenity of tax policy, I add firm and year fixed effects to the
regression.
Estimates from this linear regression can be used to test the corporate governance–
earnings management hypothesis. From (5), γG defines the relationship between gov-
ernance and accounting earnings focus. This parameter of interest can be constructed











where c is an adjustment cost parameter.
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by taking a ratio of coefficients from the regression, γG = −β3/β1. In intuitive terms,
β1 is the response by firms with a “zero” level of governance. β3 is the amount that
the β1 coefficient changes when an additional unit of governance is added. It fol-
lows that γG is the fraction that the investment response decreases when governance
increases by one unit relative to the response of the “zero” governance firms.
If γG is estimated to be positive, investment response to bonus depreciation is
decreasing in the corporate governance measure, and empirical evidence indicates
that the weight placed on accounting earnings is larger at higher levels of corporate
governance. This result would strongly support the hypothesis that corporate gover-
nance induces earnings management behavior consistent with the evidence presented
in Section 1.2.21
1.3.4 Endogenous α
One simple and plausible extension of the model would allow α to be a function of
depreciation tax benefits in addition to governance. The logic behind this assumption
is that managers, knowing that accounting earnings do not reflect the tax benefits
of accelerated depreciation, may shift their focus towards cash flows when bonus
depreciation is enacted or increased to better take advantage of the policy. With
this extension, investment response to depreciation tax incentives would be positive,
but would decrease more slowly in the level of governance. Thus, if α is a function
of depreciation tax allowances, then the estimated γG from equation (1.5) would
underestimate the impact of governance on the accounting earnings weight α.
21The investment equation implies that changes in marginal Q (λ/p) should have the same impact
on the investment ratio as the Z Tax Term. Unfortunately, because proxies for marginal Q are often
mismeasured, this result is typically not present in Q-theory empirical studies. See Cummins et
al. (1994) and Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006) for potential solutions to the mismeasurement
problem.
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1.4 Data Construction and Descriptive Statistics
In order to examine the investment response to bonus depreciation across firms
with different levels of corporate governance, I collect data from the RiskMetrics
Governance Legacy Database, from the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database,
from Internal Revenue Service documentation, from Bureau of Economic Analysis
Capital Flows tables, and from Standard and Poor’s Compustat CRSP combined
database. The remainder of this section outlines the construction, measurement, and
descriptive statistics of key variables.
1.4.1 Governance Index
Following Gompers et al. (2003), I construct a firm level measure of governance
based on the 24 governance provisions contained in the RiskMetrics Governance
Legacy Database. The majority of provisions recorded by Riskmetrics protect the
manager from disciplinary actions on the part of the shareholders or protect the firm
from takeovers. Gompers et al. (2003) construct a “G Index” in a simple, straight-
forward manner: for every firm, a point is added for every provision that restricts
shareholder rights. I transform the “G Index” in an effort to make its interpretation
more intuitive. To construct the “Governance” variable that I will use in the em-
pirical analysis, I subtract “G Index” for each firm and year from the maximum “G
Index” observed in the data.
The transformed “Governance” variable has the advantage over the “G Index”
that it is increasing in proportion to the level of governance placed on the manager
by the shareholders of the firm. A one point increase in the Governance variable means
that the firm has one fewer provision in place to protect managers from shareholder
discipline. For further ease of interpretation, I scale Governance by its standard
deviation over the sample period, so that a one point increase in the standardized
variable corresponds to a one standard deviation increase in governance relative to
20
Figure 1.1: Distribution and Covariance of Governance Variable
Governance Distribution Governance and Entrenchment
Notes: Figure 1 presents a histogram of the Governance variable overlaid with a normal distribution.
Figure 2 presents the linear fit relationship between the Government and Entrenchment variables as
well as a binned scatter plot of their relationship. The Governance variable is split into 17 equal-sized
bins. For each bin, the average Entrenchment is plotted. The linear fit is predicted over unbinned
data.
the average level of governance observed in the data.2223
Bebchuk et al. (2009) constructed an “Entrenchment Index” from 6 of the original
24 provisions that they found most important from a legal and operational stand-
point.24 I transform and scale their index in the same manner as the “G Index” to
create “Entrenchment.” I use this measure as a robustness check in Appendix 1.9.4
and in the fiscal cliff analysis because data necessary to construct the Governance
variable are unavailable.
Figure 1 presents a histogram of the Governance variable overlaid with a normal
distribution. The governance variable is normally distributed with a median value of
22The G Index is available only for years 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. The Governance variable
for years 2001, 2003, and 2005 is imputed as the value of the G Index for the previous year. The
Governance variable for years 2007–2010 is constructed from the 2006 G Index. Appendix 1.9.5
presents several robustness checks to confirm that this simple imputation does not strongly influence
empirical results. As Gompers et al. (2003) noted, there is little within-firm change in the index
over time, so it is unsurprising that these checks do not strongly influence results.
23Data on corporate governance provisions has been collected by RiskMetrics for years 2007 to
2011. However, these data do not contain the full swath of provisions examined in Gompers et al.
(2003) and thus the exact G Index cannot be constructed for these years.
24The Entrenchment Index focuses on 6 provisions: (1) Staggered Board, (2) supermajority to
approve mergers, (3) limited ability to amend charter, (4) limited ability to amend bylaws, (5) poison
pill, and (6) golden parachute.
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9 and standard deviation of 2.557. Figure 2 compares Governance and Entrenchment
across firms. The figure confirms that firms with high Governance measures, on
average, have high Entrenchment measures of corporate governance.
1.4.2 Managerial Equity Percentage, “Shares”
The third measure of governance that I consider is the percentage of total shares
held by the firm’s highest-paid executive, which I label “Shares.” I use this measure
for two reasons. First, it is used in other papers, making my results comparable
to an earlier literature. Second, results from Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest
that fractional ownership is a close proxy for pay–performance sensitivity for CEOs
with non-negligible stockholdings. I follow Chetty and Saez (2005) in constructing
this measure using the following method: (1) for each firm, the top executives are
ordered by total compensation, then (2) the shares owned by highest-paid executive
are divided by the total shares of the firm to find the percentage of the firm held by
the top executive.25 Shares owned by the executive is defined as the number “shares
owned excluding options” plus the “number of shares vested” plus the “number of
unexercised exercisable options.”26,27
Figure 4 presents the relationship between Governance and Shares. The figure pro-
vides interesting insight into the use of governance provisions versus equity incentives
to generate corporate control. Over the majority of governance measures, excluding
the extremes, there is a strong positive linear relationship between the Governance
25Managerial equity percentage is only determined correctly using this method if the highest-paid
executive is the manager. Empirically and anecdotally, this seems to be an accurate assumption.
26Due to reporting error, I observe 16 firm-year observations in which the“Shares” variable is
greater than 100%. These observations are excluded from the analysis.
27Data on both managerial equity percentage and shareholder governance covers only approxi-
mately one-third of the companies listed in the Compustat CRSP Combined Database. The firms
for which the data are available are not a random sample of publicly traded firms; Execucomp and
Governance Legacy tend to cover only larger firms (Fortune 1500 firms). These large firms do the
lion’s share of investment, and thus the empirical results describe the majority of investment behav-
ior by publicly traded firms. The applicability of the empirical results to the universe of publicly
traded firms depends on how much the largest firms resemble and act like other publicly traded
entities.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution and Covariance of Shares Variable
Shares Distribution Governance and Shares Measures
Note: Figure 4 presents the linear fit relationship between Shares and Governance as well as the
binned scatter plot of their relationship. The Governance variable is split into 20 equal-sized bins.
For each bin, the average of the Shares variable is plotted. The linear fit is predicted over unbinned
data.
variable and the managerial equity percentage. This suggests that for the majority
of firms, governance provisions and equity incentives are complements in generating
corporate control. The empirical analysis will consider investment response as a func-
tion of both measures of governance. Figure 4 suggests results should be similar, as
Shares is a proxy for Governance and vice versa for the majority of firms.
However, for firms with very low levels of governance, managerial equity per-
centage is relatively high, in contrast to the overall positive relationship. The high
managerial equity percentages suggest that relatively low-governance firms may have
owner-managers, those who own a large voting block of shares and are also the firm’s
highest-paid employee. The owner-managers may at low cost insulate themselves
from discipline or takeover from other shareholders via provisions. As a result, one
might expect owner-managers to work at firms with low governance. For these owner-
managers, principal–agent problems may not exist and predictions about earnings
management and investment response to bonus depreciation may not be accurate.
The visual evidence suggests that analysis should be limited to smaller values of
managerial equity percentage in an effort to exclude owner-managers from the anal-
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ysis.
The highest levels of governance do not correspond to high levels of managerial
equity percentage. This suggests that, while over the majority of the governance
distribution equity, incentives may be a complement to governance, at the highest
levels of governance, where salaries are at the discretion of shareholders and the
management is subject to takeover, equity incentives may be redundant in providing
discipline.
1.4.3 Z Tax Term
Investment tax policy during this period affected only the present value of tax
depreciation allowances, which I will label the “Z Tax Term.”





where zt is the present value of tax depreciation allowances on $1 of investment. It is
composed of MACRS statutory depreciation allowances di and bonus depreciation bt.
The Z Tax Term varies both over time and across different types of assets. Varia-
tion over time and within asset types is driven by “bonus depreciation” legislation.28
The policy generally applies to all property with MACRS depreciation schedules of
less than 20 years. Table 1 and Figure 5 display the bonus depreciation rates during
the years 2000 to 2012.Variation in the Z Tax Term across asset types is driven by
differences in tax depreciation rates and recovery periods for different types of capital.
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28Items of legislation that include bonus depreciation and their effect on the level of bonus depre-
ciation are detailed in Appendix 1.9.3.
29IRS Publication 946 details how different types of assets may be depreciated. Assets may be
depreciated using either the straight line method or the double declining balance method. Within
each method, a recovery time period of 5 through 35 years may be applied. Generally, investment
assets that have a longer service life must be recovered over a longer time period. Longer recovery
results in lower present value of tax depreciation allowances. Both the system and length of recovery
are specified for each type of investment in the IRS publication. For an extended discussion of the
MACRS, see House and Shapiro (2008).
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Figure 1.3: Available Bonus Percentage 2000-2013
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Ideally, firm-level investment data by asset type for each year would be avail-
able and a firm-specific weighted tax depreciation rate and Z Tax Term could be
constructed. Unfortunately, firm-level data on investment by asset types are not
available. In lieu of micro-level tax depreciation rates, I follow Cummins et al. (1994)
and Desai and Goolsbee (2004) and construct industry-level present value tax depre-
ciation rates using the Capital Flows table from the Bureau of Economics Analysis,
which records industry-level investment by asset types.30
To construct industry-level rates, I (1) construct present value tax depreciation
rates for each asset type in the BEA table. (2) For each industry, I weight the asset-
level depreciation rates by the amount of investment made by each asset category for
each industry. The industry-level BEA rates are matched to firms using the NAICS
classification system. The industry-level tax depreciation rates are constructed only
for equipment.31 Once the present values of tax depreciation allowances are con-
30The BEA classifies investment into 51 categories; 28 are equipment and 23 are structures.
Equipment categories include Computers and Peripheral Equipment, Mining and Oilfield Machinery,
and Autos. Structures categories include Industrial Buildings, Residential Buildings, and Farm
Nonresidential Structures. The BEA classifies firms into 123 industries which can be matched to
3-digit NAICS codes.
31Bonus depreciation cannot be applied the purchase of structures. A separate Z Tax Term can
be constructed for structures, however, because the term does not vary within industries over time,
when firm and year fixed effects are included in regression, a coefficient on the structures tax term
cannot be separately identified.
Because bonus depreciation cannot be applied to the purchase of structures, the percentage of
capital investment in structures as a fraction of total investment may also influence stock prices
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structed at the industry-level, they are combined with bonus depreciation rates over
time and the statutory tax rate to form the Z Tax Term.
For interpretability, I scale the Z Tax Term by the change in the present value of
tax depreciation allowances when bonus depreciation varies from 0% to 100% for the
firm with average-lived investment assets. As a result of this scaling, the coefficient
on the Z Tax Term in regression can be interpreted as the increase in It/Kt−1 for the
average firm when the bonus goes from 0% to 100%.
1.4.4 Investment and Control Variables
The dependent variable in all regressions is the investment during the current
period scaled by the stock of capital in place at the beginning of the period. This






where capx is capital expenditures and ppent is property, plant, and equipment.
In all investment regressions, I control for marginal Q. Additional possible deter-
minants of investment, a measure of cash flows and a measure of financial distress,
are included in select regressions. Appendix 3.9.2 details the construction of these
variables. Following Desai and Gooslbee (2004) and others, I winsorize the invest-
ment, marginal Q, and control variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to minimize
the effects of misreported data.
1.4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on capital expenditure, the Z tax term, cash
flow, marginal Q, cash flows and the financial constraint measure, both for the full
reactions to the bonus depreciation policy. Firms that invest a larger percentage in structures
should have smaller abnormal returns after the extension of the policy. The event study results are
unchanged when industry-level structures tax rates are included.
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sample and then separately for governance sample (those firms for which governance
and managerial equity data are available). Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics
for the measures of corporate governance, Governance, Entrenchment, and Shares.
Firm-level data on investment, cash flows, financial constraints, and marginal Q
are similar to the prior literature. The governance sample is composed of more mature
firms. Consistent with their maturity, firms in the governance sample have larger cash
flows, invest less relative to their stock of capital, and have lower values of marginal
Q than the full sample. However, the governance sample is not dramatically different
except for cash flows. The average investment as a fraction of existing capital observed
is 0.255 in the governance sample, meaning that in each year the average firm invests
an amount approximately equal to one-quarter of their existing capital stock.
The average firm in the governance sample has a Governance score of 9, meaning
that the average firm has 9 fewer provisions protecting managers from shareholder
discipline than the firm with the maximum number of these such provisions. The aver-
age value of Entrenchment is 3.758, meaning that the average firm has approximately
2.24 provisions protecting management from shareholders.
The average value of Shares is 3.66% and the distribution is skewed to the left;
the modal managerial equity percentage is only 1.3%. 58% of top executives hold
more than 1%, 27 hold more than 3%, and only 17.9 hold more than 5%.
1.5 Estimation Strategy
The estimating equation implied by the model in Section 3.3 is
Iit
Ki,t−1











The Z Tax Term varies both across industries, due to MACRS regulations, and over
time, due to bonus depreciation. With firm and year fixed effects, identification
27
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics Years 2000-2010
Median Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Full Sample
Cap Exp / Prop Plant Equip 0.197 0.357 0.544 76,497
Z Tax Term 0.487 0.483 0.036 92,311
Q/(1-τ) 2.130 4.482 10.074 93,823
Cash Flow / PPE 0.205 -1.403 8.295 71,659
K-Z Financial Constraint 0.227 0.006 2.720 75,164
Governance Sample
Cap Exp / Prop Plant Equip 0.185 0.255 0.274 11,606
Z Tax Term 0.488 0.484 0.031 13,196
Q/(1-τ) 2.242 2.873 2.123 12,113
Cash Flow / PPE 0.409 0.599 2.572 11,314
K-Z Financial Constraint 0.395 0.308 1.419 11,718
Governance, Equity
Governance 9 8.966 2.557 15,422
Bebchuk 4 3.758 1.277 15,422
Shares 1.302 3.661 6.726 19,976
Note: The investment and tax variables are provided for both the full sample and for the governance
sample. The governance sample are firms for which both governance and managerial equity incentive
data are available.
of the β1 coefficient comes from how changes in bonus depreciation differentially
affect industries. Industries that invest in longer-lived equipment benefit more from
the policy than industries that invest in equipment that depreciates quickly for tax
purposes.
The Governance variable varies across firms and over time. With firm fixed effects,
the β2 parameter is identified off of within-firm variation in the Governance variable.
This variable is potentially endogenous to within firm variation in investment behav-
ior. Shareholders could conceivably choose to significantly increase governance when
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the firm increases investment behavior. However, because the parameter of interest is
constructed as a ratio of β1 and β3, any impact of within-firm variation of investment
on governance should not compromise testing of the primary empirical hypothesis.
The crucial assumption is not that the level of governance is exogenous to invest-
ment, but that the level of governance is exogenous to investment response to bonus
depreciation, which is a plausible assumption.
Because the Governance variable is relatively stable within firms over time (see
Gompers et al. (2003)), identification of the β3 parameter comes from variation in the
mean governance level and variation across industries in how much bonus depreciation
decreases the present value cost of investment.32 The variable is larger when bonus
depreciation hits firms with high levels of governance.
A potential threat to identification would arise if firms with low-governance lev-
els invested primarily in long-lived assets, which would increase the impact of bonus
depreciation on investment. If this were the case, then estimation would inaccurately
attribute investment response to low levels of governance when only differential im-
pacts of the tax policy across industries are driving investment behavior. One obser-
vation that mitigates this threat is that there appears to be significant variation in
Governance levels within industries. As a result, there exists within industry varia-
tion in the interaction term. In Appendix 1.9.9, I add industry-year fixed effects to
baseline regression to further alleviate this concern. With industry-year fixed effects,
the β3 coefficient is identified from within-industry variation in the interaction term,
coming only from across firm differences in Governance levels. The drawback of us-
ing industry-year fixed effects is that the β1 coefficient can no longer be estimated.
However, the sign and magnitude of the interaction coefficient are similar to base-
line results, suggesting that baseline results are not driven by a correlation of low
32Regressions that use mean Governance levels are presented in Appendix 1.9.5. Coefficients on
the interaction parameter have magnitudes similar to baseline results, confirming that identification
of β3 is not driven by within-firm changes in Governance.
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Low Governance High Governance
0 30 50 0 30 50
Note: Mean Capx/PPENT is the mean level of Capx/PPENT controlling for marginal Q, cash flow,
the K-Z measure of financial distress, and firm and year fixed effects. Firms are considered“High
Governance” if their governance level is above the median level of observed governance. 0, 30 and
50 are levels of bonus depreciation in percentage terms.
governance and long-lived assets.
1.6 Investment Response to Bonus Depreciation
1.6.1 Visual Analysis of Investment Responsiveness to Bonus Deprecia-
tion
The investment response to bonus depreciation across different levels of Gover-
nance is presented in Figure 6. Figure 6 plots the mean investment levels at bonus
levels of 0%, 30%, and 50% for Low and High Governance groups, controlling for
marginal Q, controls for cash flow, financial distress, year fixed effects, and firm fixed
effects. High Governance firms are defined as those with measures of Governance
above the median. Firms with governance measures at or below the median level are
classified as Low Governance.
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Figure 6 presents compelling visual evidence that investment is less responsive
to bonus depreciation for firms with high levels of governance. This evidence sug-
gests that corporate governance induces earnings management behavior. For the Low
Governance group, as bonus depreciation is increased and the net present value costs
of investment decrease, investment increases. Evidence of investment responsiveness
to bonus depreciation is not as clear for the High Governance group; investment is
higher when bonus depreciation is set at 30% than 0%, but smaller at 50% than at
30%. The intuitive explanation for this unresponsiveness by High Governance firms
is that the managers of these firms are highly incentivized to focus on maximizing
accounting earnings, the most salient measure of corporate performance. Because
accounting earnings are unaffected by bonus depreciation, firms with high levels of
governance are unresponsive.33
1.6.2 Replicating Previous Literature
The first four columns of Table 3 replicate prior empirical studies of bonus depreci-
ation both for all Compustat firms and for the smaller Governance sample. Specifica-
tion (1) regresses It/Kt−1 on the Z Tax Term and marginal Q, and includes year and
firm fixed effects. Specification (2) repeats the regression from the first specification,
but includes cash flow and financial distress controls. The Z Tax Term coefficient
is interpreted as the increase in It/Kt−1 that results from an increase in bonus de-
preciation from 0 to 100% for the firm with average MACRS statutory depreciation
rates.
33Figure 6 also shows that High Governance firms invest more, on average, than Low Governance
firms, regardless of the bonus depreciation level. This may also be a phenomenon of the accounting
treatment of new investment expenditures. When accounting earnings are calculated, the expense
for accounting earnings purposes is booked only as the new investments depreciate. Therefore, a
manager choosing the investment level to maximize accounting earnings will invest more than a
manager choosing the investment level to maximize cash flows, all else equal. Similarly, a manager
choosing to increase earnings per share may increase investment levels without issuing new equity.
I view this evidence as only suggestive given the potential endogeneity of the governance variable as
discussed in Section 1.5.
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Without additional controls for investment, a 100% increase in bonus depreciation
is associated with an increase in It/Kt−1 of 0.04, approximately an 11% increase in
investment as a percentage of installed capital. When additional controls are added
to the regression, the effect of a 100% increase in bonus depreciation is approximately
a 4% increase relative to the mean investment level, suggesting that the controls are
correlated with the tax policy. Specification (2) results are in line with the bonus
depreciation literature and demonstrate the empirical puzzle, addressed by House
and Shapiro (2008) and Edgerton (2012), that investment is not strongly responsive
to bonus depreciation, despite the temporary nature of the policy and the policy’s
potential to significantly decrease the net present value costs of investment.
Specifications (3) and (4) repeat the regressions of specifications (1) and (2), but
limit the sample to firms for which governance data was available. Specification (4)
shows that the effect of moving from 0 to 100% bonus depreciation has an impact on
investment that is very similar for the full sample and for the governance sub-sample.
1.6.3 Baseline Results
Baseline results presented in Specifications (5) and (6) of Table 3 show a strong
heterogeneous response across different levels of governance. Consistent with the
governance–earnings management hypothesis, firms with high levels of governance
are less responsive to bonus depreciation. Specification (5) fits the linear estimating
equation implied by the theoretical model to the data; specification (6) adds addi-
tional controls for cash flows and financial distress. In these regressions, the Z Tax
Term can now be interpreted as the effect of increasing the bonus depreciation from
0 to 100% for the firm with the average MACRS statutory tax depreciation rates
and a Governance score of 0. The regression predicts that for the least governed
firms, increasing bonus depreciation from 0 to 100% results in an increase of It/Kt−1
by 0.160 or a 42% increase relative to mean investment levels. This effect is large
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and can viewed as how firms would respond to the policy if they placed the minimal
amount of focus on accounting earnings. This effect is nearly 10 times as large as the
effect for the firm with the mean level of governance.
The investment response to bonus depreciation decreases as the level of gover-
nance increases. The coefficient on the interaction term in (5) and (6) is interpreted
as the change in the Z Tax Term coefficient resulting from a one standard deviation
increase in Governance relative to the mean level. Each one standard deviation in-
crease in Governance decreases the It/Kt−1 response by 0.041 (approximately 25%).
The γG presented in Table 3 is the percentage decrease in investment response to
bonus depreciation that results from a one standard deviation increase in governance.
γG is approximately 0.26 in specification (6), meaning that a one standard devia-
tion increase in governance makes firms 25% less responsive to bonus depreciation.
These results strongly support the theoretical hypothesis that more strongly governed
managers focus their attention on accounting earnings. Strongly governed firms are
less responsive to bonus depreciation and demonstrate more earnings management
behavior. 34
Marginal effects of bonus depreciation on investment at different levels of Gover-
nance are presented in Table 4. As a result of bonus depreciation going from 0 to
100%, investment percentage increases by 0.097 or 25% compared to average levels
for firms with Governance level two standard deviations below the mean level. For
firms with Governance levels one standard deviation below the mean, bonus depreci-
ation increases investment percentage by 15%. Investment responses for firms at the
mean level of Governance and with Governance one standard deviation higher than
the mean are not statistically different from zero.
34Gompers et al. (2003) broke down the “G Index” into 5 categories: (1) tactics for delaying
hostile takeovers, (2) voting rights, (3) director/officer protection, (4) other takeover defenses, and
(5) state laws. The baseline regression is presented separately for each category and then for all the
categories together in Appendix 1.9.7. The results indicate that no one category fully determines the
heterogeneous investment response to bonus depreciation, suggesting that the Governance variable
is an adequate measure of the overall level of governance faced by firm managers.
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Table 1.2: Baseline Analysis 2000–2010, Governance Index
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z Tax Term 0.040*** 0.015 0.027* 0.017 0.177*** 0.160***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.033) (0.031)
Governace 0.357*** 0.342***
(0.056) (0.054)




Firms 12,932 12,047 1,944 1,911 1,944 1,911
Firms x Years 78,506 71,773 14,261 13,704 14,261 13,704
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1






Specifications (5) and (6) include governance measures and present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1τz
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Specifications (2), (4), and (6) include additional controls for financial distress and cash flows. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects and marginal Q. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%
level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Note that the estimates suggest that investment responds negatively to bonus de-
preciation for firms with very high levels of governance. This result is not consistent
with the behavior of economically rational actors or with the tax policy itself. In-
vestment response to the policy should be bounded below by zero, because not only
do firms not have to respond to bonus depreciation, but they can also choose not to
take bonus depreciation and, instead, write off investment using statutory MACRS
schedules.35 Therefore, there must be other factors driving the negative estimated
response.
35Knittle (2007) noted that only 55–63% of corporate investment actually claimed bonus depre-
ciation during the 2002 to 2004 episode. The paper suggested that the low take-up rate was a
product of three factors: the temporary nature of the policy, significant tax losses which mitigated
the policy’s impact, and the non-conformity of some state tax systems to the federal policy.
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Table 1.3: Investment Response Marginal Effects 2000–2010
Governance Level -2 -1 0 +1 + 2
Std. From Mean
d(It/Kt−1) 0.097*** 0.057*** 0.015 -0.026 -0.067***
/d Z TT (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021)
% of mean (It/Kt−1) 25% 15% 3.9% -6.8% -17%
Notes: Table 4 provides marginal effects estimates of the change in It/Kt−1 from an increase in
bonus depreciation from 0 to 100% for firms at different levels of Governance. Marginal effects are
provided for firms with mean level Governance and firms with Governance ± 1 and ± 2 standard
deviations from the mean. Marginal effects are derived from the regression presented in specification
(6) of Table 3. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
One possible explanation is that this estimation strategy may not sufficiently
control for general equilibrium effects of the policy. As noted by Goolsbee (1998),
investment tax incentives can affect the purchase price of capital, thereby depressing
investment response to the policy. In the theoretical model, the price of investment
goods should be reflected in marginal Q. Marginal Q may not sufficiently control for
these general equilibrium effects. For the strongly governed firms, the tax policy does
not increase the tax benefit of investment because managers care only to maximize
accounting earnings. Strongly governed firms may, however, experience price increases
in investment goods as a result of the policy. For strongly governed firms, there
is no upside to the policy, only downside. Because governance varies significantly
within industries, price increases in investment goods should not be a function of the
governance level and should not effect the estimation of heterogeneous response to the
policy or the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management
behavior.36
However, due to the accounting treatment of the cost of investment, these general
equilibrium effects may be unable to explain the negative responsiveness phenomena.
36While Goolsbee (1998) found that investment prices increase 3.5 to 7% when investment tax
credits are increased by 10%, House and Shapiro (2008) found that investment prices were unre-
sponsive to bonus depreciation in 2001 through 2004.
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Recall that the purchase price of new capital does not affect accounting earnings;
the cost of new investment is subtracted from accounting earnings only as the newly
installed capital depreciates for book purposes. Thus, firms with high levels of gov-
ernance that place a large weight on accounting earnings should not benefit from
the tax policy nor be as significantly affected by potential investment price shocks as
firms that place less emphasis on accounting earnings.
Another possibility is that the severity of the 2008 and 2009 recession is not
sufficiently captured by the model. The model does not account for supply-side
financing constraints, which were significant during the height of the recession. To
test this explanation, I estimate specification (6) from Table 3 using only data prior to
year 2008. Marginal effects from this temporally adjusted regression are presented in
Table 5. During years prior to 2008, investment was more responsive to the tax policy.
Firms with mean-level Governance increased investment as a percentage of installed
capital by nearly 16%. Furthermore, the investment response of the most strongly
governed firms was not statistically different from zero, suggesting that financing
constraints, which were the largest when bonus depreciation was at its highest level
(during the sample period), may be driving the negative responsiveness among the
most highly governed firms.
Overall, the baseline analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that corporate
governance induces earnings management behavior. Consistent with the hypothesis,
more strongly governed firms are less responsive to bonus depreciation. Using the
heterogeneous response to the policy, I estimate that a one standard deviation increase
in Governance results in a nearly 25% increase in accounting earnings focus and by
extension a 25% increase in earnings management behavior.
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Table 1.4: Investment Response Marginal Effects, 2000–2007
Governance Level -2 -1 0 +1 + 2
Std. From Mean
d(It/Kt−1) 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.045*** 0.010* -0.024
/d Z TT (0.034) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
% of mean (It/Kt−1) 39% 27% 16% 3.4% -8%
Notes: Table 5 provides marginal effects estimates of the change in It/Kt−1 from an increase in
bonus depreciation from 0 to 100% for firms at different levels of Governance. Marginal effects are
provided for firms with mean-level Governance and firms with Governance ± 1 and ± 2 standard
deviations from the mean. Marginal effects are derived from the regression presented in specification
(6) of Table 3. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
1.6.4 Equity Incentive Analysis
Table 5 presents estimation results using Shares as the measure of corporate gov-
ernance. This additional analysis has the advantage that the Shares variable is a
cardinal measure of governance and a given value of Shares means the exact same
thing for two different firms.
Specifications (1) and (2) fit the linear estimating equation derived in Section 3.3
to the data with and without additional controls from cash flows and financial distress.
The Shares x Z Tax Term coefficient can be interpreted as how much less responsive
an additional percentage of ownership makes It/Kt−1 to bonus depreciation. Specifi-
cations (1) and (2) suggest that Shares has no impact on investment responsiveness,
and therefore managerial equity incentives have no impact on investment response
to taxation, a conclusion inconsistent with the hypothesis. However, as discussed in
Section 3.4, the managers that hold a very high percentage of equity are more likely
to be owner-managers of firms and therefore face no principal–agent problems nor
the need to maximize accounting earnings to signal their value. To limit biases in
the results created by potential owner-managers, in specifications (3) through (6), I
progressively limit the sample to managers that hold less than 20, 15, 10 and 5% of
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Table 1.5: Baseline Analysis 2000–2010, Managerial Equity Percent-
age
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shares Restriction < 20% < 15% < 10% < 5%
Z Tax Term 0.032** 0.020 0.031** 0.025 0.027* 0.028
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Shares 0.009 0.012* 0.048*** 0.041** 0.062** 0.098**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.045)
Shares x Z TT -0.001 -0.002 -0.007*** -0.006** -0.009** -0.014**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
γS 0.041 0.087 0.218* 0.235 0.316* 0.495*
(0.035) (0.076) (0.124) (0.146) (0.181) (0.290)
Firms 2,348 2,294 2,257 2,228 2,183 2,074
Firms x Years 17,352 16,592 15,973 15,664 15,110 13,716
Notes: Table 6 presents regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1τz
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Specifications (2) through (6) include additional controls for financial distress and cash flows. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects and marginal Q. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%
level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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total equity.
When the sample is limited to managers who own less than 20% of total equity,
an additional percentage of ownership makes managers approximately 21.8% less
responsive to bonus depreciation. When the sample is limited further to 10%, each
additional percentage of firm ownership makes managers approximately 31.6% less
responsive to bonus depreciation. All in all, these results provide strong evidence of
heterogeneous investment response to bonus depreciation and identify an impact of
governance on earnings management behavior; the firms most responsive to bonus
depreciation are those in which the managers are the least governed and have the
least strong incentives to focus on earnings instead of cash flow maximization.
As Figure 4 demonstrates, Shares and Governance are strongly correlated. Thus
the Shares results do not necessarily capture a different channel of governance, but
rather reinforce the Governance analysis. As Shares and Governance increase to-
gether or as the general level of shareholder discipline increases, investment response
to bonus depreciation decreases. In this setting, it seems reasonable to run an empiri-
cal horse race to determine which type of governance is driving the results. Appendix
1.9.6 presents specifications including both Governance and Shares. The Governance
variable generates a large heterogeneous investment response, while the Shares vari-
able does not impact investment or its response. This horse race indicates that
management exposure to potential shareholder discipline is more important than eq-
uity incentives in motivating accounting earnings focus and earnings management
behavior.
1.6.5 Investment Response Summary
Investment response to bonus depreciation is heterogeneous across different levels
of Governance and managerial equity percentage. A one standard deviation increase
in the Governance variable results in a 25% decrease in investment response to bonus
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depreciation. Professional managers that own an additional one percentage point of
total firm equity are 21.8% less responsive to bonus depreciation. This heterogeneity
of investment response to bonus depreciation is in line with the intuitive theory that
stronger corporate governance forces managers to focus on the most salient measure
of corporate performance, accounting earnings, perhaps at a large long-term cost to
shareholders.
1.7 Stock Price Response to Extension of Bonus Deprecia-
tion
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) was passed by the United
States Congress on January 1, 2013, and signed into law by President Barack Obama
the next day. The act partially resolved the United States “fiscal cliff” by addressing
certain provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (known together
as the “Bush tax cuts”), which had been temporarily extended by the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 but were
set to expire on December 31, 2012. In a surprise move, the ATRA extended bonus
depreciation at a rate of 50% through the end of 2013.37 The fact that the extension
of bonus depreciation was largely unexpected creates a natural experiment that can
be used to corroborate investment results that indicate strong corporate governance
37In September 2012, Gary Guenther of the Congressional Research Service published a re-
port on bonus depreciation that concluded, Evidence indicates that the expensing allowances
probably have no more than a minor effect on business investment. Citing the probable ex-
piration of the policy, finance websites proclaimed, Buying equipment this month, rather than
next, could save you on taxes (finance-commerce.com) Dont wait on those fixed asset acqui-
sitions (www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti). When the provision was extended leasing and in-
dustry websites took notice. Congress also surprised many by extending the Bonus Deprecia-
tion allowance on qualified new equipment (www.teqlease.com/2013/01/08/the-fiscal-cliff-deal-saves-
bonus-depreciation/) One major surprise was a generous renewal of Sec. 179 and bonus deprecia-
tion rules that have allowed high-income farm operations to shelter sizable incomes in recent years.
(http://www.dtnprogressivefarmer.com). The surprise is confirmed empirically. See Figures 9 and
10.
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induces earnings management behavior.
To examine the impact of the surprise extension of bonus depreciation, I rely on
event study methodology. To use the ATRA event study to examine the impact of
governance and earnings management, I empirically address two questions. First:
are abnormal returns higher for firms that, on average, invest in longer lived equip-
ment assets, (those with on-average slower statutory depreciation rates) i.e. those
who stand to gain the most from the extension of bonus depreciation? Second: are
abnormal returns to the policy relatively higher for firms with weaker corporate gov-
ernance? If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then the ATRA event
study provides additional support that governance encourages earnings management
behavior. In light of the investment response to bonus depreciation, the answers to
these questions also address whether, at least in the context of bonus depreciation,
the market values low governance, which allows managers to respond to the policy.
1.7.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
In order to perform an event study, abnormal returns are computed for each
firms for the days after the event occurs and are multiplicatively compiled to produce
cumulative abnormal returns that describe by how many percentage points a stock
over- or under-performs its expected return t days after the event. I rely on the
Fama-French Value Weighted Three Factor Model (Fama and French (1992), Fama
and French (1993)) to generate expected returns and then compare this prediction
against the actual observed stock returns to generate the abnormal and cumulative
abnormal returns.38 The cumulative abnormal return, CARit, will be the dependent
38More precisely: using daily stock data from CRSP for the month prior to the passage of the
ATRA, I regress the return for each firm above the risk free rate, Rit − Rft, on three factors: (1)
the market return over the risk-free rate Rmt − Rft, (2) the value-weighted return on small firms
over the value-weighted return on large firms SMB, and (3) the value-weighted return on high book-
to-market value firms minus the return on low book-to-market value firms HML. The regressions
produce coefficients β, γ, and δ for each firm. I then use these coefficients to predict each individual
firm’s performance after the passage of the ATRA. How much the firm over or underperforms this
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variable in the fiscal cliff event study. It is defined as the Cumulative Abnormal Return




I summarize the MACRS statutory tax depreciation allowances on one dollar of






where di is the amount of tax depreciation allowed by MACRS accounting standards
in year i. Deprec is the net present value of statutory tax depreciation allowances.
This variable is constructed at the industry level using data from the BEA and IRS
publications in the manner described in Section 3.4. The average tax depreciation
allowance per dollar of investment is $0.88. In the regression analysis, this variable
is scaled by its standard deviation for ease of interpretation. Deprec is larger when
the net present value of statutory tax depreciation allowances is high. As discussed
in Section 3.4, when firms have higher Deprec measures, they stand to gain little
from the extension of bonus depreciation. The sign of the coefficient on this variable
will depend on whether investors value only accounting earnings or a combination of
prediction during a trading day is the firm’s abnormal performance, a;
ait = [Rit −Rft]︸ ︷︷ ︸
actual
− [βˆi(Rmt −Rft) + γˆi(SMB) + δˆi(HML)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimated
.
Once the abnormal returns have been estimated, I construct Cumulative Abnormal Returns for each
firm t days after the passage of ATRA 2012, CARit. The multiplicative cumulative abnormal returns
are often referred to as Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns or BHARS. In constructing traditional
CARS, one simply adds abnormal returns together. This procedure, however, is not appropriate
when abnormal returns are defined in percentage points above or below predicted returns.
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accounting earnings and real economic value (cash flow, in the model). If investors
care only about accounting earnings, then the tax policy will not benefit them, and
cumulative abnormal returns should be unrelated to the Deprec variable. If, however,
investors value real economic earnings, then returns should be higher for firms with
lower Deprec rates and the coefficient on Deprec should be negative in the days after
the passage of ATRA 2012.
1.7.2.2 Entrenchment
I use Entrenchment as defined in Section 3.4 as the governance measure in the fiscal
cliff event study. Entrenchment is used in this analysis because the data necessary
to construct the Governance variables is not available in recent years.39 The mean
level of Entrenchment is 3.61. There is no reason that the level of governance within
the firm should have any effect on cumulative abnormal returns after the passage of
ATRA 2012.
1.7.2.3 Deprec x Entrenchment
The interaction term specifies the heterogeneity of stock price response to the
surprise extension across firms with varying levels of governance. If investors place
any value on firm cash flows/real economic value, then they should value not only the
policy itself, but also low governance levels, which allow managers to respond to the
policy. Again, the sign on the coefficient depends on whether or not investors value
only accounting earnings or a combination of accounting earnings and cash flow. If
39How the IRRC records these 6 provisions changed in 2007, so the Entrenchment index that I
construct for the event study analysis is not directly comparable the Entrenchment variable from
years prior to 2007. Median and mean Entrenchment measures are similar between the 2000–2010
sample and the 2011 sample. Percentages of each provision are also comparable, despite the changes
in IRRC reporting standards. The Entrenchment measure as I have constructed it here is one point
higher if the firm does not have a provision specifying staggered appointment of board members,
if the firm does not need a supermajority to amend the charter, does not need a supermajority to
amend firm bylaws, does not need a supermajority to approve mergers, does not have poison pills,
or does not have golden parachutes.
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investors value only accounting earnings, then the coefficient on the interaction term
should be zero. If, however, investors place some value on cash flows, then investors
would prefer managers that are able to respond to the policy, i.e., those in firms with
low governance levels. If this is the case, then investors value low Deprec and low
Entrenchment, and cumulative abnormal returns should be positively related to the
interaction variable.
1.7.3 Event Study Results
Table 7 presents the event study results.40 Each column represents a separate
regression as the dependent variable evolves from cumulative abnormal returns 1 day
after passage ATRA 2012 to 6 days after the passage of ATRA 2012. The dependent
CAR variable is regressed on the governance measure, Entrenchment, the present
value of statutory tax depreciation allowances, Deprec, and the interaction of the two
variables.41 Looking across the table from left to right, the reader can see how the
effect of governance, potential benefit from the extension of bonus depreciation, and
the interaction of the two are related to cumulative abnormal returns over time.
The event study results suggest that investors value not only bonus depreciation,
but also low levels of governance, which allow firms to respond to the tax policy. The
Deprec coefficient is negative and statistically different from zero 2, 3, and 4 days after
the passage of ATRA 2012. These results indicate that abnormal returns are higher
for firms with lower MACRS depreciation rates – those firms that stand to benefit
from the extension from a cash flow perspective. Cumulative abnormal returns after
the passage of ATRA 2012 indicate that investors value bonus depreciation.
40Appendix 1.9.11 presents two placebo event studies. Using the estimated parameters from the
Fama French Value-Weighted Three Factor Model, I produce CARs beginning on December 10,
2012, and then again for January 15, 2013. No coefficients from either event study are estimated to
be statistically different from 0 at the 95% level. In the December 10 placebo, the Deprec coefficient
does have a positive coefficient different from zero at the 90 percent level.
41Cash flows are included in all regressions to control for firms’ ability to respond to bonus depre-
ciation.
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The coefficient on the interaction of Deprec and Entrenchment is positive and
statistically different from zero 2, 3, 4, and 5 days after the passage of ATRA 2012,
suggesting that for firms that stand to gain from bonus depreciation, low values
of governance are valued by investors. Consistent with our hypothesis, abnormal
returns are the highest for firms that should respond to bonus depreciation (those
with low Deprec measures) and for those that do respond to the policy (those with low
governance measures). Taken together, this evidence suggests that, in the context of
bonus depreciation, strong governance, which places managerial focus on accounting
earnings and limits the firms ability to respond to the extension of the policy, is value
decreasing. An alternative way to view these results is that investors do not value
strong governance, in the context of bonus depreciation, because it induces earnings
management behavior and limits response to the tax policy; earnings management
behavior is this setting is value decreasing.
I focus on the third column of table 7 to examine the magnitude of the point
estimates. Three days after the passage of ATRA 2012, a one standard deviation de-
crease in the present value of MACRS statutory tax depreciation allowances results
in a 0.644 percentage point over-performance. The coefficient on the interaction term
is equal to 0.457. The interpretation of this estimate is that for a firm whose benefit
from the policy is one standard deviation above the mean, a one standard deviation
decrease in governance increases cumulative abnormal return by an additional 0.457
percentage points. These estimates are consistent with back-of-the envelope calcula-
tions that utilize results from the investment response analysis; details are provided
in Appendix 1.9.13.
Marginal effects of an additional standard deviation Deprec are presented across
various levels of governance in Table 8. When governance levels are low and the
firm is responsive to bonus depreciation (as determined in the investment analysis),
the extension of the bonus has a large impact on abnormal returns. However, when
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Table 1.6: Americian Taxpayer Relief Act 2012 Event Study Results
Dependent Variable CAR1 CAR2 CAR3 CAR4 CAR5 CAR6
Entrenchment -0.049 -0.043 -0.031 -0.095 -0.075 -0.031
(0.102) (0.096) (0.118) (0.127) (0.147) (0.176)
Deprec -0.000 -0.448** -0.644*** -0.429** -0.361 -0.095
(0.322) (0.187) (0.168) (0.176) (0.222) (0.292)
Entrenchment x Deprec 0.251 0.411*** 0.457** 0.465** 0.320 0.186
(0.211) (0.149) (0.183) (0.177) (0.214) (0.248)
Observations 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189
Table 7 presents results for regressions of the form
CARt = β0 + β1 [Entrenchment] + β2 [Deprec Rate] + β3 [Entrenchment X Deprec Rate]
CARt is the cumulative abnormal return t trading days after the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012 was signed into law on January 1, 2013. Controls for cash flow are included in each regression.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the1 %
level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Table 1.7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Marginal Effects
Governance Level -2 -1 0 +1 + 2
Std. From Mean
d(CAR3) -1.558*** -1.101*** -0.644*** -0.187 0.267
/dDeprec (0.466) (0.305) (0.181) (0.190) (0.321)
Notes: Table 8 provides marginal effects estimates of the change in cumulative abnormal returns 3
days after the passage of ATRA 2012 resulting from a one standard deviation increase in depreciation
rates. Marginal effects are provided for firms with mean level Governance and firms with Governance
± 1 and ± 2 standard deviations from the mean. Marginal effects are derived from the regression
presented in column 3 of Table 7. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Note: Figure 7 and Figure 8 graph regression coefficients on Deprec and Entrenchment x Deprec.
Each data point is from a different regression where the dependent variable, cumulative abnormal
return, changes with the number of days after the passage of ATRA 2012. 95% confidence bands
are shown in blue. The Deprec coefficient can be interpreted as how much higher the cumulative
abnormal return is in percentage points when a firm’s statutory tax depreciation rates increase
by one standard deviation relative to the average. The Entrenchment x Deprec coefficient can be
interpreted as how much larger the Deprec coefficient is when the governance measure increases by
one standard deviation relative to mean.
governance measures are high, the effect of the bonus on abnormal returns is not
statistically different from zero. Again, bonus depreciation is valued by the market,
and the value of the policy is larger among those firms with low levels of governance,
who will be most responsive to the policy.
1.7.4 Visual Representation of Event Study Results
Figures 7 and 8 present the event study results from Table 7 visually. Each data
point represents a coefficient from a different regression where the CAR dependent
variable is changing over time. Blue lines represent lower and upper bounds predicted
with 95% confidence. From the visual representation of the regression results, one
may observe that the Deprec coefficient is negative and statistically different from
zero 2, 3, and 4 days after the passage of ATRA 2012. Figure 8 shows that the
interaction coefficient is positive and statistically different from zero 2, 3, 4, and 5
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days after the passage of ATRA 2012.
One concern with these results in that they are driven by pre-trends and not a
product of the event. To address these concerns, figures 9 and 10 present CARs
that are constructed beginning 5 days prior to the passage of ATRA 2012. The
disadvantage of constructing CARs that begin prior to the event is that additional
variation unrelated to the event is introduced.
Cumulative abnormal returns are close to zero (and not statistically different
from zero) in the days prior to the event, confirming that the event was a surprise.
Upon impact, the Deprec coefficient drops and the interaction coefficient increases
substantively. The magnitude of the point estimates in the days after the event is
very close to coefficients depicted in Figures 7 and 8. Clearly, pre-trends are not
driving the event study results.
While the Deprec coefficient remains statistically different from zero 1, 2, and 3
days after passage of ATRA 2012, the interaction coefficient does not. Again, the
decrease in the precision of the estimate is due to increased variance in the CARs.
Because abnormal returns are uncorrelated with the interaction term in days prior
to the event, additional variance is introduced into the construction of CARs in days
after the event and as a result the standard errors increase. Due to this increased
variance unrelated to the event itself, CARs constructed beginning only on the date
of the event are typically used to estimate the impact of the policy.
1.7.5 Fiscal Cliff Event Study Summary
Firms that invest in longer-lived equipment assets and stand to gain the most from
bonus depreciation have higher than average cumulative abnormal returns following
passage of ATRA 2012. A one standard deviation decrease in statutory tax deprecia-
tion rates results in more than a one-half percentage point higher cumulative returns
3 days after passage. Cumulative abnormal returns are relatively higher for firms
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Figure 1.6: Event Study Results with Pre-trends
Deprec Coefficient Bebchuk x Deprec Coefficient
Note: Figure 9 and Figure 10 graph regression coefficients on Deprec and Entrenchment x Deprec.
Each data point is from a different regression where the dependent variable, cumulative abnormal
return, changes with the number of days after the passage of ATRA 2012. 95% confidence bands
are shown in blue. The Deprec coefficient can be interpreted as how much higher the cumulative
abnormal return is in percentage points, when a firm’s statutory tax depreciation rates increase
by one standard deviation relative to the average. The Entrenchment x Deprec coefficient can be
interpreted as how much larger the Deprec coefficient is when the governance measure increases by
one standard deviation relative to mean.
with low levels of governance. The event study results suggest that investors value
bonus depreciation and firms that have traditionally been most responsive to the pol-
icy, those with low levels of governance with low incentives to focus on accounting
earnings or engage in earnings management behavior. In the context of bonus depreci-
ation, earnings management behavior, a product of aggressive corporate governance,
is value decreasing.
1.8 Conclusion and Implications for Governance and Policy
The accounting treatment of bonus depreciation makes possible the identification
of earnings management behavior, in which managers distort firm activities in or-
der to manipulate accounting earnings. Inaction in the face of bonus depreciation
is consistent with the type of earnings management documented by Graham et al.
(2005), in which managers may sacrifice positive NPV investment projects in order to
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meet earnings targets. This research has documented that this earnings management
behavior is concentrated among firms with strong corporate governance and is the
first to confirm that, as hypothesized by Stein (1989), stronger corporate governance
forces managers to focus on maximizing current accounting earnings at the expense
of long-run real economic benefit. Stock price responses to the passage of The Amer-
ican Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 suggest that earnings management behavior is both
concentrated among strongly governed firms and is value decreasing in the context of
bonus depreciation.
These findings have potential implications for the role of corporate governance and
for the use of bonus depreciation. Shareholders should be aware that equity incen-
tive or the threat of takeover may induce earnings management and should take this
cost into effect when making governance decisions. Trends in corporate governance
suggest that perhaps shareholders are already aware of these costs and are insulating
managers to avoid them. Gompers et al. (2003) documented a slow-moving trend
towards less corporate governance as a result of the firms enacting provisions that
limit the reach of shareholders. If shareholders choose to enact these policies opti-
mally, then the benefits of these policies must outweigh the costs. The cost of these
provisions is that they may exacerbate principal–agent problems. The benefits are
less clear. However, this research has identified that lower levels of governance and
less shareholder discipline may allow managers to focus on economic value maximiza-
tion, as opposed to accounting earnings. If shareholders understand this connection
and its potentially large distortionary consequences, then the need to limit earnings
management may be driving trends towards managerial entrenchment.
The documented heterogeneous investment response among firms with varying
levels of governance explains why bonus depreciation has been less effective than
many had believed it would be. Firms with low levels of shareholder oversight and
lower incentives for earnings management behavior are very responsive to the policy.
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This indicates that the policy would have been more effective were it not for the
accounting treatment of tax depreciation allowances.
That the policy was less effective at increasing investment during the recessions
of 2001 and 2008 is unfortunate. This heterogeneous response may be extra unfortu-
nate from a welfare perspective. The firms that have been observed to be the most
responsive to the policy are those with low levels of shareholder control. These are
also the firms with the most significant separation of ownership and control. Previous
research has shown that weakly governed managers are most likely to make decisions
that are not in the best interests of shareholders with respect to financing, payout
policy, and merger behavior. If the least-efficient firms are the most responsive, the
macroeconomic stimulus aspect of the policy is doubly dubious: for the average firm,
bonus depreciation is relatively ineffective at stimulating investment; and the sub-
population of firms that is responsive is composed of corporations that may make
investment decisions not in the best interest of shareholders.
On the other hand, the heterogeneous investment response uncovered in this paper
may provide evidence that the policy is more effective than previously believed and
may have an unintended progressivity born of its accounting treatment. Given that
the most responsive firms are those that focus the least on earnings management,
then private firms, which have no reason to engage in earnings management, may be
more responsive to bonus depreciation than the publicly traded firms under study
in this research. This possibility, if true, would have three important implications.
First, if private firms are more responsive to bonus depreciation, then estimates of
the effect of bonus depreciation on investment using only publicly traded firms may
underestimate the true impact of the policy. Second, private firms have ostensibly
less separation of ownership and control (or at least have large block holding owners)
and therefore may make more efficient investment decisions than the poorly governed
but very responsive publicly traded firms. Finally, because private firms tend to be
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smaller, the policy may have an aspect of built-in progressivity, perhaps making the
policy extra appealing from an equity standpoint.
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1.9 Appendices






e−rt[αAEt + (1− α)CFt]
subject to
K˙t = It − δKt
K˙Tt = pIt − δTKTt





e−rt[α[(1− τ)[F (Kt)− pψ(It, Kt)− rDt − δBKBt ]]
















t − pIt + δBKBt )dt. (1.6)
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= e−rt(1− α)τδT + λ˙Tt − λBt δT . (1.10)
Solving for the shadow value of an additional dollar’s worth of book and tax capital
respectively in the steady state yields:








For ease of notation, I define zB and zT as the present values of future depreciation
















Plugging (8) and (9) into (4) and solving for the derivative of the adjustment cost




− ((1− α) + αzB − τ [(1− α)zT + αzB]− ITC
1− τ .
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1.9.2 Investment Control Variables
The marginal value of an additional dollar of investment (marginal Q), is measured
as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities excluding
deferred taxes, divided by the book value of assets,
Qt =
prcct × cshot + att − ceqt + txdbt
att
,
Where prcc is the price of outstanding shares, csho is the number of outstanding
shares, at is total assets, ceq is outstanding equity and txdbt is the differed tax
liabilities.
Measures of cash flow and financial distress are constructed following Kaplan and





This ratio is the income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortiza-
tion, scaled by the capital stock at the beginning of the year.
“K-Z financial constraint” is defined as






dlttt + dlct + seqt
Financial Constraint proxies for financial constraint as a linear combination of (1)
common and preferred dividends paid as a fraction of total assets, (2) liquid assets
as a fraction of total assets, and (3) debt as a fraction of debt plus equity.
1.9.3 Bonus Depreciation Legislation
• The Job Creation and Workers Assistance Act of 2002 enacted 30% bonus
depreciation for property placed into service after September 10, 2001.
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• The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 increased the bonus
level to 50% for property placed into service after May 5, 2003, and before
January 1, 2005.
• Bonus depreciation expired December 31, 2004.
• The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 reintroduced the bonus depreciation at a
50% rate for capital placed into service after January 1, 2008.
• American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended the bonus at the
50% rate through 2009.
• The Small Business Jobs and Credit Act of 2010 further extended the depre-
ciation at the same rate through 2010. However, SBJCA was not signed into
law until September 27, 2010, so for the majority of 2010 businesses may have
been under the impression that the bonus depreciation might not be available
on new capital expenditure.
• The Tax Relief and Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation
Act of 2010 (signed on December 17, 2010) raised the bonus rate to 100% for
property placed into service after September 8, 2010, and before January 1,
2012. Property placed into service during 2012 garnered the 50% bonus.
• The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended bonus depreciation at a
rate of 50% for 2013.
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Table 1.8: Entrenchment Investment Analysis
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z Tax Term 0.027* 0.017 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.123*** 0.136***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.027) (0.034) (0.034)
Entrench 0.161*** 0.170*** 0.236*** 0.242***
(0.052) (0.054) (0.063) (0.062)
Entrench x Z TT -0.019** -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
γB 0.239*** 0.267*** 0.203*** 0.203***
(0.044) (0.056) (0.051) (0.055)
Firms 1,944 1,911 16,19 1,592 1,576 1,543
Firms X Years 14,261 13,704 12,364 11,926 8,122 7,831
Notes: Specifications (1) and (2) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1






for the governance subsample. Specifications (3) through (6) include governance measures and
present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T






Specifications (2), (4), and (6) include additional controls for cash flows and financial distress. The
time period for specifications (1) through (4) is the years 2000–2010. Specifications (5) and (6) focus
on years 2000–2006. γG represents how much less responsive a firm is to the bonus depreciation
when the Entrenchment measure of governance is increased one standard deviation relative to the
mean. All specifications include marginal Q and firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
1.9.4 Entrenchment Investment Analysis
Appendix C presents key results using “Entrenchment” as defined in Section 5.1.2.
During the full sample of years, firms with the lowest measures of governance and
average rates of statutory tax depreciation increase their investment percentage by 7.5
percentage points when bonus depreciation increases from 0 to 100%. A one standard
deviation increase in Bebchuk decreases investment responsiveness by 27%. Results
are similar when the sample is restricted to years 2000–2006.
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1.9.5 Investment Analysis Robustness to Interpolation
Appendix 1.9.5 addresses Governance imputation concerns. In (1) analysis is
limited to years prior to 2007, when the method of interpolation used to construct
the governance measure is least likely to skew results. In (2), Governance measures
for 2001, 2003, and 2005, are interpolated by average Governance in the two closest
years. 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 data are extrapolated from 2000 to 2006 trends
in the observed measure. (3) limits analysis using average interpolation to years
2000–2006 to allay concerns that data imputation using trends are driving results. In
(4) the average Governance measure is used. Heterogeneous investment response to
bonus depreciation is present and of similar magnitude in all results.
1.9.6 Governance and Shares Analysis
Appendix 1.9.6 presents specifications with both Governance and Shares variables
and their interactions with the Z Tax Term. Specifications (2) through (6) progres-
sively limit analysis to firms that are more likely to have professional managers.
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Table 1.9: Robustness to Interpolation
Dependent Variable Cap Ex / PPE
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Z Tax Term 0.197*** 0.160*** 0.197*** 0.124***
(0.050) (0.031) (0.050) (0.026)
Governance 0.358*** 0.342*** 0.358***
(0.076) (0.054) (0.076)
Gov x Z TT -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Gov x Z TT -0.036***
(0.006)
γG 0.212*** 0.314*** 0.194*** 0.290
(0.031) (0.067) (0.063) (0.027)
Firms 1,873 1,972 1,932 1,917
Firms x Years 9,257 13,131 8,684 16,859
Notes: Specifications (1) through (3) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T






Specification (1) uses the Governance variable as defined in Section 5.1.1, but limits the analysis
to years 2000 to 2006. Specifications (2) and (3) use Governance constructed by interpolating the
measure for year 2001, 2003, 2005, and years 2007–2010. Specification (2) uses data for years 2000
to 2010; the time period is limited to years 2000–2006 in Specification (3). γB represents how much
less responsive a firm is to the bonus depreciation when the Governance measure of governance
is increased one standard deviation relative to the mean. All specifications include controls for
marginal Q, cash flows, and financial distress and firm and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.10: Baseline Analysis 2000–2010, Managerial Equity Percent-
age
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shares Restriction < 20% < 15% < 10% < 5%
Z Tax Term 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.166*** 0.153***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036)
Governance 0.315*** 0.321*** 0.324*** 0.323*** 0.334*** 0.310***
(0.054) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.064)
Gov x Z TT -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.040***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Shares -0.000 -0.003 0.023 0.008 0.041* 0.070
(0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.044)
Shares x Z TT 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Firms 1,619 1,592 1,571 1,557 1,526 1,453
Firms x Years 12,364 11,926 11,535 11,348 10,992 10,071
Notes: Table 5 presents regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1τz
T
it + β2Git + β3Gitτz
T






Specifications (2) through (6) include additional controls for financial distress and cash flows. All
specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and
* at 10%.
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Table 1.11: Decomposing the Governance Index
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z Tax Term 0.050 -0.013 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.221*** 0.379***
(0.043) (0.018) (0.023) (0.029) (0.042) (0.061)
Voting 0.062 0.092
(0.059) (0.059)
















Other x ZTT -0.065*** -0.056***
(0.012) (0.014)
Notes: Specifications (1) through (5) present coefficients from regressions of the form:
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T






Specification (6) includes all sub-indexes and their interaction with the Z Tax Term. All specifications
include marginal Q and firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%,
and * at 10%. i = 1, 911, i× t = 13, 704.
1.9.7 Decomposing the Governance Index
In Appendix 1.9.7, the effect of Governance Sub-Indexes are analyzed separately.
1.9.8 Standard Errors Clustered On Industry
In Appendix 1.9.8, the baseline analysis is repeated with standard errors clustered
by industry to alleviate concerns that correlation in errors is at the industry, and not
the firm, level. Standard error estimates are very similar to baseline results.
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Table 1.12: Baseline Analysis, Standard Errors Clustered by Industry
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z Tax Term 0.040** 0.015 0.027 0.017 0.177*** 0.160***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.033) (0.052)
Governance 0.357*** 0.342***
(0.056) (0.092)




Firms 12,932 12,047 1,944 1,911 1,944 1,911
Firms x Years 78,506 71,773 14,261 13,704 14,261 13,704
Notes: Specifications (1) and (2) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1






for the governance subsample. Specifications (3) through (6) include governance measures and
present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T






Specifications (2), (4), and (6) include additional controls for cash flows and financial distress. The
time period for specifications (1) through (4) is the years 2000–2010. Specifications (5) and (6) focus
on years 2000–2006. γG represents how much less responsive a firm is to the bonus depreciation
when the Governance is increased by one standard deviation relative to the mean. All specifications
include marginal Q and firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%,
and * at 10%.
62
1.9.9 Industry x Year Fixed Effects
One concern in identifying the heterogeneous investment response to bonus de-
preciation is that Governance levels may be higher for the least responsive industries,
those with the fastest statutory tax depreciation rates. To alleviate concerns, I in-
clude industry-year fixed effects to identify heterogeneous response within industries.
Because the Z Tax Term is identified exclusively from differences across industries
over time, it is perfectly collinear with the industry-year fixed effects and is dropped
when industry-year fixed effects are included for the 123 BEA industries as in spec-
ifications (1) and (2). In specifications (3) and (4) industry-year fixed effects are
included for industries defined by 2-digit NAICS codes. Heterogeneous investment
response to bonus depreciation is present in all specifications.
1.9.10 Taxable Status and Investment Response
Firms that have tax loss carry-forwards should be unresponsive to bonus depre-
ciation. If firms are strongly governed because they have performed poorly in the
past, then the most strongly governed firms are likely to have tax loss-carry-forwards
and should be unresponsive to bonus depreciation. In this case, empirical analysis
excluding measures of tax status would show that strongly governed firms are less
responsive to bonus depreciation. To alleviate concerns of this nature, I include three
different measures of tax status and tax status interacted with the Z Tax Term to
baseline regressions.
1(TLCF) The first measure of taxable status is an indicator for whether the firm
has any tax loss carry-forwards. The variable is equal to 1 when the firm reports
a positive number of tax loss carry-forwards. The indicator is equal to zero if the
firm reports 0 tax loss carry forwards or if the value is missing but the firm reports
a positive number for Property Plant and Equipment. When the indicator is turned
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Table 1.13: Including Industry x Year FE
Dependent Variable Cap Ex / PPE
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Z Tax Term 0.108*** 0.094***
(0.034) (0.033)
Governance 0.192*** 0.183*** 0.288*** 0.282***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.054)
Governance x ZTT -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.033*** -0.033***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Q/(1− τ) 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.024***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Additional Controls X X
Firms 1,944 1,911 1,944 1,911
Firms x Years 14,261 13,704 14,261 13,704
All specifications present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T






All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Specifications (1) and (2) include Industry
x Year FE for the BEA Industries. Specifications (3) and (4) include Industry x Year FE for the
industries defined by 2 digit NAICS industries. Additional controls include Cash Flows and Financial
Distress. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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on, firms should be less responsive to bonus depreciation.
TLCF The second measure of taxable status is the level of tax loss carry-forwards
reported by the firm. The variable is set equal to zero if the value is missing but the
firm reports a positive number for Property Plans and Equipment. When firms have
more tax loss carry-forwards, they should be less responsive to bonus depreciation. I
scale this variable to be a number between 0 and 100.
MTR The third measure of taxable status is a simulated marginal tax rate con-
structed by Blouin, Core and Guay (2010). I use the marginal tax rate after interest
deductions have been accounted for. When this number is higher, firms should be
more responsive to bonus depreciation. The simulated tax rates take on values be-
tween 0 and 1.
I perform analysis using both contemporaneous taxable status measure and once-
lagged measures to control for potential endogenous. Odd-numbered specifications
reported below use the contemporaneous tax status measure. Even-numbered speci-
fications use the lagged tax status.
The results of the tax-status analysis continue to show substantial heterogeneity
in investment response to bonus depreciation. The magnitude of the heterogeneity is
similar to the magnitude of the heterogeneity in the baseline results. The regression
analysis also indicates that taxable status plays a role in determining investment
response to bonus depreciation. Specification (1) results suggest that firms that have
tax loss carry-forwards are more than 50% less responsive to bonus depreciation.
Specification (5) results suggest that a 10% increase in simulated marginal tax rates
makes firms approximately 50% more responsive to bonus depreciation.
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Table 1.14: Investment Responsiveness and Tax Status
Dependent Var Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z Tax Term 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.182*** 0.156*** 0.055 0.054
(0.032) (0.032) (0.042) (0.040) (0.056) (0.057)
Gov x Z TT -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
1(TLCF) 0.168* 0.143
(0.098) (0.104)








MTR x ZTT 0.263* 0.256*
(0.145) (0.140)
Firms 1,911 1,911 1,471 1,479 1,809 1,810
Firms x Years 13,704 13,692 8,505 8,534 13,080 13,113
Notes: All specifications present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1z
T
it + β2Git + β3Gitz
T






Where TAX is an indicator for tax loss carry-forwards in specifications (1) and (2), is the level of tax
loss carry-forwards in (3) and (4), and is the Blouin et al. (2010) estimated marginal tax rate in (5)
and (6). Specifications (2), (4), and (6) use the lagged tax variable to avoid endogeneity concerns.
All specifications control for marginal Q, financial distress, and cash flows and include firm and year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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Table 1.15: Event Study Placebos
Event Study Placebo 1: December 10, 2012
Dependent Variable CAR1 CAR2 CAR3 CAR4 CAR5 CAR6
Bebchuk 0.049 -0.001 0.042 0.046 0.085 0.128
(0.042) (0.058) (0.073) (0.079) (0.072) (0.084)
Deprec -0.030 0.217* 0.345* 0.382 0.203 0.168
(0.108) (0.129) (0.206) (0.260) (0.180) (0.194)
Bebchuk x Deprec -0.063 0.012 0.152 0.121 0.149 -0.063
(0.088) (0.117) (0.137) (0.146) (0.126) (0.137)
Observations 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189
Event Study Placebo 2: January 15, 2013
Dependent Variable CAR1 CAR2 CAR3 CAR4 CAR5 CAR6
Bebchuk 0.017 0.095 0.055 0.037 0.030 0.024
(0.048) (0.066) (0.097) (0.111) (0.135) (0.157)
Deprec -0.143 -0.157 -0.238 -0.331 -0.339 -0.214
(0.213) (0.424) (0.411) (0.528) (0.516) (0.577)
Bebchuk x Deprec -0.054 -0.012 0.145 0.244 0.305 0.214
(0.065) (0.097) (0.110) (0.152) (0.193) (0.204)
Observations 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189 1,189
Table X presents results for regressions of the form
CARt = β0 + β1 [Bebchuk] + β2 [Deprec Rate] + β3 [Bebchuk X Deprec Rate]
CARt is the cumulative abnormal return t trading days after Pacebo Dates December 10, 2012 and
January 15, 2013. Results include industry fixed effects and control for Cash Flow. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** statistical significance 1%
level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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1.9.11 Event Study Placebo Tests
1.9.12 Investment Impact of ITC Repeal
In this section, I test a secondary hypothesis of the theoretical model presented
in Section 4. The model predicts that while investment response should be heteroge-
neous to bonus depreciation via the Z Tax Term, investment should not be heteroge-












If, in fact, investment response to ITC is not heterogeneous across firms with varying
levels of governance, then there is additional evidence that bonus depreciation take-
up is limited due to its accounting interactions and that bonus depreciation is a
nice natural experiment to test for the relationship between governance and earnings
management.
To test the theory, I will run regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1
ITCTit
1− τt + β2
τzTit













on data that includes changing tax depreciation rates and investment tax credits.
If the coefficient β3 is equal to zero, then the subsidiary model prediction is con-
firmed. Coefficient β4 should be greater than zero if investment response to changes
in statutory depreciation rates is heterogeneous in the governance measure. However,
I expect to find no heterogeneous response, because statutory tax depreciation rates
were not the primary investment stimulus tool used during the new sample period;
the ITC was.
The ITC was retroactively repealed in 1985 by The Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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This analysis will focus on the period around the repeal, years 1981 to 1987, three
years prior to and three years after repeal. During this time, top statutory tax rates
and statutory depreciation rates were also in flux. The analysis accounts for these
changes.
Governance Data: The IRRC began collecting corporate governance data in 1990.
This data will be projected back to the time sample of interest. This presents possible
measurement error into the analysis. However, as Gompers et al. (2003) pointed out,
governance variables are relatively stable over time. I will test both the Governance
and Entrenchment measures in the following analysis.
Tax Variables: I construct the Z Tax Term as in Section 3.4. The construction of
the investment tax credit variable,
ITC Tax Term =
ITCit
1− τt ,
is similar. Dale Jorgenson provides ITC data on 44 different types of assets. For each
asset class, both the ITC rate, which varies over time, and the ITC basis (whether the
type of asset qualified for the tax credit) is provided. Using the 1982 BEA Capital
Flow Table, the percentage of investment in each asset type by each industry is
constructed. These weights are combined with ITC rates and bases to create industry-
level ITC rates that vary over time. Variation over time in the ITC is driven by
reforms in 1982 and 1985, when the ITC was ultimately (and retroactively) repealed.
Variation across industries is driven by the percentage of investment eligible for the
tax credit in each industry. The impact of the investment tax credit is identified by
industry-level differences in the percentage of capital expenditures that are eligible for
the investment tax credit. When the credit is repealed in 1985, it is most detrimental
to the industries where a large percentage of capital expenditure used to be eligible
for the credit.
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Other Data: All other variables are constructed as in Section 5.
Table 1.9.121 provides descriptive statistics for the 1981-1987 analysis. The Gover-
nance sample are larger firms for which the governance variables are available. These
firms tend to invest less as a percentage of capital. They also have larger cash flows.
The investment tax credit ranges from 0 to 10% over the sample, 0 to 0.187 when
scaled by the top statutory tax rate.
Results: Table 1.9.122 provides regression results for the 1981–1987 ITC analysis.
Specifications (1) and (2) examine the effect of the ITC Tax Term and the Z Tax Term
for the full sample with and without additional controls. The results suggest that the
general population of firms is very responsive to changes in both investment tax
credits and depreciation allowances. When the sample is limited to the Governance
Sample in specifications (3) and (4), the results are less extreme and not statistically
different from zero. This is most likely due to the small sample size.
In specification (5), Governance, Governance interacted with the ITC Tax Term,
and Governance interacted with the Z Tax Term are added to the regression. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically different from zero for either
tax variable, suggesting no heterogeneity in response to changes in either type of
investment tax incentives. Specification (6) repeats the analysis using the Entrench-
ment governance variable. Results are similar, again suggesting no heterogeneity of
response.
While this analysis is plagued by a relatively small sample size and possible mis-
measurement of the governance variables, it does not strongly contradict the main
results presented in this paper. If this analysis found that strongly governed firms
decreased their investment behavior the least when the investment tax credit was
repealed, it would call into question the heterogeneity that supports the connection
between governance and earnings management.
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Table 1.16: Descriptive Statistics, Years 1981–1987
Median Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Full Sample
Cap Exp / Prop Plant Equip 0.204 0.433 0.765 36,977
Z Tax Term 0.715 .0696 0.066 50,104
ITC Tax Term 0.167 0.109 0.082 50.104
Q/(1-τ) 1.212 1.817 1.866 34,675
Cash Flow / PPE 0.204 -0.040 2.758 37,405
K-Z Financial Constraint 0.463 0.373 2.135 40,158
Governance Sample
Cap Exp / Prop Plant Equip 0.206 0.311 0.424 5,783
Z Tax Term 0.714 0.690 0.071 6,979
ITC Tax Term 0.167 0.111 0.082 6,979
Q/(1-τ) 1.197 1.567 1.100 5,811
Cash Flow / PPE 0.302 0.500 0.944 5,751
K-Z Financial Constraint 0.138 0.118 1.398 6,594
Governance, Equity Incentives
Goernance 8 8.085 2.897 8,027
Entrenchment 4 4.066 1.363 8,027
Note: Table 1.9.121 provides descriptive statistics for the 1981–1987 analysis. The investment and
tax variables are provided for both the full sample and for the governance sample. The governance
sample are firms for which data are available. Table X also provides governance data for years
1981–1987.
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Table 1.17: Investment Tax Credit Analysis 1981–1987
Dependent Variable Capital Expenditure / Property Plant Equipment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITC Tax Term 3.794*** 3.730*** 1.143 0.770 0.336 0.297
(1.347) (1.238) (1.386) (1.367) (1.369) (1.352)
Z Tax Term 4.060*** 3.407*** 1.620* 0.943 1.029 0.963
(0.981) (0.941) (0.942) (0.908) (1.410) (1.361)
Gov x ITC TT 0.049
(0.069)
Gov x Z TT 0.002
(0.181)
Entrench x ITC TT 0.097
(0.114)
Entrench x Z TT 0.009
(0.308)
Q/(1− τ) 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.077*** 0.039* 0.039** 0.038*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Additional Controls X X X X
Firms 7,497 7,280 988 950 950 950
Observations 30,126 29,299 5,340 5,222 5,222 5,222
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1
ITCTit
1− τt + β2
τzTit




Specifications (5) and (6) include governance measures and present regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1
ITCTit
1− τt + β2
τzTit













All specifications include the structures tax term. Specifications (2) and (4) through (6) include
additional controls for cash flow and financial distress.
All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%,
and * at 10%.
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1.9.13 Reconciling Investment and Event Study Results
This robustness check uses investment response results to predict stock market
price responses to the 50% bonus deprecation extension analyzed in Section 1.7. The
back of the envelope calculations produce estimates surprisingly similar to event study
results. That the magnitudes of investment and stock price response and comparable
strengthens the findings presented in each disjoint analysis.
• Using results from the investment response analysis, the effect extension of
bonus depreciation at a rate of 50% can be calculated. According the the in-
vestment response results, for a firm with the average level of governance, invest-
ment does not respond to bonus depreciation. For the average firm, the benefit
of bonus depreciaiton comes exclusively from decreases in the net present value
costs of investment. For a firm with mean Deprec, 50% bonus decreases NPV
investment price by $0.21. For the average firm in the sample, this amounts to
a decrease of $6.573 million and results in a net income of 2.08%. For a firm
that invests in longer-lived equipment and has Deprec one standard deviation
below the mean, the cost of investment decreases by $0.035 per dollar which
decreases the cost of investment by $10.995 million and increases income by
3.47%. Under the overly-simple assumption that income is a perfect proxy for
firm value, upon announcement of 50% bonus depreciation, the value of firms
that have one standard deviation lower Deprec should increase by 1.39% more
than firms with mean Deprec levels. This is the exact interpretation of the
Deprec coefficient in the event study analysis. The event study analysis found
this number to be 0.644%.
• As the level of governance decreases, bonus depreciation is more effective at
stimulating investment. While the firm with mean levels of governance does not
increase investment in response to bonus deprecation, a firm with governance
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one standard deviation below the mean increases investment percent by 2.85%
in response to 50% bonus depreciation. This increase is equivalent to $8.921
million in additional investment. Using marginal Q to translate investment into
firm value, this investment response increases the value of the less-governed firm
by $25.38 million or 0.46% of the value of the average firm in the sample. The
event study analysis concludes firm values with governance levels one standard
deviation below the mean experience abnormal returns of 0.457 % more than
firms with mean governance levels.
74
CHAPTER II
Dividend Taxation and Merger Behavior: A New
View Explanation for the Post-Merger
Performance Puzzle (with Nathan Seegert)
2.1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions are a large part of the United States economy. Between
2000 and 2012, the dollar value of merger and acquisition activity in the US was
$12.78 trillion. Mergers are critical to economic growth because, done well, they can
capitalize on positive synergies and economies of scale, thereby increasing efficiency
and creating value for shareholders. However, executed poorly, mergers can dampen
innovation, decrease efficiency, and destroy shareholder value. Because of the scale
and significance of this topic, large literatures in finance and economics have developed
that discuss possible mechanisms which distort merger and acquisition behavior. In
this paper, we examine dividend taxation and its effect on merger behavior. We posit
that dividend taxation lowers the synergy threshold for profit maximizing mergers
and makes potentially inefficient mergers more attractive to firms. We find strong
empirical support for the this profit maximizing explanation, demonstrating long-run
returns are 8 to 10 percent higher for dividend paying firms following the 2003 US
dividend tax reform.
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There is reason to believe that merger and acquisition behavior is being distorted.
The finance literature documents that on average twenty-four months after a merger
returns are eighteen percent lower than would be expected in the absence of the merger
((Gregory 1997), (Myers 1984), (Agrawal and Madelker 1990), (Agrawal, Jaffee and
Madelker 1992)). This empirical puzzle seems to be robust across countries and
through time despite the fact that researchers have been discussing it for twenty
years ((Agrawal and Jaffee 2000)). Furthermore, it seems difficult to reconcile this
empirical puzzle with a model in which firms seek to maximize shareholder value.
This difficulty has inspired many behavioral explanations, such as CEO hubris.
We propose an alternative theory for this puzzle in which value-maximizing be-
havior in the presence of dividend taxation may result in inefficient mergers and
negative post-merger performance. A representative shareholder considers two prof-
itable investment opportunities an outside investment and a merger. The outside
opportunity differs from the merger in that in order to engage in the outside invest-
ment the shareholder must distribute funds and therefore pay dividend taxes. The
merger generates no tax costs, but may destroy the some of the value of the target
firm due to mismanagement or other possible issues. The shareholder weighs the tax
cost of the outside investment (which is larger in the presence of high dividend tax
rates) against the value that may be destroyed by the merger. When tax rates high,
value destroying mergers are relatively more attractive and may be profit maximiz-
ing. Therefore, when the cost of distributing funds through dividend payments is
distorted by the dividend tax, firms substitute towards mergers and acquisitions as
the preferred investment method.
This tax mechanism implies that in reaction to a dividend tax rate decrease, long-
run post-merger returns should be higher for firms paying a dividend and should be
unchanged for firms not paying a dividend. We test this implication using varia-
tion created by the 2003 dividend tax reform. Our empirical examination uses data
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on nearly 7,000 acquisitions by publicly traded companies between 1998 and 2010.
We collect data from Bureau Van Dijks Amadeus Zephyr database, the Compustat
North American Fundamentals Quarterly database, and the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database. In later analyses we extend this data to the years
1992 to 2012, over 20,000 acquisitions by publicly traded companies, using Thom-
son and Reuters SDC database. We implement a difference-in-difference empirical
strategy motivated by the theoretical model’s result that post-merger long-run re-
turns should be affected by a dividend tax change for firms paying a dividend but
should be unaffected for firms not paying a dividend. In this specification, we use
firms that distribute retained earnings through repurchases of shares as a benchmark
to control for other time-varying factors. Firms active in repurchasing shares are a
good benchmark because they are similar to firms that pay dividends based on ob-
servable characteristics, and are unaffected by the dividend tax change. Furthermore,
using firms actively repurchasing shares as the control group we empirically test and
fail to reject the common trend assumption, the key identifying assumption of the
difference-in-difference specification.
This paper contributes to both the economics literature on corporate taxation and
the finance literature on mergers and acquisition behavior. We make three significant
contributions. First, we provide a possible profit maximizing explanation for the post-
merger performance puzzle. Second, we provide empirical evidence supporting the
profit maximizing explanation, demonstrating the distortion due to dividend taxation
is real and empirically large enough to explain the puzzle.
2.2 Documenting and Explaining Merger Behavior
Two literatures have developed which separately explore aspects of merger and
acquisition behavior that we seek to study. The first literature is concerned with
documenting and explaining why mergers fail relative to benchmark trends. The
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second literature explores the impact of taxation on mergers.
2.2.1 The Post-Merger Performance Puzzle
(Franks, Harris and Titman 1991) was the first paper devoted entirely to explain-
ing long-run post-merger performance. The paper introduces techniques for analyzing
post-merger performance that the subsequent literature follows. (Franks et al. 1991)
describe the amount a firm was under- or over-performing over time by comparing
a counterfactual performance with the firm’s actual performance, measured by its
stock price. The cumulative difference between the counterfactual performance and
the actual performance of the firm is defined as the Cumulative Abnormal Return or
CAR. Subsequent literature improves upon the methods for predicting counterfactual
performance, but the (Franks et al. 1991) framework of studying CARs for individual
firms and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for all merging firms
is the benchmark in this field of study.
(Franks et al. 1991) investigates 399 acquisitions, both mergers and tender offers,
that occurred during the period 1975-1984, where both the acquirer and the target
were on NYSE/AMEX. The (Franks et al. 1991) findings suggest that cumulative av-
erage returns for acquiring firms are not statistically different from zero, however the
subsequent literature finds different results using (Franks et al. 1991)’s methods. For
example, (Agrawal et al. 1992) repeat the work done by (Franks et al. 1991) but extend
the time period to cover the years 1955 to 1987 and exclude tender offers from the sam-
ple, which would otherwise bias the results towards zero. (Agrawal et al. 1992) report
five-year CAARs of -0.1026, (interpreted as ten percentage points under-performance
relative to counterfactual stock performance). (Agrawal and Madelker 1990) find
very similar results to (Agrawal et al. 1992) when the counterfactual performance is
adjusted to control for firm size and the book-to-market ratio.
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(Gregory 1997) provides the most comprehensive study of post-merger perfor-
mance to date. The paper computes counterfactual performance using multiple
benchmarks. Furthermore, the study, which examines mergers in the United Kingdom
(UK) between 1984 and 1992, provides an out-of-sample test of the merger-failure
phenomenon observed in the United States. Gregory finds two-year buy-and-hold
(or multiplicative) CAARs which vary between -0.1182 and -0.18 using six different
counterfactual models. All point estimates are statistically different from zero.
The survey work by (Agrawal and Jaffee 2000) covers these results and lists sev-
eral other similar findings. They conclude “Taken together, we believe that the post
Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) articles suggest strong evidence of an anomaly
following mergers.” The empirical anomaly that mergers often result in poor per-
formance and that this trend is consistent over time is often called the post-merger
performance puzzle.
2.2.2 Possible Explanations
Several mechanisms have been offered to explain the post-merger failure puzzle.
(Agrawal and Madelker 1990) propose two mechanisms for abnormal negative post-
merger performance: speed of adjustment and size of the merger. The speed of
adjustment hypothesis posits that post-merger abnormal returns are the result of the
market reacting positively to the merger upon announcement. To test this hypothesis
they attempt to determine whether abnormal returns upon announcement are neg-
atively correlated with post-merger cumulative abnormal returns. Looking at post
1960 data they find no evidence of negative correlation, suggesting that the speed of
adjustment is not the mechanism driving the post-merger failure puzzle. (Agrawal
and Madelker 1990) also examines whether the size of the merger, which may im-
pact the speed at which information is capitalized into the price of the acquiring firm
stock, impacts firm CARs. They again find no empirical relationship. (Franks et
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al. 1991, Loughran and Vijh 1997) also find no connection between the size of the
merger and the post-merger cumulative abnormal return.
Another proposed mechanism, based on work by (Myers 1984), is that firms with
private information about the value of their own stock are able to buy companies
at a discount using their stock when it is overvalued. (Loughran and Vijh 1997)
find support for this mechanism by demonstrating that mergers paid for with stock
fail more often. However, (Gregory 1997) finds evidence that abnormal returns are
highest for mergers paid for with a combination of stock and cash. In addition,
if method of payment were the mechanism driving the post-merger failure the new
information should be capitalized into the share price immediately upon merger, not
over a period of 24 to 50 months which the literature focuses on.
A theory referred to as “performance extrapolation” has also been considered
to explain the post-merger performance puzzle. (Rau and Vermaelen 1998) posits
that the market over-values actions of firms that have performed well in the past.
Thus, upon announcement of a merger the market overvalues the activities of these
“glamour” firms. Similarly, the market undervalues mergers performed by firms with
poor past performance, or “value” bidders. As the information of the true value
of the merger is revealed, the glamour firm prices drop and the value firm prices
increase. (Rau and Vermaelen 1998) cite past literature which links higher announce-
ment returns to higher Q-ratios. (Rau and Vermaelen 1998) find modest evidence
that long-run under-performance is linked to glamour firms. However, their findings
are inconsistent with method of payment explanations. Their findings are also incon-
sistent with the (Agrawal and Madelker 1990) results, which do not demonstrate a
negative relationship between announcement abnormal performance and subsequent
cumulative abnormal returns.
To summarize the post-acquisition stock performance literature, there is ample ev-
idence from a number of studies using varied methodologies and samples to demon-
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strate that acquiring firms under-perform relative to predicted counterfactual per-
formance. Several explanations have been advanced to account for this apparent
anomaly but none have been widely accepted. The post-merger performance puzzle
remains an open question two decades after (Franks et al. 1991) first described it.
2.2.3 Mergers and Taxation Literature
We posit that taxation may, at least in part, explain the post-merger performance
puzzle. While this is a new mechanism for the literature following (Franks et al. 1991),
the effect of taxation on merger behavior has been studied in the corporate taxation
literature.
(Auerbach and Reishus 1987) examine mergers that occurred before 1986. During
this time period, acquiring firms could gain windfall tax benefits generated by mergers
(especially through the acquisition of tax loss carry-forwards or the basis step-up
of assets). (Auerbach and Reishus 1987) offer preliminary results that suggest: 1)
many acquisitions provide an opportunity for acquiring firms to receive some sort of
tax benefit, 2) in a small minority of cases, these benefits are large relative to the
value of the acquiring firm, and 3) even in cases where relatively large tax benefits
exist, there is no strong evidence that this is the driving force in the merger. In
addition to the benefits of attaining tax loss carry-forwards, (Auerbach and Reishus
1987) also identify a possible tax wedge; when transactions are made via nontaxable
stock transactions, the shareholders of the acquiring company may pay a premium
because they are able to diversify their portfolio without realizing capital gains. Given
this tax wedge theory, the acquirer should realize larger gains when paying with
stock.1 Although (Auerbach and Reishus 1987) do not find strong evidence that
merger behaviors are driven by tax attributes of mergers, the authors do find that
tax loss carry-forwards, at least prior to 1987, are the most beneficial tax attributes
1This theory runs counter to the method of payment empirical findings.
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of acquired firms.
A subsequent paper by the same authors, (Auerbach and Reishus 1988), present
empirical findings that support the theory that some types of tax benefits can influ-
ence merger behavior. (Auerbach and Reishus 1988) find that tax loss carry-forwards
(TLCFs) on the part of the acquiring firm do influence the takeover of firms that
earn positive income. In these cases, the TLCFs can be used to offset the income of
the acquired firm. (Auerbach and Reishus 1988) also find that firms that issue share
repurchases in the two yeas prior are less likely to merge which is “hard to reconcile
with the theory that firms seek acquisitions to free trapped equity.” This pattern does
not exist in our data.
In reviewing the results from the 1987 and 1988 Auerbach and Reishaus papers, the
reader should keep in mind that many of the tax benefits of mergers were eliminated
in provisions contained in Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The corporate finance literature presented here predicts that taxation should be
a driving force behind mergers if 1) the tax attributes of acquiring or acquired firms
may be better used after the merge or 2) if there exists some “trapped equity” in-
centives that make mergers more attractive options than some opportunity cost of
outside investment. While strong empirical results are generally lacking in this liter-
ature, some of these theories may be applied to help us understand the post-merger
performance puzzle. Our theory seeks to bridge the gap between these two litera-




2.3.1 A Framework of Substitute Investment Strategies
Consider a representative shareholder seeking to maximize the value of Firm A. At
the outset, the value of Firm A is denoted VA. Assume the shareholder is the firm’s
sole decision maker, thus the firm is immune to issues of agency. The shareholder
considers redirecting some of the capital from Firm A towards investment in a second
firm, Firm B. The shareholder has two alternative methods to invest in Firm B. The
first method involves distributing funds from Firm A and purchasing Firm B via an
“outside” investment. In this scenario, firm B would operate independently of Firm
A. The distribution of funds triggers taxation at rate θ. The shareholder values firm
B at VB. If we consider the cost of Firm B is CB, then the shareholder is willing to
engage in the outside investment only if
VA + VB − CB − θCB ≥ VA.
That is, the joint investment is only optimal if the values of Firms A and B minus
the cost of Firm B and the tax cost of distributing funds is greater than the value of
the original firm. Put differently, the investment in Firm B is only optimal if
VB − CB ≥ θCB, (2.1)
the net value of investing in B exceed the tax cost of distributing the funds necessary
for the purchase. If θ = 0 and distributions are not taxed, outside investment in B is
only optimal if the net value of B, VB −CB, is positive. When tax costs are positive,
the wedge between VB and CB must be even higher in order for the investment to be
profit maximizing.2
2There are several potential explanations for the existence of this wedge. For instance, the
shareholder may possess private information regarding the value of B. Alternatively, information
83
Alternatively, the representative shareholder may acquire Firm B through corpo-
rate M&A activities. The “merger” investment differs from the outside investment
in two ways. First, the shareholder does not have to distribute funds in order to
finance the acquisition and therefore avoids the tax cost of the investment. Second,
the merger generates synergy specific to the A and B combination, ξAB.
3 This syn-
ergy parameter captures the fact that once the merger in performed, the performance
of Firm B inherently depends on how the shareholder operates B and its resources
and/or how its operations interact with those of Firm A. For instance, if the merger
may create synergistic value by generating vertical supply chain integration. Alterna-
tively, the shareholder of Firm A may not operate Firm B as efficiently as the original
Firm B management team and the acquisition may actually destroy value. Thus, the
synergy parameter may take on both positive and negative values.
A merger is only profit maximizing if
VA + VB − CB + ξAB ≥ VA,
the value of the Firm A plus the net value of Firm B and the synergy between A
and B outweighs the value of the initial investment in only Firm A. Rewriting the
inequality in terms of the net value of B yields
VB − CB ≥ −ξAB, (2.2)
which differs from equation (2.1) in that −ξAB may take on positive or negative
values depending on whether the merger is value creating or value destroying. If the
asymmetries or agency issues may be depressing market’s valuation of B and thereby driving down
the cost of Firm B investment. The simple observation that individual investors often sell one stock
in order to buy another that they believe will garner higher returns confirms the existence of such
wedges.
3The cost of Firm B is assumed to be identical whether the investment is made via outside
investment or merger investment.
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synergy parameter is positive, then the shareholder may optimally invest in Firm B
via a merger even when the net value of Firm B is negative (as long as it is less
negative than −ξAB). When ξAB is negative and the merger is value destroying, the
merger is still optimal as long as the net value of Firm B outweighs the synergy costs.
Assuming that ξAB is positive, there are no values of VB−CB at which investment
in B will take place via private investment. To see this, first assume that VB −CB <
−ξAB. On this range of Firm B net value, no investment in B will take place as VB−CB
is negative (so private investment is sub-optimal) and large enough in magnitude
to eclipse the value of any potential synergies. When −ξAB < VB − CB < θCB,
then the merger is profit maximizing while the private investment is not. When
θCB < VB − CB, both investment strategies are profitable, however the merger is
always preferred because not only does the merger avoid the tax cost of investing in
Firm B, but it creates positive synergistic value for the shareholder.
However, when the synergies created by the merger are value destroying, the
private investment may be a substitute for the merger and the trade-off between the
two methods is governed by the tax rate on distributed funds. Assuming that either
investment strategy is profitable (that is, inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) hold) then the
merger is the profit maximizing choice for the shareholder as long as
ξAB ≥ −θCB. (2.3)
That is, as long as the synergies from the merger (which may be negative) are higher
than the tax costs of the private investment. The threshold at which the merger is
the preferred investment strategy is increasing in the tax rate on distributed funds.
If the tax rate is zero, then no mergers will take place because the private investment
has no costs outside of CB but the merger incurs the synergy cost. Only when
taxes on distributed earnings are positive, are inefficient mergers potentially profit
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maximizing choices. As the tax rate increases, the threshold at which the merger
is optimal decreases. Said differently, taxes on distributions increase the cost of the
substitute investment strategy making even inefficient mergers more attractive to the
decision making shareholder.
Given this discussion, the expected value of the merger may be written as
VM =
[
VB − CB + ξAB
∣∣∣ ξAB ≥ −θCB]
where the synergy parameter may be negative as long as the tax costs outweigh
any value destroying synergies created by the merger. From this expression, the
formal theoretical hypothesis upon which the remainder of this paper is based may
be constructed.
Hypothesis 1. The expected value of profit maximizing merger is decreasing in the
tax rate on distributed earnings, θ.
Given that both the outside investment and merger investment generate positive prof-
its, the merger is more profitable whenever the tax costs of the outside investment
outweigh any negative merger synergies. At higher rates of taxation on distributed
earnings, the tax costs of the outside investment increase and the synergy threshold
at which the merger is the preferred option decreases. When the threshold decreases,
the expected value of an observed profit maximizing merger decreases. More suc-
cinctly, an increased tax rate on distributed earnings drives down the minimum profit
maximizing merger synergy and lowers the bottom end of the distribution of the val-
ues profit maximizing mergers. As a result, the expected value of any observed profit
maximizing merger is lower.
Hypothesis 1 may also be understood by examining the expected value of an
observed profit maximizing merger both in a zero and positive tax environment.
When the tax rate on distributed earnings is zero, the merger synergy threshold is
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zero and the merger is only the profit maximizing investment option if it generates
positive synergies. The expected value of any observed merger is then weakly greater
than VB − CB because ξAB is constrained to be weakly greater than zero. When the
tax rate on distributions is positive, the lower threshold of profit maximizing synergies
is driven below zero. When the threshold is below zero, the expected value of profit
maximizing mergers is now weakly less than VB − CB.
When the tax rate on distributed earnings is positive, mergers may be both profit
maximizing from the perspective of a representative shareholder and “failures” from
the perspective of the greater economy. The merger is profit maximizing as long as it
is profitable and more profitable than the substitute outside investment option. With
positive tax rates, negative synergy mergers may be profit maximizing but the value
of the two firms prior to the merger VA + VB is strictly greater than the value of the
two firms after the merger, VA + VB + ξAB.
2.3.2 Investor Valuation and the Post-Merger Performance Puzzle
Before moving on to discuss the empirical strategy that will be used to test Hy-
pothesis, 1. First consider how the Hypothesis may help explain the post-merger
performance puzzle. The stock price response to the merger decision is driven by the
valuation of the merger by minority non-controlling investors. Assume the minority
investors accurately value VB and CB but cannot perfectly value the synergies cre-
ated by the merger, ξAB. If investors do not take into account the tax costs of the
substitute private investment, then they assume the merger will only be undertaken
when synergies are value creating. Thus, investors will value the merger as
VI =
[
VB − CB + ξAB
∣∣∣ ξAB ≥ 0] .
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In reality, the merger may be the best investment strategy as long as the synergies
destroy less value than the tax cost of the private investment. Thus, as noted above,
the real value of the merger, VM , is
VM =
[
VB − CB + ξAB
∣∣∣ ξAB ≥ −θCB] .
This divergence in the expected value of the merger from the investor’s perspective
versus the true value of the merger as understood from the perspective of the rep-
resentative shareholder provides a profit maximizing explanation for the long-run
cumulative abnormal stock returns of firms following acquisitions. Upon announce-
ment/acquisition stock returns for the acquiring firm are on average positive. How-
ever, in the long-run, abnormal returns are depressed for the acquiring firm up to 2
years after the merger, resulting in long-run negative stock performance relative to
pre-merger performance. This pattern is consistent with investors initially valuing the
firm at VI then revaluing the merger towards VM as the value of the merger synergy
parameter is slowly revealed.
2.4 Data Collection and Construction
To test Hypothesis 1, we collect data describing merger and firm characteristics.
The abnormal performance of the acquiring firm post-merger are compiled using this
data and details are provided in appendix 2.8.1. The sources, collection, and cleaning
of these data are described in the following three subsections. The last subsection




Merger characteristics are taken from the Bureau Van Dijk Amadeus Zephyr
database, with permission of Zephyr. We examine mergers that occurred between
the dates of January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2010. We restrict our sample in
several ways. First, acquisitions made by private companies not listed on the NYSE
or NASDAQ are excluded because they lack a stock price by which to measure per-
formance. We further limit our sample to 100 percent acquisitions to avoid merger
type effects. Finally, we exclude firms with more than twenty 100 percent acquisitions
during our sample period.4 This exclusion limits the effects from overlapping mergers
and excludes mostly large banking firms from our sample.
The Zephyr database has extensive data on mergers and acquisitions. For our
analysis the most pertinent features capture the timing of the merger, including the
announcement and official date, and merger type. We match the merger data from
Zephyr with data from CRSP and Compustat databases.
2.4.2 Stock Prices and Firm Characteristics
Stock prices are taken from the CRSP database. These data allows us to calculate
the abnormal returns for acquiring firms (using the month end closing stock price)
and the dollar value of repurchased shares (using the quarter end closing stock price).
Acquiring firm characteristics are taken from the Compustat North American Fun-
damentals Quarterly database. From the Compustat database we extract acquiring
firm data on dividends, share repurchases, assets, sales, and retained earnings.
Cash dividends paid per year are referred to simply as dividends throughout this
paper. Compustat provides the dividends paid as a number reported quarterly that
accumulates throughout the year. To transform the variable into cash dividends paid
per quarter, we use the accumulating variable value for the first quarter of the year
4The results are robust to setting other limits on the maximum number of mergers per firm.
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and then for each subsequent quarter take the difference in the accumulating variable
to be the cash dividends paid in that quarter. These values are used to determine
which firms regularly pay a dividend to identify them as the treatment group in the
empirical analysis.
Compustat provides data on shares repurchased starting with the first quarter of
2004. We follow (Stephens and Weisbach 1998) in imputing shares repurchased as
the dollar value of decreases in shares outstanding from Compustat. This method is
internally valed as it closely approximates repurchase behavior in years when Com-
pustat records actual repurchase data. As with the dividends, these values are used
to determine which firms regularly repurchase shares to identify them as the control
group.
Throughout the proceeding analysis, we also use firm controls in an effort to elim-
inate any correlation between merging behavior, payout behavior, firm size, retained
earnings, and productivity. To control for these characteristics, we include in our
analysis assets, retained earnings, percent cash merger, sales, percent stock merger,
marginal q, and the book-to-market ratio. We average these by firm for the two years
prior to the merger to attain average firm characteristics.
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
The empirical strategy compares long-run stock returns of dividend paying firms
making acquisitions before and after the dividend tax rate change in 2003. The
empirical strategy uses firms that regularly repurchase shares to control for all other
time varying variables that may affect long-run stock returns after an acquisition.
Table 2.1 demonstrates the similarity of firms that regularly pay a dividend and firms
that repurchase shares. On average, dividend firms have more retained earnings but
fewer assets than firms that repurchase shares, however they are more similar in these
categories than firms that do neither or both. In fact, across most of these statistics
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firms that pay dividends and firms that repurchase shares are more similar than firms
that do neither or both, supporting the use of firms that repurchase shares as a control
for firms that pay a dividend.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dividend Only SBB Only Neither Dividend and SBB
Retained Earnings 374.3 182.7 -268.9 2,009
(1,040) (2,264) (3,104) (5,636)
Total Assets 3,141 3,796 1,242 17,967
(10,919) (27,569) (4,268) (81,356)
Cash Flow 0.144 0.185 0.114 0.201
(0.331) (0.444) (0.696) (0.318)
Marginal q 2.058 2.377 3.227 2.019
(1.315) (1.505) (2.258) (1.212)
CAR 12 mo. -5.322 -5.419 -9.223 -5.040
(29.37) (30.80) (40.27) (23.00)
CAR 24 mo. -17.73 -18.38 -27.52 -13.34
(18.53) (19.32) (23.79) (13.77)
Observations 382 1,841 861 2,555
Notes: These descriptive statistics support the use of firms that repurchase shares as the
benchmark, or control, for firms that pay a dividend based on the similarity across these
observable characteristics.
Dividend Only: firms that regularly pay a dividend but have not repurchased shares.
SBB only: firms that regularly repurchase shares but have not paid a dividend.
Neither: firms that do not distribute retained earnings regularly.
Dividend and SBB: firms that regularly pay dividends and repurchase shares.
The advantage of using a difference-in-difference (DD) strategy is that it is able to
control for differences in unobservable characteristics between dividend and share re-
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purchasing firms that may affect long-run stock returns after an acquisition. Despite
the advantages of the (DD) strategy, a smaller concern remains that unobservable
characteristics will change affecting dividend paying firms and share repurchasing
firms differentially. This concern is a violation of the common trend assumption, the
key identifying assumption in difference-in-difference empirical strategies. Formally,
the common trend assumption states that the effect of changes in unobservable vari-
ables will have the same effect on the two subgroups. This assumption is empirically
testable by regressing,







where long-run stock returns are given by our twenty-four month CAR estimates, λk
are year fixed effects, and dD,i is an indicator variable of whether the firm pays out
dividends or not.5 The coefficients on the year fixed effects, δk, estimate the common
trend. The coefficients on the year fixed effects interacted with the dividend firm
indicator, γk, estimate the difference in trend between firms that pay a dividend and
firms that repurchase shares. Therefore, a failure to reject the joint test that all γk
are zero is a failure to reject the common trend assumption.
Table 2.2 reports this empirical test of the common trend assumption for three
subgroups: firms that pay dividends, firms with a low percentage of institutional
ownership, and firms that pay dividends and have a low percentage of institutional
ownership. Column (1) reports that none of the coefficients of the year fixed effects
interacted with the dividend firm indicator are statistically significant. The joint F-
test fails to reject the null, and therefore, the common trend assumption, at the fifty
percent level. Similarly, Columns (2) and (3) report that none of the coefficients on
the other subgroups are statistically significant and the F-test fails to reject at the
5This regression is run only over firms that pay dividends or share repurchases. Firms that do not
distribute retained earnings or distribute using both dividends and share repurchases are excluded.
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thirty-seven and forty-six percent levels respectively.
Table 2.2: Common Trend Assumption
Dividend Low Inst. Div x Low Inst.
1998 -4.289 -3.046 -2.508
(3.036) (1.868) (3.220)
1999 -7.901 -6.658 -6.120
(5.032) (4.424) (5.147)
2000 2.790 3.807 6.095
(5.911) (5.623) (6.110)
2001 -1.720 -0.650 1.731
(4.625) (4.095) (5.018)
2002 -0.193 0.962 3.325
(5.314) (4.862) (5.880)
R2 0.029 0.030 0.033
Observations 2223 2223 2223
F-stat 0.87 d.f. 5 1.09 d.f. 5 0.94 d.f. 5
p-value 0.500 0.365 0.457
Notes: The estimation equation is run over the set of firms paying
a dividend paying or repurchasing shares, excluding firms that do





2.5 Empirical Design and Results
The goal of the empirical strategy is to separate the effect of the dividend tax
on the quality of acquisitions undertaken from other unobserved factors that may
have changed between 1998 and 2010.6 We use variation in the dividend tax rate,
6The capital gains tax also decreased in 2003, but by only 5 percent. Using firms that repurchase
shares, that may be affected by the capital gains tax reform, will bias our estimates toward zero.
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across firm payout strategies, and across firm percentage institutional ownership to
identify the effect. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut
the tax rate on qualified dividends from the ordinary income tax rates to the long-
term capital gains tax rate.7 For top income tax payers this effectively lowered the
tax rate on dividends from 38.6 percent to 15 percent.8 This tax rate change gives us
variation in the dividend tax rate across the years in our sample. The dividend tax
rate change may not be the only relevant factor to acquisition policy that changed
in our sample years. For example, differences in market conditions before and after
2003 could cause differences in performance. To control for these other time-varying
factors we use variation across firms in payout strategy. Specifically, we use firms that
distribute profits through share repurchases as a benchmark to control for all other
time-varying factors. Firms that repurchase shares are a good benchmark because
they are similar in terms of observable characteristics, as Table 2.1 demonstrates, and
firms that repurchase shares are unaffected by the dividend tax rate change.
A difference-in-difference (DD) specification is used to exploit the variation in the
dividend tax rate and across firm payout strategies. The goal is to isolate the effect
of taxation on the performance of firms after an acquisition by comparing differences
in performance before and after the tax rate change for firms affected by the tax
rate change relative to firms unaffected by the tax rate change. To isolate this ef-
fect, we limit our sample in two ways. First, we use only firms that regularly pay
7A dividend is a qualified dividend if 1) it was paid after December 31, 2002, 2) paid by a U.S.
corporation or other entity that qualifies for benefits under U.S. tax laws and treaties and 3) the stock
most have been held 60 days during the 121-day period that begins 60 days before the ex-dividend
date.
8
Dividend Tax Rate Change
Income Level 2002 Tax Rate 2002 Income Level 2003 Tax Rate 2003
0 - $6,000 10 0 - $7,000 5
$6,000 - $27,950 15 $7,000 - $28,400 5
$27,950 - $67,700 27 $28,400 - $68,800 15
$67,700 - $141,250 30 $68,800 - $143,500 15
$141,250 - $307,050 35 $143,500 - $311,950 15
over $307,050 38.6 over $311,950 15
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a dividend and firms that regularly repurchase shares, excluding firms that do both
or neither. Second, we limit the sample to firms with a low percentage of institu-
tional ownership because many institutions are exempt from the dividend tax and
therefore, firms with a high percentage of institutional ownership will be unaffected
by the change: (Michaely 1991, Robin 1991, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1986). The
dependent variable of interest is the cumulative abnormal returns twenty-four months
after an acquisition, though other months are examined in appendix 2.8.2. The spec-
ification includes dummy variables for being a dividend paying firm, dD, and being
in the high dividend tax years 1998-2002, d0, and the interaction term, which is the
(DD) estimate. Finally, the specification includes time fixed effects λt and merger
specific covariates z as given by
R = β0 + β1dD + β2d0 + δ1dDd0 + λt + zγ + u (2.5)
where the subscripts for time, t, and merger, i, have been suppressed. The coefficient
of interest is δ1 which captures the effect of high dividend tax rates on the stock
return performance of dividend paying firms after an acquisition.
Alternatively, we can estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) spec-
ification using the variation across firms with high and low institutional ownership.
This specification allows us to control for time-varying factors that affect all dividend
paying firms and all firms with a low percentage of institutional ownership. However,
we are unable to control for unobserved time varying factors which differentially affect
dividend paying firms with a low percentage of institutional ownership. Though, this
concern is dampened by the fact that we fail to reject the common trend assumption,
reported in Table 2.2.
As in the (DD) specification, the dependent variable of interest in the (DDD)
specification is the cumulative abnormal returns twenty-four months after an acqui-
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sition. In addition to the indicator variables for being a dividend paying firm, dD,
and being in the high dividend tax years 1998-2002, d0, from the (DD) specification
we now include an indicator variable for being a firm with lower than 50 percent in-
stitutional ownership, dL, and the additional interaction terms, d0dL, dDdL, and the
(DDD) estimate d0dDdL.
9 Once again, the specification includes time fixed effects λt
and merger specific covariates z as given by
R = β0+β1dD+β2d0+β3dL+δ1dDd0+δ2d0dL+δ3dDdL+δ4d0dDdL+λt+zγ+u (2.6)
where the subscripts for time, t, and merger, i, have been suppressed. The coefficient
of interest δ4 captures the policy effect of higher dividend taxation on a firm’s long-run
stock returns after an acquisition.
2.5.1 Non-Parametric Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Table 2.3 calculates the unconditional means of the twenty-four month CARs for
each of the eight subgroups. The third row calculates the differences between the
high-tax and low-tax period for firms paying dividends and repurchasing shares with
high and low institutional ownership. Row (3) Column (1) reports that dividend
paying firms with low institutional ownership performed 5.47 percent worse in the
high tax period than in the low tax period. This simple difference conflates the tax
rate change and all other unobserved changes, creating the need for a benchmark to
compare it to. Column (2) in Row (3) provides this benchmark, reporting that firms
that repurchase shares with low institutional ownership performed 3.8 percent better
in the high tax period than in the low tax period. This difference implies market
conditions for acquisitions were better in the high-tax period, 1998-2002, than in the
low-tax period, 2003-2010. Thus in the counterfactual case without a tax rate change
9The results are robust to specifying the percentage of institutional ownership as a continuous
variable instead of a dummy variable.
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we would have expected dividend paying firms to perform better in the high-tax
period, contrary to what we observe. Taken together these two differences imply that
the higher taxes in the high-tax period led dividend paying firms with low institutional
ownership to perform 9.27 percent worse than they would have with the lower tax
rates. This result is the non-parametric difference-in-difference (DD) estimate that
corresponds to the parametric estimates in section 2.5.2 (Table 2.4 Column (1) ).
Table 2.3: Non-Parametric Estimates
Low Institution High Institution
Ownership Ownership
Dividends Share Purchases Dividends Share Purchases
High-Tax -21.36 -21.46 -19.84 -16.91
Low-Tax -15.89 -25.26 -16.84 -16.35
Differences -5.47 3.8 -3 -.56 -6.83
Notes: This table reports the mean levels of the cumulative abnormal returns 24 months after
an acquisition. The top row reports R¯0,D,L, R¯0,S,L, R¯0,D,H , R¯0,S,H and the second row reports
R¯1,D,L, R¯1,S,L, R¯1,D,H , R¯1,S,H .
Columns (3) and (4) in Row (3) repeat this exercise for firms with high levels
of institutional ownership. These differences report dividend paying firms with high
institutional ownership performed 2.44 percent worse in the high-tax period than
in the low-tax period, relative to firm’s that repurchase shares. This 2.44 percent
difference may be due to time-varying differential effects on firms paying a dividend
and firms repurchasing shares. If this is the case then we want to control for this
difference and subtract it off of the policy effect found for firms with a low percentage
of institutional ownership. However, this 2.44 percent difference may be due to the
fact that firms with a high percentage of institutional share holders are still affected by
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the dividend tax rate, but to a lesser extent. In this case we would not want to subtract
this effect off of the policy effect found for firms with a low percentage of institutional
ownership because it will bias the policy effect toward zero. The difference between the
tax effects for low institutional ownership firms and high institutional ownership firms
gives the result that dividend paying firms with low institutional ownership performed
6.83 percent worse because of the high tax rates. This result is the non-parametric
triple difference estimate that corresponds to the parametric triple difference estimates
reported in section 2.5.2 ( Table 2.5 row 7 Column (2) ).
2.5.2 Parametric Difference-in-Difference Analysis
This section reports the parametric difference-in-difference (DD) and difference-
in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimates from the empirical models in equations
(2.5) and (2.6). These estimates demonstrate higher dividend tax rates in the late
1990s and early 2000s led firms to perform 8 to 10 percent worse two years after an
acquisition relative to what their returns would have been with the lower dividend
tax rates after 2003. This evidence is consistent with the the model in section 2.3
which demonstrates dividend paying firms have an incentive, proportional to the
dividend tax rate, to make acquisitions with negative net synergies. Section 2.6 runs
several alternative specifications to rule out other possible models, including payment
method and firm monitoring, that could explain this result. Together these sections
provide strong evidence in support of the theoretical model and the negative impact
of dividend taxation on merger and acquisition behavior.
Table 2.4 reports the parametric difference-in-difference (DD) estimates for the
sub-sample of firms with a low percentage of institutional ownership. Limiting the
sample to firms with a low percentage of institutional ownership concentrates the
analysis on firms most likely to be affected by the dividend tax rate change, since many
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institutional shareholders are tax-exempt.10 In all three specifications the difference-
in-difference estimator is statistically and economically significant. Specification (2)
controls for firm characteristics such as sales, marginal q, retained earnings, and
total assets and specification (3) includes year fixed effects. The point estimates are
similar across these specifications, estimating post-merger long-run returns were 8 to
10 percent lower because of higher dividend taxation.
Table 2.4: Difference-in-Difference Estimates:
Low Institutional Firms Sub-Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Dividend Firms β1 8.387*** 5.559* 8.826**
(2.143) (3.167) (3.097)
High-Tax β2 3.286 0.895 0.736
(2.146) (1.850) (4.350)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -9.271** -8.004* -9.911**
(4.922) (4.133) (4.291)
Firm Controls X X
Year Fixed Effects X
R2 0.010 0.076 0.108
Observations 927 798 798
Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates. The
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 24 months
after an acquisition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The results remain statistically significant clustering at the group
level (e.g. firms that pay dividends and are in the high-tax years
1998-2002) and clustering by firm.
10The (DDD) specification uses the full sample of firms that pay dividends or repurchase shares
and includes a third difference for firms with low and high percentages of institutional ownership.
The (DD) estimates are robust to using the full sample and controlling for the level of institutional
ownership.
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Table 2.5 reports the parametric difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) es-
timates using the full sample of mergers by firms paying dividends or repurchasing
shares. This specification is more flexible than the (DD) estimates and is able to fur-
ther control for differences between firms that repurchase shares and firms that pay
a dividend by using the difference between them in the sub-samples of firms with low
and high percentages of institutional ownership. However, to the extent that firms
with high percentages of institutional share holders are affected by the dividend tax
rate change then the (DDD) estimates will be an underestimate of the true policy
effect of higher dividend taxation. Specification (1) runs the (DD) specification using
the full sample of mergers by firms paying dividends or repurchasing shares. The
(DD) estimate is statistically significant and has a smaller point estimate, −3.773,
than in Table 2.4 because it conflates firms with tax-exempt shareholders with firms
with taxable shareholders. The (DDD) estimate, given by δ4 is statistically and eco-
nomically significant across all specifications. Specification (2) does not control for
firm controls or year fixed effects and therefore, exactly replicates the non-parametric
estimates in Table 2.3. Controlling for year fixed effects and firm controls increases
the magnitude of the point estimate from −6.836 to −10.704. The point estimates
are similar across these specifications and similar to the (DD) results, estimating
post-merger long-run returns were 8 to 10 percent lower because of higher dividend
taxation.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dividend Firms β1 2.319** -0.495 -0.565** -1.354*** -2.178***
(1.093) (1.172) (0.172) (0.010) (0.233)
High-Tax β2 -0.542 -0.558 -13.398*** -0.922*** -8.663***
(0.948) (1.118) (1.202) (0.109) (1.943)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -8.915*** -10.566*** -6.453*** -8.101***
(1.470) (0.481) (0.926) (0.533)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -3.773** -2.437 -0.548 -1.162* 1.501**
(1.922) (2.717) (0.491) (0.529) (0.609)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 4.366** 7.328*** 3.591*** 6.359***
(2.154) (0.583) (0.564) (0.511)
Dividend x Low Inst. δ3 9.868*** 11.520*** 8.143*** 11.281***
(2.432) (0.449) (0.390) (0.391)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -6.836* -7.954*** -8.282*** -10.704***
(4.033) (0.698) (0.058) (0.827)
Year Fixed Effects X X
Firm Controls X X
R2 0.089 0.082 0.125 0.061 0.129
Observations 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimates. The dependent vari-
able is the cumulative abnormal return 24 months after an acquisition. Robust-clustered standard errors
are in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the group level (e.g. firms that pay dividends,
have low institutional ownership, and are in the high-tax years 1998-2002). The results remain statisti-
cally significant without clustered standard errors.
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2.5.3 Graphical Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the (DDD) estimation graphically, expanding the analysis
from twenty-four months after an acquisition to any month between one and thirty.
Each sub-figure graphs the average long-run returns before and after the tax rate
change. Firms that repurchase shares and have a high percentage of institutional
ownership are shown in Figure 2.1(A), and with a low percentage of institutional
ownership in Figure2.1(B). Below that firms that pay dividends and have a high
percentage of institutional ownership are shown in Figure 2.1(C), and with a low
percentage of institutional ownership in Figure 2.1(D).
The theory suggests firms that distribute retained earnings through share repur-
chases should not be affected by the dividend tax rate change. To the extent that
there are no other unobserved changes between the high-tax and low-tax periods, this
suggests the long-run returns for these firms should look similar before and after the
dividend tax rate change. For almost all months between one and thirty months after
an acquisition the long-run returns look very similar before and after the dividend
tax reform, denoted by the similarities in the blue solid (high-tax period) and red
dashed (low-tax period) lines in Figures 2.1(A) and 2.1(B). This suggests unobserv-
able changes between the high-tax and low-tax periods are minimal. Similarly, the
theory suggest firms that have shareholders that are tax-exempt from the dividend
tax, measured here by the percentage institutional ownership, should also not be af-
fected by the dividend tax rate change. Therefore, to the extent that firms with a
high percentage of institutional ownership are tax-exempt, the blue solid line and red
dashed lines in Figure 2.1(C) should also be similar, absent any other unobservable
changes. In contrast, to the previous three figures, the theory suggests firms paying
a dividend with taxable shareholders should be affected by the dividend tax reform
and cause a difference in the high-tax period (blue solid) line and low-tax period (red
dashed) line in Figure2.1(D).
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These figures support the empirical analysis demonstrating the returns in the high-
tax and low-tax periods are similar for firms repurchasing shares and firms paying
a dividend but with tax-exempt shareholders while the low-tax period led to higher
returns for firms paying a dividend with non-tax-exempt shareholders. Formally,
the policy effect is captured by subtracting the difference in lines in Figures 2.1(A),
2.1(B), and 2.1(C) from the difference in lines in Figure 2.1(D). These graphs suggest
the empirical results in Table 2.5 are robust to using any month between one and
thirty months after an acquisition as the dependent variable.
Figure 2.1: Difference High-Tax and
Low-Tax Time Periods
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2.6 Durability Of Empirical Results
This section presents several robustness tests which reinforce the baseline esti-
mates in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 and strengthen the connection between the empirical
results and the theoretical model. For these robustness tests, we rely on additional
data from Thomson and Reuters’ Securities Data Company (SDC) to expand the
time series to the years 1992-2012. The SDC data allows us to examine smaller sub-
sets, such as non-cash mergers and mergers done by firms not paying a dividend,
because the data set more than doubles the initial set of mergers considered from
just under 7,000 to just over 20,000. While the SDC data increases the number of
observations, it does so by using data up to 10 years on both sides of the tax rate
change in 2003. Using data further from the tax rate change in 2003 increases the
possibility of conflating effects, for example other tax rate changes in the 1990s. On
whole, these robustness checks provide further evidence that dividend taxes distort
merger and acquisition behavior and that this tax mechanism may be responsible for
the post-merger performance puzzle.
First, we present baseline specifications (as in Table 2.5) using the expanded data
set. The results are reported in Table 2.6. Using this data two additional tests are
run and reported in the appendix. Appendix 2.8.2 tests the robustness of our baseline
results to considering different time horizons. Appendix 2.8.2 tests whether the results
are biased due to mergers that occur in quick succession. These tests suggest that
the results are robust to different time horizons and the bias from mergers occurring
in succession is small. Furthermore, these tests suggest the baseline estimates may
be underestimates of the true policy effect of higher dividend taxation.
Second, we examine two alternative models which could generate our baseline
results. Regression results are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. We find no evidence
that the method of payment nor shareholder monitoring models are able to explain
the change in post-merger long-run returns reported in this paper.
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2.6.1 Parametric Difference-in-Difference Analysis Using SDC Data
Table 2.6 presents baseline specifications as in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 using the ex-
panded data set. Column (1) reproduces the (DD) results reported in Column (3)
of Table 2.4. The magnitudes of the (DD) estimates, -9.911 and -9.289, are close in
both data sets, though the estimate in Table 2.6 is not statistically significant. The
(DDD) estimates in Column (5) of both Table 2.5 and 2.6 are also similar, -10.704
and -14.872, and statistically significant. The similarities between the estimates using
the Zephyr and SDC data sets provides some additional confidence in these estimates
and lessens the concern of possible biases in the SDC due to the longer time series.
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Table 2.6: Robustness: New Data Set 1992-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dividend Firms β1 10.844 1.312 1.320*** -0.003 -0.083
(6.900) (1.071) (0.088) (0.060) (0.062)
High-Tax β2 3.954 -11.942*** -13.261*** -11.371*** -14.441***
(11.548) (1.751) (1.462) (0.071) (1.088)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -4.623 -5.594*** -9.998*** -11.075***
(4.650) (0.148) (0.091) (0.550)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -9.289 6.461*** 6.461*** 6.752*** 7.117***
(7.689) (1.816) (0.172) (0.038) (0.220)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 0.711 1.775*** 11.358*** 12.295***
(5.425) (0.213) (0.006) (0.595)
Dividend x Low Inst.δ3 4.328 5.589*** 8.879*** 10.263***
(4.714) (0.134) (0.015) (0.552)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -2.692 -3.943*** -13.657*** -14.872***
(5.510) (0.154) (0.073) (0.645)
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Firm Controls X X X
Low Inst. Subset X
R2 0.094 0.067 0.128 0.056 0.131
Observations 665 4207 4207 4207 4207
Notes: This table repeats the estimates in Table 2.5 with mergers data from Thomson and Reuters
Securities Data Company (SDC) years 1992-2012. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal
return 24 months after an acquisition. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level for the (DDD) specification. Statistical significance denoted, 10 percent *, 5
percent **, and 1 percent ***. The results are robust without clustering the standard errors and clustering
at the firm level.
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2.6.2 Method of Payment Alternative Explanation
This subsection tests whether the merger method of payment could explain the
(DD) and (DDD) results. The finance literature, notably ((Travlos 1987), (Wansley,
Lane and Yang 1983), and (Martin 1996), have found a link between the method of
payment and abnormal returns: cash payments are correlated with larger negative
abnormal returns. The following analysis tests whether the negative abnormal returns
observed in this paper are due to tax effects or effects associated with cash financing.
To separate these effects we run two different specifications, the first reported in
Columns (2) and (5) and the second in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2.7. The first
specification runs the benchmark analysis on the subset of mergers that were financed
with less than 50 percent cash payments. Here we find the magnitude of the (DD)
and (DDD) estimates increase in this subset, strengthening the empirical results and
contrary to what we would expect if the empirical results were due to method of
payment effects.
The second specification replaces the indicator variable for firms that pay a divi-
dend with an indicator variable for 100 percent cash financed mergers, and then runs
the analysis on the subset of mergers by non-dividend paying firms. If method of
payment effects could explain the empirical results we would expect to see the (DD)
and (DDD) results to look similar in this specification. In contrast, estimates of δ˜1
and δ˜4 are the opposite sign and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These
results corroborate the tax mechanism in explaining the empirical results and further-
more, suggest the tax effect may be the mechanism driving the method of payment
correlation noted in the finance literature.
108
Table 2.7: Alternative Explanation: Method of Payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividend Firms β1 10.844 15.779 -0.083 1.704
(6.900) (10.687) (0.062) (2.645)
Cash Payments β˜1 -10.980*** 3.150***
(0.000) (0.469)
High-Tax β2 3.954 4.789 -6.896*** -14.441*** -15.618*** -4.867
(11.548) (14.397) (0.000) (1.088) (5.669) (2.748)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -11.075*** -14.944 -3.194***
(0.550) (10.061) (0.407)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -9.289 -20.614* 7.117*** 3.287
(7.689) (12.064) (0.220) (4.259)
Cash x High-Tax δ˜1 14.154*** -4.168***
(0.001) (0.536)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 12.295*** 20.309* -1.639**
(0.595) (12.005) (0.457)
Dividend x Low Inst.δ3 10.263*** 11.976
(0.552) (10.205)
Cash x Low Inst. δ˜3 -2.323*
(0.932)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -14.872*** -21.408*
(0.645) (12.225)
Cash x H-T x Low Inst. δ˜4 7.913***
(1.215)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
< 50% Cash Mergers X X
Non Dividend Firm Mergers X X
R2 0.094 0.040 0.018 0.131 0.126 0.185
Observations 665 233 90 4207 2876 3419
Notes: This table reports the estimates limiting the data to mergers paid with less than 50 percent
cash, (2) and (5), mergers made by firms not paying a dividend, (3) and (6), and the benchmark
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specifications with all of the data, (1) and (4). Specifications in (1), (2), and (3) limit the data
to firms with low percentages of institutional ownership. The dependent variable is the cumulative
abnormal return 24 months after an acquisition. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard
errors are clustered at the group level for the (DDD) specification. Statistical significance denoted, 10
percent *, 5 percent **, and 1 percent ***. The results are robust without clustering the standard
errors and clustering at the firm level. Data comes from Thomson and Reuters Securities Data
Company (SDC) and Compustat, years 1992- 2012.
2.6.3 Shareholder Monitoring Alternative Explanation
(Chetty and Saez 2010) provide a second alternative hypothesis that may be able
to explain the empirical results presented in this paper based on firm monitoring by
shareholders. The shareholder monitoring model predicts that when the dividend
tax rate decreases, shareholders will increase their monitoring of corporate managers.
This increase in monitoring could generate the increased acquisition performance
that we observe after the 2003 dividend tax reform if our measure of tax status, low
percentage of institutional ownership, is also measuring monitoring within the firm.
According to this shareholder monitoring model, the increase in monitoring and by
extension increase in acquisition performance should be larger when the firm has large
block shareholders with strong incentives to monitor.
To test the ability of the monitoring model to explain the DD and DDD empirical
results we observe, we replace the indicator variable for low institutional ownership
with an indicator variable for firms with a low percentage of stock owned by the
top five shareholders and the top shareholders generally. The percentage of the firm
owned by a few shareholders is a measure of the monitoring within a firm because a
shareholder with a larger percent of the firm’s stock will have a greater incentive to
monitor the firm. In contrast, this is not a good measure for tax status as the top
shareholders of a firm may be taxable.
If monitoring is able to explain the empirical results we would expect the specifica-
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tions with the measures of percentage owned by top shareholders to be similar to the
results in the benchmark specifications. In contrast, the (DD) estimates in Columns
(2) and (3) and the (DDD) estimates in Columns (5) and (6) have the opposite sign
as the benchmark model and are not statistically significant. These empirical results
are inconsistent with the shareholder monitoring model but are consistent with the
tax mechanism.
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Table 2.8: Alternative Explanation: Firm Monitoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividend Firms β1 10.844 3.028 2.502 -0.083 1.276*** 1.732***
(6.900) (2.786) (3.397) (0.062) (0.126) (0.082)
High-Tax β2 3.954 -14.272*** -12.117** -14.441*** -12.742*** -12.692***
(11.548) (5.104) (6.007) (1.088) (1.458) (1.484)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -11.075***
(0.550)
Top Inst. β˜3 -0.680
(2.418)
High Inst. β˜3 -0.322
(3.169)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -9.289 2.581 2.842 7.117*** 5.958*** 5.597***
(7.689) (4.057) (4.443) (0.220) (0.206) (0.150)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 12.295***
(0.595)
Dividend x Top δ˜3 1.802
(2.503)
Dividend x High δ˜3 0.840
(3.188)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -14.872***
(0.645)
Div x H-T x Top δ˜4 0.313
(2.917)
Div x H-T x High δ˜4 1.157
(3.582)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Low % Top 5 Sub-Sample X
Low % Top Holders Sub-Sample X
R2 0.094 0.124 0.118 0.131 0.124 0.124
Observations 665 652 638 4207 4207 4207
Notes: This table reports the benchmark specifications in (1) and (4). Specification (2) limits the
data to firms with a low percentage of stock held by the top five shareholders. Specification (3) limits
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the data to firms with a low percentage of stock held by top shareholders generally. Specifications
(5) and (6) replace the indicator variable on low institutional ownership (used to control for the tax
status of the shareholders) with an indicator variable for firms with a low percentage held by the
top five shareholders, (5) , and an indicator for firms with a low percentage held by top shareholders
generally, (6), (used to control for the level of monitoring in the firm). The dependent variable
is the cumulative abnormal return 24 months after an acquisition. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the group level for the (DDD) specification. Statistical
significance denoted, 10 percent *, 5 percent **, and 1 percent ***. The results are robust without
clustering the standard errors and clustering at the firm level. Data comes from Thomson and
Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) and Compustat, years 1992- 2012.
2.7 Conclusion
Mergers and acquisitions continue to be an important way for economic activity
to be reorganized; as the first half of 2013 saw $437 billion in merger and acquisition
transactions. Our intutive profit maximizing framework demonstrates a potentially
large distortion in merger and acquisition behavior caused by the dividend tax. Em-
pirically, we find long-run returns are 8 to 10 percent higher as a result of lower
dividend taxation that resulted from the 2003 dividend tax reform in the US. These
findings suggest the deadweight loss caused from dividend taxation could be a signif-
icant drag on the economy.
The intuitive profit maximizing investment framework presented in this paper
provides a new explanation for the post-merger performance puzzle ((Agrawal and
Jaffee 2000)). This model differs from other proposed mechanisms to explain this
empirical puzzle in that it does not rely on explanations of agency or asymmetries of
information.
The intuition for the tax mechanism in the follows from the insight that outside
investments are substitutes for mergers and acquisitions. Without dividend taxation
the firms only make an acquisition when the expected net synergies from the acqui-
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sition are positive. In contrast, with dividend taxation, mergers that are inefficient
and destroy value may be a profit maximizing option. This leads firms that maximize
shareholder value to sometimes make acquisitions with negative net synergies and
depresses the expected value of any observed merger.
Through a series of empirical tests we find strong evidence that dividend taxation
is distorting merger and acquisition behavior. The empirical results corroborate the
theoretical claim that the distortion due to the dividend tax is economically large.
This suggests that the tax mechanism we propose is large enough to explain the
post-merger performance puzzle. Furthermore, these results on the distortion of the




2.8.1 Generating Cumulative Abnormal Returns
We estimate the cumulative abnormal returns using the same method as (Gregory
1997) and (Agrawal et al. 1992) to match the post-merger performance puzzle liter-
ature. Our results are robust to alternative estimates of long-run stock returns, see
(Bessembinder and Zhang 2013)’s recent advance, but we report estimates following
(Gregory 1997)’s method for better comparability. The difference-in-difference em-
pirical strategy we use controls for any bias from the cumulative abnormal return
estimation because the procedure is the same for all subgroups in the sample. There-
fore, each of the subgroups are evaluated on a level playing field.11 The cumulative
average return at time t is the multiplicative sum of abnormal returns from period 1
to t where the abnormal return for firm i at time t is calculated as the actual perfor-
mance of the firm at time t minus the performance of the firm specific benchmark.
The firm specific benchmark is the predicted counterfactual performance of firm i at
time t in the hypothetical world where the firm did not merged.
In generating CARs for acquiring firms, the choice of benchmark generating model
and the time period over which to estimate the coefficients of the model are impor-
tant decisions that must be considered carefully. Following the comparative analysis
by (Gregory 1997) we use the Fama French Value-Weighted Three Factor Model de-
scribed in (Fama and French 1992, Fama and French 1993). The model is described
in depth below. The monthly return of the firm, Rit minus the risk free rate of return,
Rft, is regressed on 1) the performance of the market Rmt minus the risk free rate,
2) the value weighted return on small firms minus the value weighted return on large
firms, SMB, and 3) the value weighted return on high book-to-market value firms
minus the value weighted return of low book to market value firms.
11The difference-in-difference empirical strategy is not able to control for heterogeneous biases
across subgroups but this concern seems small given the subgroups in this analysis.
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Abnormal Returns Model: (Fama and French 1992, Fama and French 1993) Value
Weighted Three Factor Model:












ait =the abnormal return on company i in month t
Rit =return on company i in month t;
Rft =risk-free (treasury bill) return in month t;
Rmt =return on market in month t;
SMB =the value-weighted return on small firms minus the value-
weighted return on large firms;
HML =the value-weighted return on high BMV firms minus the
value-weighted return on low BMV firms.
CARit =the cumulative abnormal return for firm i in month t
CAARt =the cumulative average abnormal return in month t
(Gregory 1997) highlights the importance of the choice of time period over which
to estimate the coefficients of the model, demonstrating a significant bias when using
pre-event data. Thus, we use post-event data to estimate the model and generate
abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns, and cumulative average abnormal
returns. We generate CARs using up to 24 months of post return data (subject to
availability). We limit our sample to firms that have at least 12 months of post-merger
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data available, excluding firms that do not continue to operate or were themselves
purchased. This data limitation likely biases our CAR estimates towards insignifi-
cance. We are able to use acquisitions in the last year of our sample, 2010, by using
stock price data through 2012 to estimate CARS.
Figure 1 depicts the CAAR estimates, from one month to thirty months after
an acquisition, for the eight separate groups used in the difference-in-difference-in-
difference empirical method we employ. Twenty-four months after an acquisition the
CAAR estimates are approximately -18 percentage points below benchmark returns
and are statistically significant from zero at the 1 percent confidence level. These
estimates are very similar to (Gregory 1997) Fama French CAAR estimates despite
a different set of mergers and time period. These estimates reinforce that the post-
merger performance puzzle is still a prominent empirical phenomenon. As several
authors have pointed out, the fact that this phenomenon continues to exist more
than 20 years after the puzzle was first identified and after several explanations have
been suggested means that economists still do not understand why firms continue to
merge despite these failing market outcomes.
2.8.2 Varying Performance Time Horizons
This subsection tests the robustness of our baseline results to considering different
time horizons. The results in Table 2.9 reports the (DD) and (DDD) estimates
using long-run returns 24, 18, and 12 months after the acquisition. The benchmark
analysis, repeated in Columns (1) and (4), uses 24 months after an acquisition for
comparability with much of the post-merger performance puzzle literature. For both
the (DD) and (DDD) estimates the magnitudes are largest after 18 months, though
the (DD) results are not statistically significant. This pattern suggests the negative
synergies are fully realized somewhere between 12 and 18 months after the acquisition
and implies that the baseline (DD) and (DDD) estimates, reported in Tables 2.4 and
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2.5, may underestimate the effect of dividend taxation on acquisition performance.
Table 2.9: Robustness: Varying Performance Outcome Time Horizons
24 Month 18 Month 12 Month 24 Month 18 Month 12 Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividend Firms β1 7.223 14.849** 10.844 0.974*** -0.394* -0.083
(8.016) (7.515) (6.900) (0.111) (0.177) (0.062)
High-Tax β2 11.617 -2.691 3.954 -6.376** -11.966*** -14.441***
(14.584) (14.125) (11.548) (2.397) (1.431) (1.088)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -8.400*** -14.073*** -11.075***
(0.761) (0.433) (0.550)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -6.845 -12.608 -9.289 5.574*** 6.777*** 7.117***
(9.670) (8.626) (7.689) (0.318) (0.366) (0.220)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 9.770*** 12.450*** 12.295***
(0.780) (0.533) (0.595)
Dividend x Low Inst.δ3 8.825*** 14.907*** 10.263***
(0.829) (0.456) (0.552)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -14.114*** -18.229*** -14.872***
(0.837) (0.560) (0.645)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
R2 0.026 0.070 0.094 0.023 0.049 0.131
Observations 665 665 665 4207 4207 4207
Notes: This table reports estimates for 24, 18, and 12 months after an acquisition for both the difference-in-difference (DD)
and the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard
errors are clustered at the group level for the (DDD) specification. Statistical significance denoted, 10 percent *, 5 percent
**, and 1 percent ***. The results are robust without clustering the standard errors and clustering at the firm level. Data
comes from Thomson and Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) and Compustat, years 1992 - 2012.
2.8.3 Eliminating Mergers in Quick Succession
One concern with the data set constructed for the baseline analyses is that a single
acquiring firm may perform several mergers in quick succession. If one merger closely
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follows another then the long-run returns of the second may conflate the effects from
the previous merger. To manage this concern, we perform (DD) and (DDD) analyses
excluding mergers that occur in quick succession. Results are presented in Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Robustness: Eliminating Mergers in Quick Succession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividend Firms β1 10.844 10.857 13.100* -0.083 -0.002 -0.144
(6.900) (7.571) (7.854) (0.062) (0.065) (0.138)
High-Tax β2 3.954 0.707 3.112 -14.441*** -14.101*** -14.760***
(11.548) (13.111) (13.133) (1.088) (1.541) (1.578)
Low Inst. Ownership β3 -11.075*** -12.320*** -15.433***
(0.550) (0.747) (0.637)
Dividend x High-Tax δ1 -9.289 -9.363 -12.423 7.117*** 4.559*** 4.890***
(7.689) (8.903) (9.289) (0.220) (0.485) (0.545)
High-Tax x Low Inst. δ2 12.295*** 10.680*** 14.083***
(0.595) (0.821) (0.658)
Dividend x Low Inst.δ3 10.263*** 10.040*** 12.221***
(0.552) (0.765) (0.646)
Div x H-T x Low Inst. δ4 -14.872*** -11.925*** -15.101***
(0.645) (0.878) (0.728)
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X X X
Mergers Within 2 Years Dropped X X
Mergers Within 3 Years Dropped X X
R2 0.094 0.071 0.065 0.131 0.112 0.119
Observations 665 376 315 4207 3011 2234
Notes: This table reports the robustness specifications limiting the data by dropping mergers that occurred within 2 years
of another merger in the same firm, (2) and (5), 3 years of another merger in the same firm (3) and (6) and the benchmark
specifications with all of the data, (1) and (4). The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return 24 months after
an acquisition. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the group level for the (DDD)
specification. Statistical significance denoted, 10 percent *, 5 percent **, and 1 percent ***. The results are robust without
clustering the standard errors and clustering at the firm level. Data comes from Thomson and Reuters Securities Data
Company (SDC) and Compustat, years 1992- 2012.
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Columns (1) and (4), in Table 2.10, are the benchmark estimates using the full data
set from Table 2.6. Columns (2) and (5) exclude mergers that occurred fewer than 2
years after another merger within the acquiring firm. Similarly, Columns (3) and (6)
exclude mergers that occurred fewer than 3 years after another merger. The (DD)
and (DDD) estimates remain similar to the benchmark estimates in both of these
sub-samples. The estimates in Columns (3) and (6) are actually larger in magnitude
than the benchmark model and the (DDD) estimate is statistically significant. These
results suggest that the bias from conflating mergers is small, which is consistent with
the fact that most acquiring firms in the sample make only one acquisition during the




The Business Investment Response to the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction
3.1 Introduction
In the past several years, significant research efforts have been directed towards
studying the impact of corporate tax reform on corporate behavior. A particularly
large amount of attention has been given to the impacts of the “Bush Tax Cuts,”
which significantly reduced the top rate on individual dividend and capital gains
income and to “Bonus Depreciation,” which accelerates the deduction of new in-
vestment spending and thereby reduces the present value cost of physical capital. In
contrast, very little academic study has been concentrated on a third major corporate
tax expenditure implemented during the 2000s, the Domestic Production Activities
Deduction.
The Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) allows tax payers to
deduct a percentage of income derived from domestic manufacturing activities from
their taxable income. The DPAD thus effectively lowers a business’s effective corpo-
rate income tax rate.1 By lowering the effective tax rate on domestic manufacturers,
1The DPAD was signed into law in 2004 in response to a World Trade Organization ruling that
outlawed use of the Extraterritorial Income exclusion, a US tax policy that allowed firms to deduct
the a portion of income derived from exports. The replacement of the ETI exclusion is
121
Congress hoped to “make our manufacturing, service, and high-technology businesses
and workers more competitive and productive both at home and abroad.”2
This paper is the first (to the author’s knowledge) to directly examine whether
the DPAD affects firm behavior. In particular, the research contained herein tests
whether corporate investment responds to the DPAD. Business investment seems a
natural first investigation into the effects of the policy given that “Investment is of
paramount importance for both business cycle fluctuations and long term economic
growth.”3 Additionally, investment stimulus is cited as the primary goal of the DPAD,
the Bush Tax Cuts, and Bonus Depreciation. Thus, comparing the effects of the three
policies which more broadly represent three different tax levers can shed light on
which policy is most effective at stimulating business investment, a reduction in the
corporate income tax rate, a reduction in distributed earnings rates, or an acceleration
of depreciation allowances.
The research design exploits industry level variation in the percentage of income
that is eligible for the deduction as derived from the IRS Statistics of Income Business
Tax Statistics database. Firms that belong to industries that derive a large portion of
income from domestic manufacturing activities (such as construction and agricultural
firms) see a significant reduction in their average effective statutory corporate income
rate while firms residing in industries that are not domestic manufacturing intensive
(such as real estate and transportation) are left essentially unaffected by the policy.
The investment response to the policy should be concentrated among firms in domes-
tic manufacturing intensive industries that experience significant reductions in their
effective tax rates and large increases in their effective rate-of-return on investment.
The benefit of using industry level variation in domestic manufacturing intensity
is that the measure is plausibly exogenous with respect individual firm decisions.
Empirical observations reinforce this exogeneity assumption; the percentage of income
2Language taken from the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
3Language taken from Goolsbee (1998).
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derived from domestic manufacturing activities is stable across industries and over
time suggesting that a large number of firms are not making choices that confound the
quasi-experimental DPAD treatment. The most pressing potential concern in using
industry level variation to test the investment effects of the DPAD is that industry
trends may drive the empirical results. However, due to significant variation within
large economic sectors, the impact of the DPAD may be tested within sectors thereby
eliminating any concerns that sector-time trends such as, for example, increasing
demand for construction relative to agricultural products, might be responsible for
empirical results.
The core result of this research is that, for listed firms contained in the Com-
pustat database, the DPAD significantly increases investment activities. Upon full
implementation, the DPAD increases investment as a percentage of installed capital
by 12.113% for a firm with the average percentage of income derived from domestic
production. For a firm whose income is all eligible for the deduction, investment as a
percentage of installed capital increases by more than 30%. Even if one assumes that
these effects capture only a temporary investment spike in response to the policy, the
DPAD is still seems to be more effective at stimulating investment than either the
Bush Tax Cuts or Bonus Depreciation. This result is robust to alternative investment
specifications, alternative controls, and sector-by-year fixed effects. The policy is es-
pecially effective at stimulating investment among credit constrained firms suggesting
the policy provides slack in the budget constraint.
This work is indebted to and humbly contributes to a large literature concerning
both the theoretically and empirically effects of tax policy on business investment.
The theoretical foundations of this literature are provided by Hall and Jorgenson
(1967), King (1977), Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), Summers (1981), Poterba
and Summers (1985), and Desai and Goolsbee (2004). The empirical study of tax
incentives and investment response is highlighted by Cummins et al. (1994), Goolsbee
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(1998), Edgerton (2010), Yagan (2013), and Zwick and Mahon (2014). An in depth
discussion of a selected few of these works is reserved for the last section in which
the DPAD is compared to that of other tax policies in light of several alternative
theoretical models.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an in-depth explanation
of the DPAD. Section 3.3 provides a simple conceptual framework that captures
the effect of the policy on investment behavior paying close attention to potential
heterogeneous responses to the policy based on financial constraint and taxable status.
The framework produces several testable hypotheses which are subsequently taken to
the data. Section 3.4 discusses the data sources, construction of key variables, and
descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 describes the empirical strategy and key identifying
assumptions necessary to accurately capture the investment effects of the DPAD.
Baseline investment results are presented in Section 3.6 and investment heterogeneity
results are presented in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes by comparing the DPAD
to other tax policies designed to encourage investment and outlining directions for
future research.
3.2 The Domestic Production Activities Deduction
The Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) was enacted as part of
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. In its simplest form, the DPAD is a federal
corporate tax deduction that allows firms to deduct a percentage “Qualified Produc-
tion Activities Income” from their taxable income. The DPAD effectively lowers the
effective corporate income tax rate on income derived from domestic manufacturing.
The policy was not implemented at its maximum rate and was instead phased in
during the years 2005 to 2010. Three pieces of information are key to understanding
the policy: the rate of the deduction, the definition of Qualified Production Activities
Income (QPAI), and other factors limiting DPAD application.
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The deduction was implemented at a rate of 3% in 2005, increased to 6% in
2007, and reached its maximum rate of 9% in 2010. Figure 3.1 presents the DPAD
rates during the phase-in period. Given a statutory corporate income tax rate of
35%, these rates reduced the effective tax rate on QPAI by 1.05% in 2005 and 2006,
by 2.10% in 2007–2009, and ultimately by 3.15% in years 2010 and beyond. How
much these rates affect behavior depends on the percentage of income that a firm
derives from QPAI (its QPAI %). If a firm has 100% QPAI, then their effective rate
drops 3.15% when the DPAD is fully phased in at 9%. Firms that claim 50% of
income as QPAI see an effective rate drop of 1.575%. Effective tax rates of firms
that derive no income from domestic production are completely unaffected (at least
in partial equilibrium). Understanding the exact definition of QPAI is critical to
understanding this differential policy treatment and the estimated effects of the policy
and is discussed next.








Notes: Figure 3.1 lists and plots the percentage
of qualified production activities income that may
be deducted from taxable income via the DPAD.
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QPAI is equal to the excess (if any) of the firm’s Domestic Production Gross
Receipts (DPGR) over the Domestic Production Gross Costs (DPGC). DPGR is
defined as any income that is derived from
• Lease, rental, license, sale or exchange of goods manufactured in the United
States
• Construction and engineering and architectural services performed in the United
States
• Except sale of prepared foods and energy transmission
And DPGC are defined as
• Costs of goods allocable to DPGR
• Other deductions, expenses or losses directly allocable to DPGR or
• A ratable portion of other expenses not directly allocable to such receipts
An item qualifies as produced in the United States if at least 20% of the total costs
are the result of direct labor and overhead costs from US–based operations.
Finally the deduction is limited in two ways. First, the deduction may not exceed
50% of W-2 wages paid by the firm. Second, the deduction may not exceed gross
adjusted income (taxable income).
While the 3.15% maximum rate reduction may not seem large on firm-by-firm
basis, the policy actually constitutes a significant tax expenditure at the national level.
Figure 3.2 details the total taxable income deductions resulting from the DPAD and
total tax expenditure on the policy (assuming a corporate rate of 35% on all income).
In 2010 when the DPAD reached 9%, corporations were able to deduct more than $24
billion from their taxable income at a cost of more than $8.5 billion to US government.
Given the price tag of the policy it seems prudent to examine whether the DPAD
affects business investment and hence macro-level economic growth.
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Figure 3.2: DPAD Deduction







Notes: Source: IRS Statistics of Income. Corpo-
rate statutory rate τ = .35
3.3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Hypotheses
Generation
To guide the empirical analysis carried out in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, this section
presents a simple model of investment in the presence of the Domestic Production
Activities deduction, investment incentives, financial constraints, and heterogeneous
tax positions. The model presented here follows the recent work by Zwick and Mahon
(2014) which nicely combines the Neoclassical investment models of Abel (1982) and
Hyashi (1982) with the Stein (2003) model of costly external finance. The model
produces several testable implications. First, investment increases due to the Domes-
tic Production Activities Deduction and increases more for firms that derive a larger
proportion of income from Qualified Production Activities. This baseline result is
complemented by two predictions of investment response heterogeneity: (1) firms
that are financially constrained will be less responsive to the policy, and (2) firms
that are less likely to be taxable when income is derived from investment activities
will be less responsive to the deduction.
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3.3.1 Framework Primitives
Consider a firm making a one shot investment decision. The firm begin with initial
retained earnings R0 and chooses the level of investment I in an effort to maximize
after tax profits. Future profits are given the concave function, pi(I). Future profits are
taxed at the proportional rate τ . The DPAD allows the firm to deduct a percentage d
of qualified income from its taxable income. The percentage of income that qualifies
for the deduction is ρ.4 The firm discounts the after-tax profits at the risk-adjusted




The DPAD may be further generalized to consider a state in which the firm is
nontaxable. When the next dollar of income does not increase the firm’s tax bill,
then the firm can only realize the benefit of the deduction if it is carried forward to
decrease taxable income in a future taxable state. The generalized version of d can
be written as
d(β, γ) = γd(β) + (1− γ)βφd(1),
where γ ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for current tax state and φ is a discounter that
reflects both the expected arrival time of the taxable state and the discount rate
applied to the future and subsequent periods when the firm switches. Note that for
the nontaxable firm, β applies to all future deductions; even when β equals one, φ is
less than one and the value of the deductions are lower when the firm is nontaxable.
4In this simple framework, ρ is assumed to be fixed over time. One can imagine a more compli-
cated version of the model in which firms may expend resources in an effort to increase ρ by changing
its business model or reclassifying earnings as qualified income. Unfortunately, without firm level
data on the DPAD over time, it is hard to test predictions from this extension. Reassuringly, the
percentage of QPAI seems to be stable over time both for the population as a whole and for each
specific industry allaying concerns that the most active margin of response to the DPAD is not
through ρ. See Figure 3.3 for a visual representation of these findings.
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In additional to the DPAD, the firm can deduct a portion of the cost of the
investment over time as the investment depreciates for tax purposes. The value of
the deduction z is worth more to the firm if the investment can be written off more
quickly or the firm discounts the future less aggressively.5 Additional theoretical
discussion of z and bonus depreciation is left out here as it is not central the DPAD
analysis.6
External finance matters for all investment exceeding current cash flow. During
the investment period, the firm faces an external finance wedge that is linear in
expenses net of cash flows, that is,
c(I) = λ[(1− τz)I −R0],
where λ can be thought of as the shadow price on a borrowing constraint that may
or may not bind now or in the future. Thus, a dollar of cash inside the firm is worth
1 + λ due to costly external finance.
3.3.2 Optimal Investment







− (1− τz)I − λ(1− τz)I
}
,
5During the last decade, the rate at which investment depreciates for tax purposes has been
accelerated in an effort to stimulate investment. This largely counter-cyclical policy is known as
Bonus Depreciation. Bonus Depreciation allows firms to write off a percentage of the purchase price
of new capital in the first year in addition to write-offs specified in the statutory tax depreciation
schedules. The empirical analysis will control Bonus Depreciation by empirically constructing z and
simultaneously estimating its effect of investment.
6For an in depth treatment of z, including its construction both analytically and empirically and
its impact on investment see Ohrn (2014), Edgerton (2012), and Zwick and Mahon (2014).
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with respect to I, where terms not involving I have been suppressed. Under the
assumption of concave pi, the problem yields a unique interior solution characterized
by the first order condition
[1− τ(1− ρd)]pi′(I∗)
1 + r
= (1 + λ)(1− τz).
The optimal investment rule is intuitive; the firm chooses I to set the after-tax dis-
counted future benefits of the marginal dollar of investment equal to the after tax
price of investment and the cost of external finance. The DPAD increases d and
thereby increases the benefits to investment. Investment is thus increasing in the
percentage of QPAI that the firm may deduct from its taxable income. The effects of
an increase in d are only distinct from the effects of a decrease in τ in that a decrease
in the statutory rate would be mitigated to some degree by a reduction in the tax
benefits to investment through τz.
3.3.3 Testable Hypotheses
The DPAD increases the after-tax marginal benefit of investment and thus in-
creases the firm’s level of investment; ∂I/∂d > 0. From this intuitive result, three
testable hypotheses may be derived. The first may be considered the baseline empir-
ical hypothesis. The second and third testable hypotheses describe heterogeneity in
the baseline response based on financial constraint and tax status.
Hypothesis 2. Investment responds more strongly to the DPAD for industries that
derive a larger percentage of income from QPAI; ∂2I/∂d∂ρ > 0.
When the DPAD is offered or increased, d, the percentage of QPAI that may be
deducted from taxable income increases. The effect of the policy is amplified by the
percentage of income that may be classified as QPAI, ρ. This result is intuitive –
firms that are more domestic production intensive effectively receive a more generous
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per dollar deduction and as a result increase their investment more in response to
the introduction or increase in the DPAD. This hypothesis is empirically testable
because ρ varies substantially across industries. Section 3.4 describes the construction
of industry level ρ and its variance across both the population of corporate taxpayers
and across listed firms. If the DPAD does effectively stimulate investment, then the
elasticity of investment with response to the DPAD should be higher for industries
with high levels of ρ.
The second empirically testable hypothesis concerns how investment response to
the DPAD varies based on a firms cost of external financing or more generally its
level of financial constraint.
Hypothesis 3. Investment responds more strongly to the DPAD for firms that are
financially constrained; ∂2I/∂d∂λ > 0.
For both the constrained and unconstrained firms, the DPAD increase the marginal
return on investment. For the constrained firm, the policy is doubly beneficial as it
also provides for additional investment slack. The change in the optimal level of in-
vestment is thus larger for firms that are financially constrained. Empirically, the level
of financial constrain that a firm faces will be represented by the financial constraint
index created by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) Index. Construction of the HP Index is
discussed in Section refdata. If financial constraints do affect the investment response
to the DPAD, then the elasticity of investment with respect to the DPAD ∂2I/∂d∂λ
should be larger for firms with higher HP Index scores. If, on the other hand, finan-
cial constraint does not play a role in investment response then there should be no
heterogeneity in the investment response to the DPAD across the HP Index.
The third testable hypothesis concerns the heterogeneity in response to the DPAD
across tax status and future tax status.
Hypothesis 4. Investment responds more strongly to bonus depreciaiton for firms that
expect to be taxable when income is subject to DPAD; ∂I/∂d|γ=1 > ∂I/∂d|γ=0.
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The third hypothesis relates strongly to earlier research by Auerbach (1986) and
Edgerton (2010). These studies elucidate the idea that the effectiveness of counter-
cyclical fiscal stimulus in the form of investment tax incentives may be undermined
if firms are non-taxable either due to their possession of tax loss carry-forwards or a
less than zero amount of taxable income. The papers provide two key incites: First,
investment response to investment tax stimulus is heterogeneous across tax status -
firms that are currently taxable are more responsive to the credit. Second, when these
polices are used in a counter-cyclical manner, then they are employed when firms are
most likely to have tax losses and therefore the mean level impact of the policy is
dragged down.
The hypothesis differs slightly in that the heterogeneity in response is across future
tax status not current tax status. This is because the DPAD effectively lowers the
tax rate on earned income only if the firm is taxable when the income derived from
investment is earned, not upon the investment itself. This prediction suggests that
lowering the tax rate on earned income instead of providing tax incentives to lower
the cost of investment may be a better counter-cyclical policy option.
While this hypothesis provides a very exciting policy implication, it may be chal-
lenging to examine empirically. To begin to understand the empirical difficulties
presented, it is instructive to just how much work has gone into correctly approx-
imating a firms current taxable status and tax rate. Plesko (2003) and Edgerton
(2010) both provide very careful methods to construct an indicator of taxable sta-
tus (1 for positive marginal tax rates, 0 for zero marginal tax rate) using publicly
available accounting data. Graham (1996), Graham (2000), and Blouin et al. (2010)
attempt to go one step further by constructing marginal tax rates based on both cur-
rent taxable status and the probability of future current taxable status. To test the
difference in response to the DPAD based on only future taxable status, the analysis
contained in Section 3.6 will use measures of current tax status and marginal tax
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rates. Whether the empirical results support the third hypothesis depends crucially
on whether current and future tax status are strongly correlated.
3.4 Data Sources, Construction, and Descriptive Statistics
In order to empirically examine the investment response to the DPAD and test
the hypotheses presented in Section 3.3, data from several sources must be compiled.
Industry level data on the DPAD are taken from the IRS Statistics of Income Cor-
porate Tax Statistics website.7 Data on firm level financial statement variables are
taken from the COMPUSTAT North American Annual database. Data needed to
construct a measure of present value tax depreciation allowances for new investment
are taken from the BEA and the IRS. Finally, marginal tax rates as computed in
Blouin et al. (2010) are available on the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
Platform.
3.4.1 QPAI Percent
The effect of the DPAD differs across firms based on the percentage of income is
derived from qualified production activities (ρ in Section 3.3). For example, at a 35%
statutory corporate income tax rate, a 9% DPAD deduction would result in an effect
rate drop of 3.15% for a 100% QPAI firm but in only a 1.575% for a 50% QPAI firm.
The effect of the DPAD policy may therefore be estimated by examining differential
impact across QPAI %.
QPAI % can be constructed at the industry level using information provided by
the IRS Statistics of Income Division. Table 7 provides information on net taxable
income and the DPAD for 17 sectors and 77 more finely defined industries.8 Data in
Table 7 are compiled from all Corporations that filed a tax return during the year.
7The data are specifically taken from the SOI Tax Stats Table 7: Corporate Returns with Net
Income; years 2005 - 2010.
8Appendix 3.9.1 provides definitions of DPAD and Net Income from the IRS Statistics of Income.
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The IRS sectors and industries correspond to NAICS 4 digit industries which allow
IRS data to be matched to financial statement data at the industry level. QPAI
% is equal to qualified income divided by total income. To find qualified income,
the DPAD in total dollars is divided by the DPAD rate, which varies during years
2005-2010 as described in Section 3.2.
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3(A) present descriptive statistics for QPAI % over time,
across sectors, and across industries within the manufacturing and information sec-
tors. The average QPAI % during all years 2005 - 2010 is 25.528%. The percentage
is lowest in 2005, the first year the DPAD was available, but then levels out to an
average percentage between 25.487 and 27.588 during years 2006-2010. This economy
wide trend is similar within sectors and industries. The stability of the trend after
the first year suggests that firms manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing mixes are
relatively fixed over time. If firms were able to easily manipulate this mix in response
to tax incentives, then as the deduction increased, QPAI % would have also increased.
Critically, the stability of QPAI % over time points to the exogenity of QPAI % (es-
sentially the treatment variable in the empirical analysis) with respect to investment
(the dependent variable). If investment behavior increased QPAI %, and therefore
the intensity of the treatment, QPAI % would increase over time for the economy as
a whole and more for industries that investment more. The stability ot QPAI % is
in-line with these predictions at neither economy nor industry level suggesting QPAI
% is an acceptable tool to analyze the impact of the DPAD on investment.
Not only does QPAI % seem to be exogenous with respect to investment, but it
also varies significantly across major economic sectors and even within sectors at finer
industry level. Figure 3.3(B) presents the average QPAI % over years 2005-2010 for
each of the 17 economic sectors. The most QPAI intensive sector is construction fol-
lowed closely by agriculture, information, and manufacturing. While the construction
and agricultural sectors report more than 60% of their income as QPAI, eight sectors
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including real estate, healthcare, and finance reports less than 10% of their income
as QPAI (The financial sector is excluded from the formal empirical analysis.). The
variation within sector and across industries is almost as striking. Figures 3.3(C) and
(D) present average QPAI % over years 2005-2010 for the industries contained in the
manufacturing and information sectors. In the manufacturing sector, the majority of
industries report more than 50% of income as QPAI but several industries including
oil and gas, apparel, and leather manufacturing reports less than 30% of income as
QPAI. In the information sector, QPAI % varies from just less than 80% QPAI to less
than 20%. The within sector is especially appealing because the impact of the DPAD
is identified even when sector fixed effects and trends are included in the analysis.
Table 3.1: QPAI % for IRS Sample
Variable Year(s) Median Mean 10th pctile 90th pctile
QPAI % 2005-2010 9.394 25.538 0.291 71.127
QPAI % 2005 7.979 21.098 0.098 67.005
QPAI % 2006 9.571 25.487 0.156 74.922
QPAI % 2007 9.361 27.588 0.370 68.330
QPAI % 2008 10.696 26.219 0.524 70.171
QPAI % 2009 8.588 27.046 0.307 77.863





Notes: Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variable QPAI % for the IRS Sample
– all corporations that filed a tax return during the year in question. QPAI % is defined as
the percentage of taxable income that is derived from Qualified Production Activities.
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DPAD is the variable that captures the deduction is the empirical analysis.
DPAD is equal to the QPAI % multiplied by the deduction percent and intuitively is
the implicit rate of tax deduction (dρ in Section 3.3). Here QPAI % is the average
within each industry over years 2005-2010. For a 100% QPAI industry, the DPAD is
equal to the DPAD rate but for a 50% QPAI industry, DPAD is only equal to half
of the statutory deduction. DPAD varies over time because the deduction increases
over time and across industries because they differ in their QPAI %.
Table 3.2 reports average QPAI % and DPAD for the Compustat Sample both
over all years 2005-2010 and for each year 2005 to 2012. The average QPAI % is sig-
nificantly higher for the Compustat Sample than for all corporate taxpayers meaning
that firms in the Compustat sample are more concentrated in high QPAI % indus-
tries than the general population of corporate tax filers. However, because the lion’s
share of investment behavior is undertaken by listed firms contained in the Compustat
Sample, results from the empirical analysis describe a large majority of the corporate
population.
DPAD or the effective deduction rate varies from less than 0.882% in 2005 to
2.521% in 2010. The increase in the effective deduction over time is driven primarily
by the increase in the statutory rate rather than an increase in the QPAI %. Given a
statutory corporate tax rate of 35%, once fully phased in (2010 and beyond) the policy
provides the average firm in the Compustat Sample with a effective rate reduction of
0.875 percentage points.
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Table 3.2: QPAI, DPAD % for Investment Sample
Variable Years Median Mean 10th pct 90th pct
QPAI% 2005 - 2012 41.335 38.7431 3.471 66.660
DPAD 2005 - 2012 2.298 2.409 0.208 4.729
DPAD 2005 - 2006 1.149 0.882 0.022 1.850
DPAD 2007 - 2009 2.298 1.729 0.045 3.699
DPAD 2010 - 2012 3.447 2.521 0.067 5.542
Firms 11,189
Firms x Years 72,341
Notes: Table 3.2 presents QPAI % and DPAD for years 2005-2012 for the Compustat Sample
- listed firms with non-zero financial statement variables needed for baseline regression
analysis. QPAI % is the percentage of income derived from qualified production activities
and eligible for the domestic production activities deduction. DPAD is equal to QPAI %
multiplied by the statutory rate of the deduction. DPAD can be interpreted as the effective
rate of the deduction given a fixed QPAI %.
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Figure 3.3: QPAI Percent
(a) QPAI Percent 2005-2010 (b) QPAI by Sector
(c) Manufacturing Industries (d) Information Industries
Note: Figures 1a - 1d present percentages of Qualified Production Income as a percentage
of total income. QPAI percentage is calculated the Domestic Production Deduction divided
by Income Subject to Tax as defined by the IRS Statistics of Income Division. Figure 1a
presents QPAI averaged across all corporations for years 2005 - 2010. Figure 2 presents
QPAI for each major production section averaged across all years 2005 - 2010. Figure
3 presents QPAI for each major industry in the manufacturing sector averaged across all
years 2005 - 2010. Figure 4 presents QPAI for each major industry in the information sector
averaged across all years 2005 - 2010.
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3.4.2 Bonus Depreciation
During the time period that will be considered in the empirical analysis, a second
tax policy, Bonus Depreciaiton, potentially affects investment and must be controlled
for in order to accurately estimate the effects of the DPAD. Bonus depreciation works
by increasing the present value of tax depreciation allowances available on $1 dollar
of investment, here called the Z Tax Term. If firms can immediately expense invest-
ment (bonus equal to 100% as in 2011) then the Z Tax Term is equal to 1 because
the firm can deduct $1 from its current tax bill. If firms cannot immediately deduct
the entire purchase price of the investment from taxable income and must deduct
some portion of the cost in the future, then the present value of tax depreciation
allowances is less than $1 because future deductions are worth less in a present value
sense. For details on the construction of the Z Tax Term, please refer to Ohrn (2014).
The average value of the Z Tax Term for the investment sample is 0.917.
3.4.3 Firm Level Financial Statement Variables
Compustat provides financial statement data for firms listed on a major stock
exchange and required to file their financial information annually with the U.S. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission. Compustat data easily allows for the construction
of the dependent investment variable and determinants of investment in addition to
DPAD.
The dependent variable in all regressions contained in the body of the paper is
Investment Percent which is equal to capital expenditure in the current year scaled
by the lagged value of property plant and equipment.9 Table 3.3 provides descriptive
9The baseline investment analysis uses Investment Percent as the dependent variable in an effort
to make results directly comparable to prior research on investment behavior among Compustat
firms (Cummins et al. (1994), Desai and Goolsbee (2004), Edgerton (2010), Ohrn (2014)). The
baseline results are , however, robust to alternative investment variables; baseline analyses using
the log of capital expenditure are presented in Appendix 3.9.3. Investment reponse to the DPAD is
nearly identical under this alternative specification.
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statistics for Investment Percent as well as other investment control variables. The
mean value of investment percent is 0.450 with a median value of 0.196 meaning
the average (median) firm replaces approximately 45% (20%) of their capital stock
in a given year. The skewness of this variable is consistent with lumpy investment
behavior; firms engage in large investment projects but not every year.
The additional controls that are included in the analysis and may be derived
directly from Compustat data are Marg Q and Cash Flow. Marg Q controls for a
firm’s investment opportunities and Cash Flow controls for any investment response
that may be driven by new cash on hand. Both controls have been empirically linked
to investment behavior.
3.4.4 HP Index of Financial Distress
A measure of financial distress is included in the analyses to control for the effects
of financing on investment in the baseline analyses and to examine the heterogeneity of
investment response across firms with varying levels of financial constraint to support
the second empirically testable hypothesis generated by the conceptual framework.
The empirical analysis with rely on the HP Index as derived in Hadlock and Pierce
(2010). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find measures of financial constraint that have been
used in the past (investment cash-flow sensitivity from Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988), the KZ Index from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the Whited Wu Index from
Whited and Wu (2006)) are not particularly effective at predicting financial constraint
as measured by detailed qualitative information contained in financial filings. Instead,
Hadlock and Pierce find that firm size and age are particularly useful predictors of
financial constraint. They construct an aggregate measure of financial constraint
that decreases at a decreasing rate in firm size and decreases linearly in firm age. The
exact construction of the HP Index is described in Appendix 3.9.2. Table 3.3 reports
descriptive statistics for the HP Index.
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3.4.5 Tax Status Variables
Several variables are used to capture current and future taxable status. The
simplest measure of current tax status is 1(Tax Loss), an indicator for whether
the firm has negative taxable income.10 To take account of the magnitude of tax
losses, the continuous variable Tax Loss may also be used where Tax Loss is equal
to negative taxable income when taxable income is less than zero and equal to zero
when taxable income is equal to or greater than zero. In the investment sample,
approximately 49% of firm-year observations report negative taxable income. For
firms both positive and negative taxable income, the average firm has 26 million in
tax losses. Among, firms with tax losses, the average firm has $86 million in tax
losses. This number is however, heavily skewed towards zero; the median firm with
negative taxable income reports on $8 million in losses.
The third measure of taxable status, MTR, is a simulated marginal tax rate
constructed by Blouin et al. (2010). The marginal tax rates are both a function of a
firms current taxable status and whether the growth trajectory of the firm will make
the firm taxable in the future. The average MTR for the investment sample is 0.195
meaning the simulated tax rate on the marginal dollar of income is 19.5%. The MTRs
generated by Blouin et al. (2010) are only available for years 2000-2010.




+ tlcft − tlcft−1
following the reasoning laid out in Hanlon (2003). txfed is the federal tax bill reported. txfo is
foreign taxes paid. tlcf is the level of tax loss carry-forwards and τ is the corporate tax rate.
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Table 3.3: Additional Descriptive Statistics for Investment Sample
Median Mean 10th pctile 90th pctile
Investment Percent 0.196 0.450 0.033 0.821
Z Tax Term 0.924 0.917 0.876 0.952
Marg Q 1.493 4.630 0.835 4.986
Cash Flow 0.160 -8.368 -27.864 1.746
HP Index -4.172 -4.129 -6.629 -1.626
1(Tax Loss) 1.000 0.491 0.000 1.000
Tax Loss 0.000 23.423 0.000 24.000
MTR 0.224 0.202 0.021 0.347
Dec Fiscal Year 1.000 0.682 0.000 1.000
Domestic 1.000 0.672 0.000 1.000
Firms 11,189
Firms x Years 72,341
Notes: Table 3.3 reports the mean, median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile statistics
for the outcome variable (investment percent), control variables (Z Tax Term, Marg Q,
Cash Flow, and HP Index), and sample splitting variables (Foreign, Foreign percent, and
December Fiscal Year) for the main investment analysis sample. Tax Loss is measured in
millions of dollars.
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3.4.6 Fiscal Year Ends and Foreign Operations
Two variables are used to limit the sample to those firms that are potentially
most affected by the DPAD. The first, Dec Fiscal Year, is an indicator equal to 1 if
the firm’s fiscal year ends in December and equal to 0 if the firms fiscal year ends in
another month (usually March, June, or September). If firms have a December fiscal
year, then the information contained in their financial statements lines up perfectly
with the implementation of the DPAD – for instance, all qualified income earned
in fiscal year 2004 was not subject to the DPAD and all qualified income earned in
2005 was eligible. On the other hand, qualified income earned during fiscal year 2005
for firms with June fiscal years ends may or may not be eligible for the deduction.
Limiting the analysis to Dec Fiscal Year firms removes this potential source of mea-
surement error from the analysis. 68.2% of the investment sample have fiscal years
ending in December.
In several graphical analyses, the investment analysis is limited to firms that do
or do not report only domestic income. Firms that report only domestic income are
labeled as Domestic. If firms reports positive foreign income, then they presumably
have foreign operations and a portion of the investment observed by the researcher
may be attributable to foreign operation which generate foreign income not eligible
for the DPAD. If on the other hand firms report no foreign income, then the DPAD
is available for all qualified income and tests of the investment stimulus effect of the




Variables that potentially suffer from misreporting are Winsorized at the 1% level
in an effort to limit the effects of outliers.11 All results are robust to both more
aggressive Winsorizing at the 5% level and to the absence of Winsorizing.12 The
Winsorized variables are Investment Percent, Marg Q, Cash Flow, HP Index, and
Tax Losses. DPAD is left un-Winsorized because it is a product of statutory rates (3,
6, and 9%) and QPAI % which is an industry level aggregate variable and therefore
already void of potential individual outliers. For the same reason, the Z Tax Term is
left un-Winsorized. MTRs are constructed to vary between 0 and the top statutory
tax rate. No MTR observations fall outside of these values and therefore MTRs are
left unaltered. All indicator variables (1(Tax Loss), Dec Fiscal Year, Domestic) are
unaffected by the Winsorizing procedure.
3.5 Empirical Design and Identification
The investment impact of the DPAD may be empricailly estimated because the
policy differentially affects firms that based on the percentage of income that they de-
rive from QPAI. When the deduction is implemented and subsequented increased, the
investment behaviros of the high QPAI firms may be measured against the investment
behaviors of the low QPAI firms.
This differences-in-differences (DD) estimation strategy may be carried out using
standard OLS regression techniques. The baseline DD specification is given by
Iit
Ki,t−1
= β0 + β1DPADjt +
n∑
s=2
βsControls + ηi + γt + it
where i indexes firms, j index industries, and t indexes time. η and γ are firm and
11More precisely, observations in the bottom and top 0.5% of observations are replaced with the
observations at the 0.5% and 99.5% percentile.
12Available upon request from the author.
144
year fixed effects. In this DD specification, DPAD is akin to the interaction term
because it is equal to ρd in terms corresponding to the conceptual model or equal to
the treatment (d) multiplied by the intensity of the treatment (ρ). ρ, which varies
by firm but is fixed over time, and d, which varies over time but not by firm, are
not included in the regression separately as they are captured by firm and year fixed
effects.
Variation in DPAD is at the industry-by-year level, so identification of the β1
coefficient is generated from how different industries respond to the policy. The key
identifying assumption is that the policies are independent of other industry-by-year
shocks. To address this concerns, robustness checks are performed in which sector-
by-year fixed effects, sector specific linear time trends, or sector specific quadratic
time trends are included in baseline regressions. These controls account for variation
at the sector level over time. With these controls, identification of the β1 coefficient
comes from how different industries within the same sectors respond to the DPAD.
For example β depends on how apparel manufacturing, a low QPAI % industry in the
manufacturing sector, responds to the policy compared to how furniture manufac-
turing, a high QPAI % industry in the manufacturing sector, responds to the policy.
Reassuringly, included sector-by-year fixed effects or time trends actually increases
the estimated magnitude of the policy, suggesting that sector-by-year trends do not
drive empirical identification.
To test for heterogeneity in investment response across varying level of financial
constraint and tax status, the DD estimation strategy is implemented for different
groups of firms (high vs. low financial constraint / currently taxable vs. currently
untaxable). The β1 coefficient is then compared across the groups of firms. This tech-
nique thereby implements a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) strategy;
the DD coefficient is again differenced across groups that potentially respond het-
erogeneously to the policy. This DDD implementation is more flexible and therefore
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preferably to simply including a DDD term (ρ × d × group) and cross terms in the
regressions because it allows for controls to differentially affect investment across the
comparison groups.
3.6 Investment Response
3.6.1 Baseline Graphical Analysis
Figure 3.4 presents a visual representation of the baseline DD research design
described in Section 3.5. To construct the figures, cross sectional regressions are run
in each year of the outcome variable on a rich set of controls for financial constraint,
investment opportunity, cash flow, and tax depreciation allowances. The predicted
values are then averaged separately for the treatment and control groups in each year.
For comparability, the predicted group mean for each group in year 2002 is subtracted
and the predicted mean for all firms in 2002. The treatment group is defined as firms
with above 40% of income derived from QPAI and the control group are those firms
with below 40% of income derived from QPAI.13 The difference between the group
mean of the treatment and control groups in years after the implementation of the
DPAD in 2005 versus the the difference is years prior provides the DD estimate and
quantifies the effect of the DPAD policy.
From Figure 3.4(A), the effect of the policy is immediately apparent. The invest-
ment behaviors of the treatment and control groups move in step during years 2002 to
2004 then diverge substantially in 2005 and beyond with the treatment group doing
more investment. This striking change in investment between treatment and control
group strongly supports the hypothesis that the DPAD increases investment and in-
creases investment more among firms with a large percentage of income eligible for
the deduction. A discussion the magnitude of the the investment impact is postponed
13The median value of QPAI is 41.335 median for the investment sample.
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until Subsection 3.6.2.
Figure 3.4(A) provides two additional insights. First, the nearly identical invest-
ment behavior between the treatment and control groups in years 2002 to 2005 assures
that pretrends are not a concern. These years further provide placebo tests of the
natural experiment and show no false positives. Second, investment behaviors diverge
upon initiation of the policy but do not appreciably diverge further when the deduc-
tion is increased in 2007. There are two possible explanations for this result: either the
recession of 2008 and 2009 is affecting investment behavior in a way does not allow for
response by either group or, alternatievly, firms responded to the policy as if it were
implemented at its long-term rate of 9%. The second result is not unintuitive given
the observation that the income derived from investment projects initiated in 2005
may not arrive until 2010 and/or the majority of income from investment projects
initiated in 2005 may arrive after 2010.
Figures 3.4(B) - 3.4(D) plot the same group means for only firms with December
fiscal years, for firms that only report domestic income in years prior to 2005, and
for firms that report some foreign income in years prior 2005. Consistent with the
discussion presented in Section 3.4, the graphical analysis supports the assertation
that investment behaviors of firms with December fiscal years and firms who claim
no foreign income respond even more strongly to the introduction of the DPAD than
the general Compustat population.
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Figure 3.4: Investment Response Graphical Diff-in-Diff
(a) All Firms (b) December Fiscal Year Firms
(c) Domestic Firms (d) Foreign Firms
Notes: Figures 3.4(A) - 3.4(D) plot the mean investment percent over time for groups sorted ac-
cording to their industry-based treatment intensity. The intensity of the treatment depends on the
percentage of income that is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction and there-
fore qualifies as Qualified Production Activities Income. The Treatment Group (Control Group)
is defined as firms within industries in which more than (less than) 40% of income is derived from
Qualified Production Activities. The treatment years are years 2005-2012 as the DPAD increases
from 0 to 3 to 6 to 9% in 2005, 2007, and 2010. The averages plotted here are derived through the
following procedure: cross-sectional regression of investment percent on controls for tax depreciation
allowances, cash flows, and financial constraint are run in each year. Residual group means for the
treatment and control group are then calculated and added to the mean investment percent for each
year. Finally, group means in year 2002 are subtracted from all observations and the overall mean
investment percentage in added to ease the comparison of trends. All means are count weighted.
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3.6.2 Baseline Regression Analysis and Policy Magnitude
Table 3.4 presents the baseline regression analysis. Across all specifications, the
coefficient on DPAD is positive and statistically different from zero with at least 95%
certainty. The precision and magnitude of the coefficient estimate increase when other
determinants of investment behavior are added to the regression, when the analysis
is limited to firms with December fiscal year ends, and when the analysis is restricted
to years prior to the 2008 and 2009 recession.
The policy variable is scaled such that the DPAD coefficient may be interpreted
as the increase in investment percent resulting from an increase in the deduction
from 0 to 9% for a firm with 100% of income eligible for the deduction. Specification
(1) regresses investment percent on only DPAD and firm and year fixed effects.
Specification (2) includes controls for investment tax incentives, financial constraint,
investment opportunities, and cash flow as well as firm and year fixed effects. The
DPAD coefficient in (2) is equal to 0.141 and statistically significant at the 1% level,
meaning that the full implementation of the policy increases investment percent by
0.141 for a firm 100% of income derived from qualified production activities. Given
the mean investment percent is 0.450, the full implementation of the policy increases
investment percent by 31.3% if all income is derived from domestic production. The
magnitude of the investment response to the policy is lower for the firm with the
average QPAI%. In the Compustat sample, on average, firms only derive 38.7% of
their income from qualified production activities. Thus, a firm that claims 38.7% of
income as qualified increases investment percent by 0.055 or 12.113% in response to
the full implementation of the DPAD.
The investment response to the policy may also be interpreted as an elasticity
of investment percent with respect to the DPAD adjusted corporate tax rate, τ(1 −
ρd). The full implementation of the policy decreases a firm’s corporate statutory tax
rate by 9% and increases investment percent by 31.3% resulting in an elasticity of
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investment percent to corporate income tax rate of 3.47.14 This elasticity is large
relative to studies focusing on the investment impact of the bonus depreciation Desai
and Goolsbee (2004), Edgerton (2010). However, the magnitude is unsurprising given
arguments by Neubig (2006), Edgerton (2012), and Ohrn (2014) which assert that
the accounting treatment of bonus depreciation undermines its effectiveness as an
investment stimulus tool.15 Additionally, this elasticity may be interpreted as a short
run response. If there is some optimal concave time path of additional investment
in response to the introduction of the policy then this estimate may be capturing a
large initial increase in investment.
Specifications (3) and (4) limit the (1) and (2) analysis to firms with December
fiscal years. For firms with December fiscal year ends, the introduction and subse-
quent increases in the policy line up with the start of their fiscal years thus providing
a cleaner test of the effects of the policy. The magnitude of the DPAD coefficient es-
timated in specification (4) is larger than in specification (2), providing some evidence
that noisiness in the data is introduced when fiscal year and the implementation of
policy do not align.
14The elasticity of investment with respect to the net of tax rate, 1 − τ(1 − ρd), is 6.52 and
comparable to net of tax elasticity of 7.2 of investment to bonus depreciation reported by Zwick and
Mahon (2014).
15Because the DPAD affects both accounting earnings and cash flows equivalently, the response
should be and is empirically larger.
150
Table 3.4: Baseline DPAD Investment Response
Dependent Variable: Investment Percent
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DPAD 0.099** 0.141*** 0.162** 0.191*** 0.262***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.068) (0.068) (0.096)
Z Tax Term 0.067*** 0.127*** -0.036
(0.024) (0.034) (0.056)
HP Index -0.170*** -0.159*** -0.310***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.026)
Marg Q -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash Flow -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Dec. Fiscal Year End X X
Prior to 2008 X
Adj. R-Square 0.009 0.114 0.010 0.115 0.149
Firms 11,189 11,189 7,873 7,873 9,588
Firm x Years 72,341 72,341 49,338 49,338 44,532
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1




In specifications (2), (4), and (5), controls for bonus depreciation, financial distress, marginal Q, and
cash flows are included. In specifications (3) and (4), the analysis is limited to firms with December
fiscal year ends. Specification (5) is limited to years prior to 2008. All specifications include firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Specification (5) limits the analysis to years prior to 2008. In the restricted time
domain, the investment response to the DPAD is larger. This finding is consistent
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with both larger short-run responses and perhaps a general lack of financing in 2008
and 2009 preventing firms from investment regardless of whether they were “treated”
to a drop in their effective corporate income tax rate.
Table 3.5 repeats the preferred specificaiton (2) from Table 3.4 but includes sector-
by-year fixed effects, sector linear time trends, and quadratic time trends in specifica-
tions (1), (2), and (3) respectively. Fixed effects and trends are included in order to
be sure that trends in one sector versus another (such as trends in the manufacturing
sector versus trends in information sector) are not driving the main empirical results.
When sector controls are included, the estimates of the DPAD coefficient are large
and postive suggesting that the policy is effective at stimulating investment within
sector and is not driven by sector level trends in investment behavior.16
16A large majority of Compustat firms are located in the manufacturing sector.
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Table 3.5: Investment Analysis with Sector FE and Trends
Dependent Variable: Investment Percent
Specification (1) (2) (3)
DPAD 0.551*** 0.509*** 0.503***
(0.125) (0.112) (0.113)
Sector x Year FE X
Sector Linear Time Trends X
Sector Quadratic Time Trends X
Adj. R-Square 0.120 0.126 0.126
Firms 10,936 10,267 10,267
Firm x Years 70,746 60,154 60,154
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1




All specifications include firm and year fixed effects and controls for bonus depreciation,
financial distress, marginal Q, and cash flows. Specification (1) includes Sector x Year Fixed
Effects. Specification (2) includes sector specific linear trends. Specification (3) includes
sector specific quadratic time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at
5%, and * at 10%.
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To summarize the findings of Section 3.6, there is strong support for Hypothesis
1; firms that derive a large portion of income from domestic manufacturing activi-
ties and thus may deduct a large percentage of profits from taxable income via the
DPAD are more responsive to the policy than firms that are not significant domestic
producers. Overall, the DPAD has a strong and positive effect on investment that
most affects precisely the target of the policy – domestic manufacturers.
The robustness of this finding is strengthened by three additional results: (1)
the response is stronger among firms whose financial data is recorded to align with
the implementation of the policy suggesting that the mean investment response is
downward biased via minor measurement error, (2) the response is sharper among
firms that operate exclusively within the borders of the US suggesting foreign firms
which record investment in foreign operations and US operations together are also
undermining the baseline estimate of the policy’s effect, and (3) the effect of the
policy is strong and positive even in the presence of sector level fixed effects and thus
the primary findings are not driven by any sector trends.
While the empirical findings strongly support Hypothesis 1, the empirical ev-
idence is less clear in regard to the heterogeneity hypotheses, Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3. The empirical analysis continues by exploring investment responses
to the DPAD according to level of financial constraint and tax status. In a man-
ner similar to the baseline analysis, graphical analysis is presented first, followed by
regression results.
3.7 Investment Response Heterogeneity
3.7.1 Heterogeneity Graphical Analysis
Figure 3.5 repeats the methods used to create Figure 3.4 (described in Subsection
3.6.1) separately for four groups of firms. Panel (A) focuses the analysis on firms
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that have below median level of averaged financial constraint during the years prior
to DPAD implementation in 2005.17 In contrast, Panel (B) examines firms with
above median level of averaged financial constraint prior to 2005. The investment
response of the unconstrained firms to the policy can be said to be at best lukewarm.
In years 2005 through 2009, there seems to be very little difference between the
behaviors of the high and low QPAI firms (the treatment and control groups). The
difference between the treatment and control groups does increase in years 2010-
2012, once the policy is fully implemented. In contrast, the investment behaviors
of the financially constrained treatment and control groups diverge sharply upon
implementation of the policy. This divergence is large and evident in all years prior
to 2012. The graphical evidence provides clear support for Hypothesis 2; financially
constrained firms seem to be much more responsive to the DPAD policy. The slack
in the borrowing constraint created by the policy seems, at least from the graphical
analysis presented in Figure 3.5, to be a significant driver of investment response to the
DPAD. Additional discussion of the effect of the policy on the borrowing constraint
is postponed until regression results are presented in Subsection 3.7.2.
The graphical DD analysis is applied to Taxable and Non Taxable firms in panels
(C) and (D). The definition of Taxable used in the graphical analysis is whether the
firms had positive taxable income in more than 3/4 of years prior to the implemen-
tation of the DPAD.18 The definition of Non Taxable is firms which reported positive
taxable income in fewer than 1/4 of years prior to policy implementation. As in the
financial constraint graphical analysis, the heterogeneity across firms is an ex-ante
description of firm characteristics in an effort the avoid endogeneity concerns; for
17The difference in the investment divergence between treatment and control groups across the two
panels may be interpreted as a triple differenced estimation strategy. Put differently, the difference
between the DD results in Panels (A) and (B) reveals heterogeneous response among financial
constrained and unconstrained firms.
18For most firms, tax status is available for years 2001 - 2004. Firms have fewer than 4 observations
prior to policy implementation only if the firms was added to the Compustat database after 2001 or
if data needed to derive the taxable income variable was missing.
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example, firms with high QPAI % that are more responsive to the policy may be
more likely to be Non Taxable after the DPAD is enacted because their investment
expenditure significantly decreases taxable income levels.
Both Taxable and Non Taxable treatment groups increase investment relative to
the control groups suggesting the investment response to the policy is positive regard-
less of ex-ante tax status. Interestingly, the investment divergence is larger for the
Non Taxable firms in years 2005 to 2008. If current tax status is strongly correlated
with future tax status, then this result lies in direct opposition to Hypothesis 3
– those firms that are less likely to be taxable once the policy is implemented and
therefore less likely to benefit from the policy are most responsive to it.
There are however, several other plausible scenarios under which these graphical
findings either do not conflict with the tax status hypothesis or may, in fact, support
the hypothesis. Under tax status mean reversion, the firms that are currently non-
taxable may be more likely to be taxable in the future. This assumption could be born
of lumpy investment behavior, those firms making large investments now could have
low taxable income but plan to reap higher future profits. In this case, Non Taxable
firms now are Taxable in the future and are likely to benefit from the deduction
thereby explaining the relatively strong investment response among the Non Taxable
group. Alternatively, current Tax Status may contain no information about future
Tax Status. Under this assumption, the graphical results are not surprising.
Finally, taxable income may not be directly tied to corporate profits. Firms that
report low or zero taxable income may be using tax shields such as debt to actively
lower taxable income. Under this interpretation, the firms reporting tax losses in a
majority of years prior to 2005 are those firms most actively pursuing tax minimizing
strategies. These tax minimizers may be precisely those firms that expend resources to
optimally respond to tax incentives. This reasoning would suggest that tax minimizers
may increase investment most in response to the DPAD.
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Figure 3.5: Heterogeneous Investment Response Graphical
Diff-in-Diff
(a) Unconstrained Firms (b) Constrained Firms
(c) Taxable (d) Non Taxable
Notes: Figure 3.5 plots the mean investment percent over time for groups sorted according to their industry-based
treatment intensity. The intensity of the treatment depends on the percentage of income that is eligible for the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction and therefore qualifies as Qualified Production Activities Income. The
Treatment Group (Control Group) is defined as firms within industries in which more than (less than) 40% of income
is derived from Qualified Production Activities. The treatment years are years 2005-2012 as the DPAD increases from
0 to 3 to 6 to 9% in 2005, 2007, and 2010. The averages plotted here are derived through the following procedure:
cross-sectional regression of investment percent on controls for tax depreciation allowances, cash flows, and financial
constraint are run in each year. Residual group means for the treatment and control group are then calculated and
added to the mean investment percent for each year. Finally, group means in year 2002 are subtracted from all
observations and the overall mean investment percentage in added to ease the comparison of trends. Unconstrained
firms have less than median level average HP Index during years prior to 2005. Taxable (Non Taxable) firms are those
with taxable income in at least (less than) half of the years prior to 2005. All means are count weighted.
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3.7.2 Heterogeneity Regression Analysis
The heterogeneity graphical findings are echoed by the regression analysis pre-
sented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3.6 presents the
baseline regression of Investment Percent on DPAD separately for firms with below
median and above median ex ante financial constraint. Both sets of firms respond
positively to the DPAD. From Specification (1), a 100% QPAI firm that is less fi-
nancially constrained increases Investment Percent by 0.058 or 12.8% in response to
full implementation of the policy. Whereas, from Specification (2), a 100% QPAI
firm that is more financially constrained increases Investment Percent by 0.223 or
nearly 50%. This divergence in responses between the more and less constrained
firms suggests that the financial slack created by the policy plays an important role
in investment behavior. If borrowing constraints matter for investment response then
external financing must be costly suggesting a world in which information asymme-
tries and principal-agent problems are prevalent. Furthermore, the findings reiterates
the sentiment of recent research suggesting that financial constraint actually amplifies
the effect of investment stimulus policies.
While the magnitude of the difference in these responses is large, the difference
between these point estimates is not statistically different from zero at even the 10%
level. The statistical imprecision of the estimates may be due to a limited sample
size, a weak relationship between ex ante measures of financial constraint and financial
constraint upon DPAD implementation, or median sample split being sub-optimal in
this context. While the first concern cannot be addressed without access to better
data, the latter two concerns are addressed in Specifications (3)–(6) of Table 3.6.
Specifications (3) and (4) limit analysis to years prior to 2008 when ex ante financial
constraint data are better predictors of financial constraint during implementation.
Following this logic, the difference in investment response between constrained and
unconstrained firms is large and statistically significant. In years 2005-2007, all of
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the response to the DPAD policy was driven by financially constrained firms.
Specifications (5) and (6) limit the DPAD analysis to firms below the 80th per-
centile of ex ante financial constraint and above 80th percentile of financial constraint.
The sample split is moved to isolate the top end of the distribution of financially con-
strained firms. Compustat firms are generally very large and well established, thus
facing little financial constraint on average. Thus, only a small subset of Compustat
firms may face hard budget constraints and be affected by additional financing slack
generated by the DPAD. This sample split generates extreme response heterogeneity.
The investment behavior of firms that are not financially constrained is not statisti-
cally different from zero. On the other hand, the average firms (in terms of QPAI%)
increases investment percent in response to the policy by 42%. The different in invest-
ment response between these groups of firms is statistically different from zero at the
10% level. Overall, the graphical and regression evidence supports the Hypothesis
2 prediction that financially constrained firms are more responsive to the DPAD.
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Table 3.6: Investment Response and Financial Constraint
Dep. Variable: Investment Percent
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HP Index Split <Medan >=Median <Median >=Median >80% >=80%
DPAD 0.058* 0.223* -0.032 0.466** 0.063 0.545**
(0.030) (0.114) (0.052) (0.204) (0.040) (0.258)
Equality Test P = 0.160 P = 0.018** P= 0.064*
Prior to 2008 X X
Adj. R-Square 0.016 0.124 0.011 0.154 0.030 0.159
Firms 3,782 4,763 3,743 4,743 6,518 2,027
Firm x Years 31,296 31,294 20,531 22,141 50,080 12,510
Notes: All specifications present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1




All specifications include controls for bonus depreciation, marginal Q, and cash flows. Specifications
(1) and (3) limit the analysis to firms with below median levels of financial constraint as measured
by the HP Index. Specifications (2) and (4) limit the analysis to firms with above median levels of
financial constraint. Specifications (5) and (6) limits analysis to firms with above and below the 80th
percentile of financial constraint respectively. Specifications (3) and (4) limits the analysis to years
prior to 2008. The equality test measures whether the DPAD coefficient is equal in specifications
(1) and (2), (3) and (4), and (5) and (6); P-values are presented. All specifications include firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
As with the financial constraint analysis, regressions focused on Tax Status het-
erogeneity echo graphical results. Specifications (1) and (2) split the sample in the
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same way as the graphical analysis. The Taxable firms analyzed in Specification (1)
of Table 3.7, those with fewer than 2 years of tax losses in years prior to 2005, are
positively responsive to the policy with a DPAD coefficient of 0.118. The DPAD
coefficient for Non Taxable firms, presented in Specification (2), is larger but not sta-
tistically different from zero, perhaps owing to a smaller sample of firms that were not
taxable for more than 2 years during years prior to 2005. The behavior of one group
cannot with any confidence be said to be different than that of the other. Again,
several plausible explanations are possible to reconcile this finding with Hypothesis
3. These include mean reversion of tax status, minimal relation between current and
future taxable status, and tax loss as a signal of general responsiveness of corporate
behavior to tax policy. Additionally, as noted by Edgerton (2010), “one cannot rule
out, however, the possibility that difficulties in measuring firms ’ taxable status drive
the relative unimportance of taxable status observed in the Compustata data.”
Specifications (3) and (4) split the sample based on whether firms always (3)
or never (4) have taxable income in years prior to 2005. Again, the difference in
behavior between the two groups is not statistically different from zero. If anything,
the patterns seem to suggest that firms that never have taxable income in years 2001-
2005 are more responsive to the policy. This finding may gently push support towards
tax reversion or tax avoidance explanations.
Specifications (5) and (6) use estimated marginal tax rates to split the analysis
instead of taxable income measures. The analysis is split at the median average MTR
during years 2001 to 2005. The results are strikingly similar to the alternative tax
loss splits. Firms with below median ex ante MTRs seem to be more responsive
to the DPAD. The difference in behaviors is again not statistically different from
zero. The results presented in Table 3.7 are robust to many different sample splits
both on ex-ante measures of taxable income and MTR – firms that are currently less
profitable and thereby have lower measures of taxable income and MTR seem to be
161
more responsive to the DPAD in terms of point estimates. The difference in behaviors
between the two groups are never statistically different from zero.
While the graphical and regression analyses provide strong support for the pre-
diction of heterogeneous response based on financial constraint, the analyses do not
provide strong empirical support for Hypothesis 3. Both of these findings speak
to the progressivity of the DPAD policy. Theory predicted the DPAD to provide
more benefit to firms that were financially constrained but profitable and therefore
taxable. While the first prediction was progressive in that it benefits the firms that
need financing the most, the second prediction was regressive in that it benefited most
those firm with high measures of taxable income. Empirically, however, investment
response is concentrated only based on financial constraint not tax status, a finding
that supports only the progressive theoretical prediction.
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Table 3.7: Investment Response and Tax Status
Dep. Variable: Investment Percent
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Loss Split <2 Yr >2 Yr Taxable Tax Loss
MTR Split >21% <=21%
DPAD 0.118* 0.152 0.073 0.291 0.054 0.207*
(0.062) (0.120) (0.075) (0.268) (0.042) (0.124)
Equality Test P = 0.802 P = 0.433 P= 0.245
Adj. R-Square 0.109 0.141 0.125 0.110 0.013 0.159
Firms 4,148 3,050 3,376 1,162 2,692 3,600
Firm x Years 31,379 20,526 24,596 6,529 22,533 23,063
Notes: All specifications present coefficients from regressions of the form
Iit
Ki,t−1




All specifications include controls for bonus depreciation, marginal Q, and cash flows. Specifications
(1) and (2) split the sample based on whether the firm is taxable in fewer than 2 or more than 2
years during the period 2002-2004. Specifications (3) and 42) split the sample based on whether the
firm is taxable in all years or no years during the period 2002-2004. Specifications (5) and (6) limit
the analysis to firms with above/below median average MTRs during years 2001-2004. The equality
test measures whether the DPAD coefficient is equal in specifications (1) and (2), (3) and (4), and
(5) and (6); P-values are presented. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical
significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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3.8 Conclusions and Future Directions
The conclusions of this research, while exciting in their own right, are most enlight-
ening when compared to the behavioral impacts of other recently enacted corporate
tax incentives. In particular, the effects of the DPAD may be readily compared to
responses to the Bush Tax Cuts (as studied by Chetty and Saez (2005) and Ya-
gan (2013)) and to responses to Bonus Depreciation (as studied by Edgerton (2010),
Zwick and Mahon (2014), and Ohrn (2014)). In doing so, one can draw more general
conclusions about the impact of reductions in corporate income tax rates (DPAD)
to reduction in capital gains and dividend tax rates (Bush Tax Cuts) to investment
incentives (Bonus Depreciation).
3.8.1 Comparing the DPAD and the Bush Tax Cuts
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of 2003 reduced the top tax rate on dividend
income in the US from 38.6% to 15% and the top rate on capital gains from 20%
to 15%. These “Bush Tax Cuts” were predicted by President George W. Bush,
himself, to provide “near-term support to investment” and “capital to build factories,
to buy equipment, [and] hire more people.” In short, these tax cuts were sold to the
American people on the auspices that they would increase business investment, a key
driver of macro-level economic activity. The tax cuts, however, induced no increase
in investment and, in fact, led to an increase in total payouts to shareholders - a
behavior that could be considered essentially the opposite of corporate investment
(Yagan (2013)).
Where the Bush Tax Cuts failed to produce the desired investment response,
this research suggests the DPAD was remarkably successful. For the average listed
firm, the DPAD increased investment as a percentage of installed property plant and
equipment by 12.113%. If this result is generalized to the corporate income tax rate, a
1% reduction in the corporate income tax rate results in a more than a 3% increase in
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investment as a percentage of installed capital stock. The lesson to be taken from this
comparison is simple: if the government wishes to stimulate corporate investment and
is choosing between a reduction in taxation on payouts to shareholders or a reduction
in taxation on corporate profits, the income taxation lever is the superior tool.
From a theoretical point of view, this superiority result may be unsurprising de-
pending on one’s opinion regrading the marginal source of corporate finance. In
models where marginal investments are funded from retained earnings and riskless
debt as opposed to equity issuance and risky debt (King (1977), Auerbach (1979),
Bradford (1981)), decreases in the corporate income tax rate should increase invest-
ment behavior while decreases in dividend and capital gains taxation should have
no effect of investment – a result know as the dividend taxation neutrality. Alter-
natively, models in which firms finance investment though equity issuance and risky
debt would predict that both levers should positively impact business investment.
3.8.2 Comparing the DPAD and Bonus Depreciation
Bonus Depreciation, as discussed in Section 3.4, is a business investment stimu-
lus policy that has been used off and on and in varying intensities since 2001. The
policy theoretically works to stimulate investment by accelerating the rate at which
investments may be depreciated and deducted from taxable income. This accelera-
tion decreases the present value price of new investment purchases.19 The effect of
the policy on Compustat firms who are responsible for the majority of US business
investment has been lukewarm at best. House and Shapiro (2008), Edgerton (2010),
and Ohrn (2014) all report that the policy is not as effective as theory would predict.
Ohrn (2014) reports that 100% bonus depreciation policy induces the average firm to
increase investment as a percentage of property, plant, and equipment by a mere 4.2%
19In order for Bonus Depreciation to be an effective investment stimulus, firms must positive
rates of return on investment or be financially constrained. Under these conditions, receiving tax
depreciation allowances today as opposed to in the future decreases the price of investment.
165
relative to statutory IRS depreciation rates. This estimated mean level investment
response cannot be statistically differentiated from a zero response. Again, in con-
trast to this investment stimulus policy option, this study finds the DPAD effectively
increases investment.
Several explanations may be offered for why the DPAD has succeeded where bonus
depreciation has been generally ineffective. In fact, Neubig (2006) offers seven rea-
sons that firms would prefer a corporate income tax rate cut to an acceleration of tax
deprecation allowances. The two most applicable to understanding the investment
stimulus effects of the two policies are: (1) Bonus depreciation offers only a timing
benefit that does not increase the financial statement earnings associated with any
given investment project. A drop in the corporate tax rate, on the other hand, of-
fers real tax savings and as a result a lower financial statement effective tax rate. (2)
Bonus depreciation only benefits tangible assets. A drop in the income tax rate incen-
tivizes investment in both tangible and intangible assets which may be complements
in the production process. Given this reasoning, its no wonder that the DPAD, which
effectively decreases the corporate income tax rate, is a more effective investment
stimulus policy than bonus depreciation.20
3.8.3 Future Work: the DPAD, Corporate Profits, and
Corporate Payouts
While this research has presented strong evidence that the DPAD effectively in-
creased investment among domestic producers, there is much more work to be done
regarding this policy. Does the DPAD induce multinational firms to relocate pro-
duction activities to the United States? Do firms increase their taxable income in
20While Bonus Depreciation may be a poor investment stimulus tool, its cost at least from a
government budget perspective is zero. Government budgets do not use discounting in constructing
their outlays. Thus, allowing firms to deduct new investment from taxable income now as opposed
to in two or three years costs the same from a budgeting perspective. This budgeting nuance may
explain why the Bonus Depreciation was extended several times even after exhaustive research efforts
both by academics and government agencies concluded the policy was ineffective.
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response to the policy? Do firms increase dividends and share repurchases in re-
sponse to the policy? Do firms hire more workers or increase wages as a result of
the policy? The exogenous variation in QPAI % used in this study may be combined
with data from the BEA Survey of Foreign Direct Investment, IRS Corporate Income
Tax Returns, and the Longitudinal Employer–Household Dynamics to answer these
important questions.
Until these question are answered, at the very least, the DPAD seems to be the
investment stimulus tool that policymakers have been trying to find. In contrast
to other ineffective federal tax policies, firms increase investment in response to the
DPAD. The DPAD is especially effective for the ideal policy target, firms that are
domestic manufacturers and are financially constrained.
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3.9 Appendces
3.9.1 Data Definitions from
IRS “Corporate Returns - Explanation of Terms”
Income Subject to Tax: This was generally the amount of income subject to tax
at the corporate level. For most corporations, income subject to tax consisted of net
income minus the “Statutory Special Deductions” described in this section. However,
there were certain exceptions. S corporations were usually not taxable at the corpo-
rate level and so did not have income subject to tax. Some, however, had a limited tax
liability on capital gains and so were included in the statistics for this item. Likewise,
regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts generally passed
their net income on to be taxed at the shareholder level; but any taxable amounts
not distributed were included in income subject to tax. Because insurance companies
were permitted to use reserve accounting for tax purposes, insurance income subject
to tax was based on changes in reserve accounts; life insurance companies could also
have been allowed an additional special deduction (discussed in Statutory Special
Deductions). Consolidated returns that contain life insurance subsidiaries were not
allowed to offset all of the life insurance subsidiarys gains by losses from nonlife com-
panies, so it was possible for such a consolidated return to show no net income but
still have a positive amount of income subject to tax.
Statutory Special Deductions: Statutory special deductions in the tables was
the sum of the deductions for net operating loss carryovers from prior years and the
special deductions for dividends and other corporate attributes allowed by the Code.
These deductions were in addition to ordinary and necessary business deductions
and were shown in the statistics as deductions from net income. In general, net
income less statutory special deductions equaled income subject to tax. The following
components of Statutory Special Deductions are shown separately in Table 20.
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Domestic Production Deduction: The Domestic Production Deduction (DPD)
was added as part of the American Jobs Creation Act and is available for Tax Years
beginning after December 31, 2004. By keeping manufacturing and software develop-
ment activities in the United States, exporters may claim a deduction for a percent
of their income from qualified exports. The provision, which can be found under code
section 199, was largely written to satisfy WTO objections to Extraterritorial Income
(ETI) and Foreign Sales Corporation provisions. The credit is figured on Form 8903.
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3.9.2 Investment Control Variables
• Marg Q
Marginal Q or Tobin’s Q is the marginal value of an additional dollar of in-
vestment. Marg Q is empirically measured as the ratio of the market value of
equity plus the book value of liabilities excluding deferred taxes, divided by the
book value of assets,
Qt =
prcct × cshot + att − ceqt + txdbt
att
,
Where prcc is the price of outstanding shares, csho is the number of outstanding
shares, at is total assets, ceq is outstanding equity and txdbt is the differed tax
liabilities.
• Cash Flow
The measure of cash flow is constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997).





This ratio is the income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amor-
tization, scaled by the capital stock at the beginning of the year.
• HP Index
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) propose a measure of financial constraint based on
firm size and age.
HP Index = −0.737 ∗ size + 0.043 ∗ size2 − 0.04 ∗ age
where size = min{assets in 2004 dollars, $4.5 billion} and age = min{age, 37}.
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3.9.3 Log Capx Investment Analysis
Table 3.8: Log CapX Investment Analysis
Dependent Variable: Log Investment
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DPAD 0.146* 0.303*** 0.232** 0.388*** 0.012
(0.081) (0.063) (0.100) (0.078) (0.092)
Z Tax Term -0.079*** -0.109** -0.037
(0.030) (0.044) (0.054)
HP Index -1.279*** -1.274*** -1.254***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024)
Marg Q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cash Flow -0.000 -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dec. Fiscal Year X X
Prior to 2008 X
Adj. R-Square 0.062 0.305 0.071 0.307 0.286
Firms 12,302 12,302 8,850 8,850 10,480
Firm x Years 77,536 77,536 54,150 54,150 46,998
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present coefficients from regressions of the form




In specifications (2), (4), and (5), controls for bonus depreciation, financial distress, marginal Q, and
cash flows are included. In specifications (3) and (4), the analysis is limited to firms with December
fiscal year ends. Specification (5) is limited to years prior to 2008. All specifications include firm and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
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3.9.4 Investment Analysis with Alternative Controls
Table 3.9: Investment Analysis with Alternative Controls
Dependent Variable: Investment % Log Capx
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
DPAD 0.064 0.115* 0.090 0.193**
(0.048) (0.066) (0.071) (0.087)
Dec. Fiscal Year End X X
Adj. R-Square 0.018 0.021 0.096 0.101
Firms 10,480 7,463 13,211 9,644
Firm x Years 67,336 46,346 89,107 62,811
Notes: Specifications (1) through (4) present coefficients from regressions of the form




All specifications include firm and year fixed effects, the Z Tax Term and ten piece linear
splines in assets, sales, profit margin, and firm age. Specification (1) includes Sector x Year
Fixed Effects. In specifications (1) and (2), the dependent investment variable is Capital
Expenditure scaled by lagged Property, Plant, and Equipment. In specifications (3) and (4)
the dependent investment variable is the log of Capital Expenditure. Specifications (2) and
(4) limit the analysis to firms with December fiscal year ends. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
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